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NEW FATAH STAFF MEMBERS DENOUNC. PEACE MOVES, FLEX MUSCLES

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 12 Jun 60 p 10

[Article by Salih Qallab: "Two Members of the FATAH Movement's New Central Committee Talk to AL-SAFIR"]

/Text/ Opinions unanimously stress the importance which characterized the fourth conference of the Palestine National Liberation Movement, FATAH. Some people even described it as one of the most important Arab conferences held in the past 10 years.

The importance of the FATAH conference lies not just in the progressive political program it brought forth or in the delicate circumstances in which it was held, but rather, primarily, in the democratic climate which dominated its discussions and the boldness which the members showed in holding the leaders accountable for their actions in the years dividing the third and fourth conferences.

Because of the importance in which the conference was steeped, especially after the emergence of its conclusions and the revelation of the nature of the interventions which dominated it, we considered it appropriate to direct specific questions to all new members of the Central Committee-- Hani al-Hasan, Majid Abu Sharar, Rafiq al-Natshah, Samih /Abu/Kuwayk (Qadri), and Sa'd Sayil (Abu al-Walid), in order to round out the picture.

Since travel circumstances prevented a meeting with Hani Hasan and Rafiq al-Natshah, and Majid Abu Sharar excused himself from responding, emphasizing that what Qadri said would represent his views, we posed the following questions to both Qadri and Abu-al-Walid:

The FATAH conference has been described as one of the most important Arab conferences to be held in the area for a number of years; why this importance?

Following the announcement of the new political program, questions have been raised. Is the movement which is FATAH a political party, a front, or a national coalition?

The program contains sections which stipulate the total liberation of Palestine, the liquidation of the Zionist entity, and the rejection of settlement in all its forms. Does this mean that FATAH has abandoned the flexible platform which it had relied on in previous years?

Questions have been raised over the stipulation which holds that the resolutions of the national congresses are a supplementary part of the political program. What are the facts about the formula which the conference has approved?

The program has reviewed the relationship between the resistance and Jordan in order to restore it as a concentration base for the revolution. Do you not believe that this decision will affect your relations with the Jordanian government, bearing in mind that you have elected two Jordanian personalities to your Revolutionary Council?

Talk about the European initiative reached its climax on the eve of the convening of the conference. In the light of the discussions which took place, what is the extent of this initiative, and have you decided on the formula through which you will deal with the European movement?

The National Congress is supposed to meet soon. To what extent can the conclusions of the FATAH conference influence it?

The FATAH conference was held while the occupied territories were dominated by a fierce popular uprising. In the light of your resolutions, what is the extent of the repercussions you anticipate in the context of the occupied territories?

The conference addressed itself to the situation in Lebanon, especially as regards the settlement and the Israeli aggressions. Do you anticipate a new Palestinian strategy toward these matters?

The Answers of Sa'd Sayil (Abu al-Walid)

These are Gen Sa'd Sayil (Abu al-Walid's) answers to the questions:

1. The importance of the fourth conference of the FATAH movement arises first from the circumstances in which the conference was held. It met at the peak of the challenge to the Camp David plot, after a stage in which doubts had been seeping into people's spirits to the effect that Arab power was deficient in facing this imminent danger.

In the spirit dominating it and the nature of the dialogue which permeated it, and the results issued by it, especially the program, the FATAH conference stressed to our Arab nation and our Palestinian people that the resources for persevering exist among this people and that the will to fight exists and is growing.

Here I would like to point out that the democratic spirit which prevailed was the basic distinguishing feature of the conference. I heard Arab commentators say that had the democratic atmosphere and the air of bluntness and boldness which prevailed in the FATAH movement conference been present in our Arab region, our nation would now be a thousand times better off. Another indication which must be presented, to emphasize the nature of the will the conference expressed, is that the terrorist Menachem Begin went to European countries after the resolutions had been issued, asked them to read the political program of the FATAH movement in addition to the Liberation Organization charter, and compared these two documents to Hitler's "Mein Kampf".

Therefore I say once again that the conference resolutions came as a true expression of the ambitions and aspirations of our Arab nation and our Palestinian people.

A National Liberation Movement

2. The FATAH movement is not a party, front or national coalition; it is a national liberation movement and its members are young men who believe in liberating their country. They are united by common goals in spite of their different political backgrounds. Some of them belonged to national internationalist parties and the FATAH movement fused these powers. They believe in united principles and united goals and methods of struggle.

However, this does not mean that differences in views do not exist within the movement. To the contrary--one of the good distinguishing features of the FATAH movement is the fact that people of different opinions struggle within it, but within the framework of unity. We are struggling intellectually for the sake of what is best, and the fourth conference of the FATAH movement has proved the validity of what I am saying, since people of different viewpoints struggled within the context of an intense adherence to organizational unity. We produced this political program, which we consider a model of maturity and precise understanding of the conditions surrounding our cause.

3 and 4. I will answer this and the following question, stressing that the political program which the conference approved absolutely did not clash with the resolutions of the Palestinian National Congress, especially as regards approval of the policy of stages on the road toward achievement of our third strategic goal.

5. I do not believe that the conference's resolution in this regard will damage our relations with Jordan because for Jordan to go back to being a concentration base for the revolution will not just be a gain for the Palestinian revolution--it will also be a gain for the entire Arab nation, and Jordan is part of this Arab nation.

I stress that the dialogue now underway between us and Jordanian officials is aimed at reaching this end and we are aware of the extent of the difficulties and obstacles preventing the realization of this issue. We are aware that turning Jordan into a concentration base for the revolution will require a long time and will require a favorable element, that is, the attainment of a form of Arab integration.

In this regard I believe that the Perseverance and Steadfastness Front can be the nucleus for the desired Arab integration. Here I am not letting out any secrets when I say that the Perseverance and Steadfastness Front is intending to crystallize its resolutions in a practical form in order to give true content to steadfastness.

As regards the choice of two Jordanians for membership in our Revolutionary Council, I state that membership in the FATAH movement is open to all Arabs who believe in its principles and is also open to friends who are not Arabs. I do not believe that this matter prejudices our relations with any Arab country. We believe that the liberation of Palestine is a national mission and that every Arab fighting man has the right to choose the Palestinian revolution and take part in the accomplishment of this mission.

No European Initiative

6. Our conference stressed, and I stress again here, that there is no truth to what is being said about a European initiative. The issue on this level does not transcend the fact that some European countries have started to develop a better understanding of the Palestinian people's cause than before.

We, in our front, welcome all positive processes in understanding our cause. We are able to distinguish between good and evil; therefore, we extend our hand to everyone who wants to support our cause.

As regards the conference's opinion in this sphere, it has given the leaders the freedom to move, but in accordance with its resolutions.

The Priority of National Unity

7. I am certain that the political program of the FATAH movement enjoys the approval and appreciation of the remaining detachments of the Palestinian resistance. Therefore the discussion in the coming National Congress will be focussed on asserting former positions, especially the political program which the National Congress approved at its 14th session.

In this regard, it is certain that the issue of national unity will take priority. Therefore, I expect that all detachments of the Executive Committee of the Liberation Organization will participate, and our fourth congress underlined this matter.

Important Resolutions To Support The Perseverance In The Occupied Territories

8. It is natural that our conference should address itself to the plight of the occupied territories and give it basic attention, as we consider our masses inside /the areas/ to be the main instrument of our revolution, because it is these masses which are standing in the front line and are clashing with the enemy at every instant.

We Bless the Reconciliation Steps

The congress adopted resolutions of great importance to support the perseverance of our people in the occupied territories and resist the Zionist schemes and policy of perpetrating mass murders to drive our nation apart and compel the members of our people to emigrate and abandon the land.

The YAFAT conference stood with wonderment and esteem before obstinate Palestinian adherence to the land and the nation and Palestinian solidarity with the Liberation Organization as the people's sole legitimate representative.

It has become widely known that the Palestinian revolution has been exposed to an imperialist conspiracy in Lebanon and it is being said that the people hatching this plot have found some Lebanese forces which have offered themselves as an instrument to carry out this plot, prompting the Palestinian revolution to enter into a defensive war for two consecutive years to protect its rear.

Here I stress that the Palestinian revolution has emerged from this war firmer and stronger, prompting Israel to intervene blatantly to weaken it, whereas previously it had /just/ been supporting conspiring forces and supplying them with weapons and other resources.

The 6-days' war of 1978 stressed that the conspiring forces had failed to weaken the Palestinian revolution through conspiring forces and puppets. However, the Palestinian revolution also emerged from this war triumphant and stronger than it had been, which underlines the fact that for the first time in the history of the Arab-Zionist struggle Israel demanded a cease fire through the United Nations.

Here I will point out that our conference took a stand in the face of these issues and studied them carefully on the premise that the perseverance of the Palestinian resistance has awakened the Arab conscience and has brought our nation out of the realm of wretchedness and fear in which it had been engulfed after the Camp David agreements.

Our conference addressed itself to the domestic situation in Lebanon in the light of the fact that the situation prevailing in Lebanon before the

outbreak of war in 1975 was characterized by the fact that the majority of the Lebanese people felt oppressed.

This majority got in movement, under the leadership of the national and domestic movement, to eliminate the causes of the oppression, as well as to defend the Palestinian revolution in the face of the conspiracy which had started to be carried out against it.

Therefore, the Palestinian revolution's support of the national forces in their struggle was a foregone conclusion. In essence, the national movement stood alongside the Palestinian revolution and offered it support with its blood and lives. Now, in the midst of the talk about the national reconciliation in Lebanon and the efforts being made, I, proceeding from the premise of intense concern for the necessity to make these efforts succeed, consider that justice and equality must exist for all the people of Lebanon.

We in the Palestinian revolution bless all steps toward reconciliation because we are on the side of Lebanon's higher interests and the unity of its people. We hope that all parties will arrive at the desired solution, in spite of the great difficulties and obstacles which stand in its way.

In order to be clearer, we state that the greatest obstacle facing the reconciliation is the enemy's occupation of part of Lebanon's territory under Sa'd Haddad's banner.

Opinions are split and parties differ on this subject. Some Lebanese forces still are linked to Israel, are betting on it and are still standing alongside and supporting Sa'd Haddad.

As regards the settlement issue, I can also stress that puppet forces and forces connected with Israel are the ones which are raising it and it is they in fact who are pushing in the direction of settlement, because those who do not want settlement must provide all the conditions for the Palestinian people to regain their nation, Palestine.

It has become well known, to everyone who wants to be convinced of the fact, that the Camp David agreements are exactly a form of settlement and that the Palestinian revolution is struggling ferociously and forcefully against settlement and an alternate nation.

Therefore, I state once again that all Lebanese forces which reject settlement actually must take the Palestinian revolution by the hand in facing these kinds of plots and plans.

Contenting oneself with repeating slogans which the Zionist enemy sets out I consider to be treason against Lebanon first and Palestine second, and the hopes of the Arab nation third.

The Answers of Samih Abu Kuwayk (Qadiri)

Samih Abu Kuwayk (Qadiri) answered the questions, in order, in the following manner:

1. The interest in the PFLP movement's fourth conference is in keeping with the increasing importance of the Palestinian revolution, of which our movement constitutes the backbone and which expresses the magnitude of the Palestinian cause at the heart of the Middle East issue which is pressing on the nerves of the world.

There is no doubt that this importance has increased in the light of the extremism in which the conference was held, since the imperialist-Zionist onslaught has increased, with the objective of eliminating the Palestinian revolution. This is represented by increased Zionist aggression, supported by the American implements of war, against our revolution and our Palestinian-Lebanese masses in Lebanon, and by the increased forms of tyranny and repression of our masses in the occupied nation, which are accompanied by the efforts of imperialism and its instruments to drag the revolution into the zone of attraction of imperialism and make it fall into the trap of settlement.

It is clear that the magnitude of the democracy which dominated the conference, the clarity of the revolutionary maturity which the base of the movement enjoys, people's boldness in placing their fingers on all the pains and the negative aspects of the journey and their ability to join together and develop positive aspects, helps to increase the interest in the conference and the resolutions it adopted.

The Ally and the Enemy

2. I do not believe that these questions were raised by the issuance of the political program. They are questions which had been raised all the time and whose answers basically existed in our theoretical premises and our literature. The movement is a national independent revolutionary movement representing the revolutionary vanguard of the Palestinian people, and it is clear that the name of the movement, "the National Liberation Movement," indicates the nature around which the question revolves, since it is known that the national liberation stage means the concurrence of those who differ ideologically over the objective of a stage, which is liberation of the nation. However, if the question means the appearance of currents which have been given the description of leftist or rightist, I consider that this also is incorrect, because it is logical that viewpoints should differ in any revolutionary movement and be in confrontation within their organizational context. This becomes more logical in a movement like the PFLP movement.

There is no doubt that the result of confrontation among opinions will benefit efforts to arrive at the most valid decision, and therefore the issuance of the political program, summarizing what is appearing as clearly for

the first time in the FATH movement constituted the beginning of a rapprochement of views and the determination of the dimensions of the arena for the confrontation of views within the range allowed by the political program. Outside of that, it would be right-wing opportunism or left-wing opportunism.

Membership conditions in the movement require commitment to the political program, on the basis that it is the instrument for the political unity of the movement, which means that the political program most clearly expresses all the intellectual schools which put the Soviet Union and the United States of America into the same basket, now that it has been clearly determined that the Soviet Union is our strategic ally and that the United States stands at the forefront of the camp of our enemies.

The Only Means for Liberation

3. The stipulation regarding the liberation of Palestine and the liquidation of the Zionist entity exists as part of the basic premises of the movement and is its first objective, representing a continuation of the platform on whose basis the movement was formed. Therefore the political efforts the movement has exerted have been harmonious with the method which appears in the body of our theoretical premises, which stipulates that it is necessary to give prominence to the Palestinian personality, with its combative and revolutionary content in the international field. This is the meaning of the activity which governed the policy of the movement and which the conference placed in its firm framework when it underlined the confrontation of all solutions to liquidate and destroy it and the consolidation of Arab stands to confront and destroy the settlement in all its forms and titles.

The conference adhered to this policy issue, considering it the central link in its actions, in view of the fact that it was the basic issue reflected in the entire structure of organizational, intellectual and military activity. The same was true regarding the issue of national unity. This issue was spelled out, in the form in which it was approved, in a manner which dispelled the obscurity which had dominated the movement before the conference, and it ended all illusions which envisioned the possibility of liberation by any means except armed struggle. It stressed the need to redouble political efforts in various fields with the objective of winning friends and isolating the imperialist-Zionist enemy from the area, on grounds that the objective of that is to give prominence to the Palestinian personality.

An Accommodation Formula

4. It is well known that the FATAH command has been very involved in setting out the resolutions of the National Congress, by virtue of its leadership role in the Liberation Organization. It was logical that these

resolutions should be set forth for discussion, considering that they were the political programs governing most of the efforts made in the political and diplomatic fields. Their presentation led to the emergence of two viewpoints on this issue. The first holds that it is necessary to return to them on grounds that they are a supplementary part of the political program of the movement, and the second refuses to accept the resolutions of other organizations as part of our political program, even if third parties participate in their demand. After many discussions and interruptions, a reconciliation was made between the two viewpoints and the resolution produced a unanimous resolution considering the resolutions of the Palestinian national congresses of the Palestine Liberation Organization to effect a supplementary part of the movement's political program, on condition that they be given this character and not conflict with the principles and goals of our movement and political programs.

Here one must point out that some newspapers have published the resolution in its proper form, as the conference approved it, while other papers have published it in a manner which is contradictory to what the conference approved. That is, the phrase which some papers published, saying "the fact that they do not conflict with the principles and goals of our movement and political programs," is incorrect; the correct one is the verbatim one which the conference approved, which says "in a manner which does not contradict with the principles and goals of our movement and political programs."

The Jordanian Arena

5. Apart from the circumstances which led to the adoption of this resolution, I am anxious to refer to its foreword, which constitutes an obvious fact to all Palestinians and Jordanians, and that is that the Jordanian arena holds special importance for the revolution and that requires that it be given special attention.

The situation here is not related to ceremony or diplomatic phrases. It is on the Jordanian arena that the destiny of the Palestinian cause, and consequently the destiny of the Arab liberation movement, will be determined. The way toward the liquidation of the cause is the Jordanian arena, as the way toward the liberation of Palestine is the Jordanian arena. The power of the Palestinian revolution was shaken, and the Arab liberation movement was jolted, when the Palestinian revolution lost its democratization base in Jordan. It is clear that a serious conference, such as that of the "FATAH" movement, cannot ignore the importance of the Jordanian arena and its effect on the future of our struggle and our cause, and is obligated to deal with this aspect.

Therefore, the stipulation which the political program contains, which will constitute the instrument for measuring our struggle, must not affect the movement's relationship with the Jordanian regime when it is serious in confronting the conspiracies to liquidate the Palestinian cause. There

is no doubt that this notion falls under the category of illusions, because relations with Arab regimes, as our charter says, are aimed at developing the positive aspects which any regime possesses on condition that the security of the armed struggle and its continued escalation not be affected by that. I do not believe that relations with the Jordanian regime will permit any armed struggle through the Jordanian arena or any organization of the masses. These matters have become set in the mind of the regime and relations with the regime are confined to political matters which are condemned by the limits of its policies--which are condemned in their role by the limits of what imperialism permits.

Because our conference was serious, it set out serious outlines which were in accordance with the importance of the Jordanian arena and which are aimed at again turning the Jordanian arena into one of the fundamental bases for the concentration of the struggle and combat against the Zionist enemy.

I am certain that this goal alone will constitute the basis of any relations with the Jordanian regime--I mean serious relations.

In order to deal in this spirit and view our relations with the Jordanian masses in a serious way, the conference unanimously elected two movement members who are of Jordanian origin as members of the most important organization, by which I mean the Revolutionary Council.

The European Initiative

6. Talk about a probable European initiative took up a large portion of the conference's discussion when it was presented as a political issue. From these discussions we produced the agreement that this type of initiative, if it takes place, will not be more in nature than a fraudulent mask for American schemes. This understanding was reflected in the foreword of the political program, which stressed that American imperialism, which is striving to achieve its goals in order to strengthen its dominance, reorganize the circumstances of the area, and consolidate its military presence, along with the changes that that requires in the political and social map, and even the geographic one, is following a policy of setting out settlement plans which acquire a new guise in each period, achieving the tactical goals of fragmenting the Arab liberation movement and the forces for perseverance in it and diverting them from the confrontation.

It is clear that this consideration will be imputed to any likely European initiative set out by countries which the political program has described as not recognizing the national rights of our people, as providing support to the Zionist enemy on any level, and as following a policy in harmony with that of the United States of America in the region. Consequently, the congress resolved to intensify efforts to resist and bring down any initiative or plan which is in conflict with our people's national rights.

There is no doubt that the political program has opened vistas for wider interaction with any European or non-European plans or initiatives and to confront them in a manner conforming to these resolutions. Most clearly accompanying this is the need to concentrate political action to the Western European countries, Japan and Canada to make use of the support of democratic and progressive political forces there, in order to diminish and thus stop support for the Zionist entity and bring about its liquidation to the end of having these forces recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of our Palestinian people and achieve a maximum of political and material support for our cause, our struggle and our national rights.

A Leadership Position

7. The political program of the movement considered that the resolutions of the Palestinian national congresses are a supplementary part of the movement's political program and stipulated that they must not conflict with the principles and goals of our movement and political program. This stipulation followed a foreword which talked about the leadership position of our movement within the Palestine Liberation Organization, including its role in formulating the resolutions of the aforementioned national congresses. There is no doubt that this leadership position possesses in the liberation organization will once again be reflected in the formulation of any resolutions produced by the next Palestinian National Congress in a manner consonant with our movement's political program. I am confident that our political program will not just be influential in helping to affect the results of the next Palestinian national congress but that it will also have a great effect on the subject of Palestinian national unity, specifically, since it will strengthen the democratic dialogue on it, in order to achieve dialogue on the terrain of the movement's political program and in the context of the Palestine Liberation Organization, since national unity is the most important focal point of the struggle to achieve our goals and have our cause triumph.

The Real Leader of the Revolution

8. To put matters in their place, one must state that our people's uprising in the occupied territories was reflected in the acts and conclusions of our conference. The political program came as a response to the aspirations of our masses in the occupied territories; they are exposed to the vilest types of repression, coercion and victimization and are persevering heroically in the face of illusions which an effort is being made to infiltrate among these masses, concerning the possibility of any solution to the issue of the occupation of the nation other than armed struggle and its liberation from the viper of the Zionist enemy and its arrogance, haughtiness and covetousness.

There is no doubt that our people in the occupied territory, who are raised their revolutionary leaders, are the true leader of the revolution and the

educating guide of the command. All the command does is to derive inspiration from their aspirations and translate their aspirations in order to lead it along the road which our people have specified for the creation of a new able Arab man, in spite of all the circumstances and obstacles which surround our cause and our nation, in the context of the struggle for the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of a united progressive Arab society.

Rejection of Settlement

9. The Lebanese arena is not an ordinary one as far as the struggle with the Zionist enemy goes. It is clear that in recent years it has been transformed into a laboratory to produce all the alternatives being devised in the wake of the failure of successive schemes which have been carried out on the Lebanese arena. It was not lost on our conference that the Lebanese masses, who have heroically and patiently borne all kinds of torment from the implementation of conspiracy schemes in order to protect the Palestinian revolution, deserve a special stand of admiration. Therefore the conference resolved that to act in solidarity with the Lebanese masses and their stand of support for the revolution will require support, protection and development, so that it may be a paragon of relations with the masses throughout the Arab nation.

The political program clearly stressed the need to liquidate all negative phenomena threatening relations with the Lebanese masses and to strengthen our relations with these masses by all ways and means.

It goes without saying that the deep feeling of combative unity with the national and domestic movement and all other national forces is what caused the conference to stress the need for solidarity to protect the unity of Lebanon, its Arabhood and the safety of its territories and that the road to this end is to stand decisively against Zionist aggressions and bring down vile alliances with the Zionist enemy.

The issue of settlement was not open to discussion, because the rejection of settlement is one of the obvious points which have been rejected since the movement and have been settled in the minds of all Palestinians. Settlement, as is known, is one of the goals which American and Zionist schemes have striven to impose on our people since the Palestinian catastrophe. However, these obvious points did not prevent the conference from addressing itself to them in the political program, by describing the presence of our people in Arab countries as a temporary one which requires that one stand up to all attempts to suppress them, exploit them, assimilate them or settle them.

I am confident that these facts are not lost on those who set forth the settlement issue and are stirring up all this noise about it, but the fact that they set it forth is tantamount to throwing ashes in people's eyes to cover the fact of their complicity with the Zionist enemy in the schemes against Palestine and the Arab nation.

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

INTER-AFRICAN COOPERATION: TRILOGUE CHOICES STUDIED

Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Aug 80 p 5

[Article by Writer Ahmed Baba Niasse: "Point of View: Arab-African Cooperation or Trilogue"]

[Text] An active cooperation, multiform, substantial is important, if not vital, for the African and Arab people. Beyond a primary economic complement (thousands of development projects badly in need of financing on the one hand, and billions of petro-dollars ready for investment, on the other), it is to the interest of both to join forces in a more fundamental manner. In this world which never ceased using the supreme law, when it was connected with force, and the will for power as a dominant motivation, an Arab-African solidarity constitutes a unique chance for each to become an important spokesman for the defense of its interests.

But to succeed it is necessary for everyone in Africa and in the Arab world to consider this alliance as a very useful tool, similar to a need; but we must not delude ourselves; in our domestic relations, for those of us who are dominated, the same law comes into play, the law of individual and national selfishness.

And if Arab-African cooperation, in spite of its importance,¹ remains insufficient and even strictly desirving for many Africans, the principal cause seems to us to dwell in a very serious psychological...unrealism. With very rare exceptions the Arabs do not see, in spite of the promises and slogans, the fundamental advantage of this cooperation; they have the impression that they are "giving" much more, without receiving, the only compensation being a sort of a good moral duty, and here and there taking a pro-Palestinian stand frequently felt to be an act of complacency.

Africans also take the same negative and unconstructive position. They wait for aid as a favor coming from Heaven; in any case they are convinced that they have nothing much to offer in exchange, perhaps only humanitarian diplomatic support, often given reluctantly (the prevailing propaganda finding this type of a "market" potentially immoral).

However, Arabs have at least as much interest as Africans in establishing a real cooperation-solidarity; economically (for average and long-term transactions, and politically (in the strongest meaning of the word) for the near future and for the future. In fact, this means devoting a part of their excess resources to Africa's development and at the same time to the creation of a vast Afro-Arab economic space (it does not matter what name it bears) integrating the considerable natural wealth of both and their human potential, and opening unlimited perspectives to the flowering of their potentialities; particularly important perspectives for after-petrol for some...which compensates for the need of finances; in the near future for the others for numerous projects without rentability...immediately. Therefore...balance.

Politically, a strong Arab-African Alliance would constitute² a determining force on the international plan and would benefit both partners and their essential causes: liberation of West Africa, a just Palestinian settlement, etc. and in a more general manner, for the good of peace and a more equitable distribution of the planet's resources (north-south dialogue, setting up less unequal exchanges, etc.); it would also permit them not to become so easily the tilt-yard of the large foreign powers' rivalries. Finally, it would also allow them, if they wished--but few of our leaders, alas, have this type of preoccupation--to undertake the rescue of our civilizations already margined and threatened with extinction, facing today's dominant civilization, inexorably encroaching and totalitarian.

But all this implies that Africans and Arabs must assume their alliance without inhibition, as a conscious, strategic choice, and draw their inferences from it. One of the most urgent concerns aid for development: to become really credible it must improve its methods and allow the greatest number of African countries to solve the essential points of their investment problems. That is to say that it must be 10 times more important, even 20 times if necessary if one does not want it to become an alibi or a propaganda ploy. But is this possible without a more concerted Arab policy, at least in this field? This is another subject for reflection.

Another advantage for Arab-African solidarity is that it would make our countries better armed to approach other more powerful partners in regard to cooperation. Thus the trilogue (Euro-Afro-Arab) advocated by the French chief of state could be envisaged with more assurance.

In fact, Afro-Arab solidarity cannot actually exclude other solidarities, gathering other exploited people (Moslem world, Asians and Latin Americans), nor any cooperative relations with the developed world, and why not, with Europe, yesterday's colonizer. On condition that it would accept to let today's neo-colonialist situation evolve rapidly towards more just relations which would be by and large to its own benefit.

But it is necessary that by organizing our own solidarity and by becoming collectively a more serious spokesman through each one of its members, we should help this immoderate partner to resist the demon of hegemonism, the logic of domination registered apparently in this extraordinary dynamism which has created modern European civilization, and which carries the best and the worst.

FOOTNOTES

1. It maintains the traditional comparison with "international cooperation" very sensibly (PDR percentage more important, etc.).
2. It is not the case as yet, contrary to some appearances.
3. Evidently, there is no concern about saving the "imperiled movement," these very precious relics, but to resuscitate, as one might say, societies positively in the process of losing their soul.

7993

CSO: 4400

BAHRAIN DRY DOCK JUSTIFIED DESPITE OPERATING LOSSES

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 25 Jul 80 pp 44-45

[Article by Ahmad al-Buz]

[Text] The great majority of the projects which the governments administer are suffering great losses. What are the reasons? Are they the methods of administration, or are they lateral considerations which nations bring forth whenever they want to execute some project?

This is the scene in the Gulf, where the belief prevails that government projects are always losing. The huge project of the dry dock in Bahrain, which was built by OPEC, is considered one of the most important of the Arab projects, and, although 3 years have gone by since work on it was begun, and although it is considered commercially profitable, it still suffers losses every year. Why?

AL-HAWADITH investigated the cause and inquired into the facts in an interview with Shaykh Khalifah bin Salman Al Khalifah, chairman of the administrative board of the Arab Company for the Construction and Repair of Ships, which is supervising the dry dock, and deputy minister of development and industry in Bahrain.

Question: It has been 5 years since construction of the dry dock in Bahrain was begun. How do you assess this important project in the light of the experience of those years?

Answer: Although the construction of the dry dock began in 1974, it commenced operation in 1977. Therefore, its operational age is only 3 years. At first, we were undertaking a limited operation, restricted to simple docking, which did not go beyond painting and repainting tankers. Then, in 1979, we were able to engage in operations of comprehensive repair, including mechanical and electrical repair and repairing rudders. In that year, we completed the enlargement of the comprehensive repair operations. These repairs are considered basic and necessary for every company which works in the field of ship repair. Our entry into the stage of comprehensive repair of tankers is considered a great accomplishment with regard to the operational age of the dock, for other

companies throughout the world require years before they start with comprehensive repairs, which we started one year after the beginning of operation of the dock. For example, the Portuguese company which performs the technical supervision of our dock was not able to enter into comprehensive repair till 4 years after the beginning of operation of the dock in Portugal. Therefore, we are proud of our success, which reflects the competence and capability of the workers, both Arab and foreign. That success was due to the perseverance of the administration with this project. This year, we hope to begin operations of comprehensive repair which will surpass those which we performed last year.

Question: Then what are the reasons for the continuing losses of the dock, and how long will they continue?

Answer: Nowadays we rarely find a dry dock the size of ours which repairs giant tankers and earns a profit. All the western European docks and docks in the Far East which do not belong to governments have closed down, and those which belong to governments are administered by nationalized companies to eliminate the losses. The main reason for that is the state of the ship repair market with regard to the high operating costs, the lack of revenue, and the increases in expenses. Therefore, the loss is natural for any dry dock the size of ours. We in the Arab Company for the Construction and Repair of Ships are determined to reduce the expenditures and increase the revenues in order to narrow the gap between costs and income.

Question: Was the purpose of building the dock purely commercial?

Answer: That is a matter which must be considered in detail. The OPEC nations are Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria and Egypt (whose membership in the organization has been suspended). At the Damascus meeting in the summer of 1973, when they adopted the resolution to build the dock, they were relying on the conditions of the tanker repair market at that time. I am not giving away any secret in telling you that all of the estimates of the cash flow during that period were made on the basis of the good condition of the market. The currency yield of this project, if we take it as a return on the capital invested, was about 3 percent; nevertheless, the 10 member nations decided to go ahead with the project, taking the Arab national issued into consideration primarily, for the purpose of building the dock was Arab national and not mercantile. As for the loss, it was expected and taken into account. The advantage of such a dock as this on the Arab national level is represented in the creation of a new industry for the requirements of the Arab petroleum-producing nations, as well as the huge petroleum storage tanks. The dry dock creates a cadre of Arab workers who are trained in the various fields in which we used to lack such men, and it also graduates skilled workers who will realize a steady income.

These considerations surpass in value any material profits which the dock can realize.

Question: Why were docks able to be successful in the past, in contrast to what is happening now?

Answer: In 1973 operating costs were less than they are now, and charges for repair in the docks were relatively higher than they are now. Furthermore, the increase in the number of docks for ships throughout the world has brought about a large surplus of them, and revenues are eaten up by inflation, which has grown worse since 1973. Because of all these considerations, it is hard for any dry dock to make any profit.

Muhammad al-Khatib, secretary of the dock's administrative board, who was present at the interview, said that there is another reason which has made the loss a foregone conclusion: the failure of the number of tankers to increase at the expected rate. It was supposed that their number would reach 50,000 in 1980, but in fact it does not exceed 30,000.

Question: Have the decisions of the Lloyd's of London Group to raise the insurance premiums and consider the Gulf area a war zone had an effect on the dry dock?

Answer: Lloyd's decisions were unfair, and are nothing more than piracy. The Gulf area is not a war zone and cannot be classified on this basis. Therefore, Lloyd's actions require a mass Arab response in favor of the Gulf states in general.

I believe that it is time to create an Arab insurance group which will be capable of insuring the various Arab installations so that we can break out of Lloyd's sphere. I do not believe that the creation of such a group as this is difficult or fanciful. I have learned recently that a number of Arab countries, both in the Gulf and elsewhere, are studying such an idea as this.

Question: This group is on the way toward being realized, and subscription in it has been made in the amount of \$140 out of a licensed capital of \$3 billion.

Answer: It has not come to my knowledge that this group has been announced or created, and an Arab insurance group which could free us from Lloyd's has not been created yet. There is an Arab reinsurance group, but it is connected in one way or another with Lloyd's group, and, in my estimation, if we continue in our present state, we shall have to suffer having our pockets picked.

The current situation is not favorable to the dry dock, to the Arab nations which invest in it, or to the Arab petroleum installations. The Arab tankers and seagoing vessels are exposed to fierce attack from the exorbitant premiums which the Lloyd's group imposes.

So far as we in the dry dock are concerned, we have rejected Lloyds from the beginning the high-handed methods which are adopted in the mercantile dangers of war. We have followed the method of anti-indemnity and we recognized the new premiums. We shall never give in to Lloyd's or to an entity which thinks our area is a war zone.

The tankers which ply the Gulf waters are insured for 7 weeks. If they stay in the Gulf exceeds 7 weeks, their owners are required to pay higher insurance premiums than ordinary. We believe that Lloyds' aim enables the tanker to perform the operation in the dry dock, which does not exceed 4 days, and then it can proceed to the loading ports, whether they are in Kuwait or the north or to those in the south, to take on their cargo in the remaining time.

Question: Has the number of tankers which ply the waters of the Gulf diminished since the measures of Lloyd's group?

Answer: We cannot reduce the number of tankers which come to the Gulf because of their connection with the transportation of large quantities of petroleum, but the stay of a tanker in the Gulf waters has diminished. I am not giving you any secret if I say that the owners of the tankers have instructed them not to stay in the Gulf any longer than they have to. This is the opposite of what used to be done when tankers used to anchor in the waters of the Gulf for over 7 months.

Question: When the Dubai dry dock began operations, do you anticipate competition between the two Arab States? Is there a plan to prepare a program for coordination between the two?

Answer: Any dry dock which enters into the market immediately must create a new competitive situation with those which are used to it, and with those which are far away from it as well. The world is experiencing an excess of dry docks these days. As for coordination, our dry dock is owned by seven Arab nations, namely, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Iraq and Libya. These nations will never spare any effort to engage in operations of coordination if they make them difficult to do so.

Question: It is known that there is an idea of building a dry dock in Algeria, to belong to OPEC. Do you believe that this dock will be more fortunate than the Dubai one, taking into consideration the remoteness from the area and also from Lloyd's propaganda?

Answer: I do not believe that there are any political considerations when it pertains to any dry dock, whether it be in the Gulf or in the Mediterranean Sea. However, if we look at the two dry docks from the mercantile point of view, we shall see that the number of tankers which frequent the Gulf exceeds (and number which frequent) over other ports. That is because of the world's need of the number of petroleum.

which are to be found in our area. Furthermore, the dock which is to be built in Algeria is specialized for a market which differs from the Gulf market, for it is designed to maintain the tankers which ply between the coasts of the Mediterranean Sea and the coasts of Europe and America.

Question: What are the projects which have been completed for the dock, and the ones which are yet to be carried out?

Answer: At the present time, we are building a factory to make steel cable. Last year, the general assembly of the company approved beginning to carry out this project. It is known that this commodity is imported, but we shall produce it ourselves in the near future.

Question: When will the Arabization of the work force at the dock be accomplished? How many workers are employed there, and what is the proportion of Arabs among them?

Answer: Arabs constitute 51 percent of the total number of workers at the dock. This is a high proportion and a good one. It is due to the fact that the company began training workers about 3 years before opening the dry dock. We expect that the operation of Arabization will be completed in 1987, and we are trying to estimate the possibility of reducing this time. We have set aside \$2 million per year for training, even though the ship repair market is going through a tight period.

Question: Let us turn aside from talking about the dock and discuss industrialization in Bahrain. In your capacity as minister of development and industry, what would you say?

Answer: I am putting on an official hat now.

In the field of industry, I shall speak of three main centers of heavy industry.

Let me begin with the petroleum industry, which is considered the oldest of our industries. As it is known, our petroleum output is quite modest in comparison with [that of the other] nations of the area, for we produce only 55,000 barrels per day. However, we have a refinery which refines 250,000 barrels per day, and it is considered one of the great refineries of the world. There are about 4,000 persons working in it, and 96 percent of these are Bahrainis.

We are also now standing on the threshold of a large petroleum project, the liquid gas project. There is another joint project for petrochemicals between Kuwait and Bahrain, and we shall soon hear of Saudi Arabia's entry into this project as an official partner. There are other petroleum projects which are being studied as well.

The second field in our heavy industries is represented in the aluminum smelter, which is now producing 120,000 tons per year. It is considered one of the largest smelters in the world. We are going to enlarge it so as to produce 165,000 tons per year. Saudi Arabia entered into this project last year by investing 20 percent in it. We are now studying three projects which arise from the aluminum project. The first of these is the industrialization of aluminum (word illegible), the second is for drawing aluminum, and the third is for making electrical cables from aluminum instead of copper. In addition to all that, there is a project for rolling aluminum into sheets. The Gulf Organization will study it in industrial consultations, and it has been decided that it will be a Saudi Arab project.

We in Bahrain welcome the projects of the industrial services to adopt our country as a center from which to export their services to the other nations of the area. For example, we have a number of companies which are engaged in servicing petroleum pipes in the various nations of the area.

Question: The hotel sector has been going through a period of stagnation, and some say it is reaching the point of crisis. What is your opinion about this matter?

Answer: To be sure, we do have too many empty rooms. I do not believe that the hotel situation has reached what can be described as a critical situation. I suppose that this situation is natural, and that any nation which works in the development of its hotel sector goes through it.

(The shaykh then cited the experience of Singapore.)

Singapore had a large surplus of hotel rooms 5 years ago, but now it is experiencing a shortage of rooms.

As for us, I believe that, with the existence of the bridge between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, which will be inaugurated in 1986, and with the increase in the number of banks and industrial companies, the demand for hotels will grow in the future.

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

TUNISIAN-MOROCCAN FRIENDSHIP OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 27 Jul 80 p 1

[Interview with Mr Ahmed El Jed, President of the Tunisian-Moroccan League for Fraternity and Cooperation]

[Text] The recent visit to Morocco of Mr Mohamed Mzali, the prime minister and secretary general of the party, was an important event not only in the history of the privileged relations between the two countries but also in the matter of prospects for the edification of the great Arab Maghreb. The activities of Mr Mzali in Rabat and the results of his visit which notably led to the signing of an economic, social and cultural agreement, were widely reported on in the mass media, in Tunisia as well as in Morocco. Nevertheless, it seems useful to us to underscore an initiative which came about as an indirect result of this visit and which is special because of the fact that it occurred essentially on the popular level. It concerns the creation of the Tunisian-Moroccan League for Fraternity and Cooperation.

The idea for this league had been in the air for several months but it was still in the planning stage. It took the faith and the dynamism of a Tunisian industrialist, Mr Ahmed El Jed, the chairman and president of a clothing company, for the hope to become a reality. Sensitized by Mr El Jed and by his Moroccan partner, Moulay Abdallah Alaoui, the two prime ministers gave their consent to the establishment of this association in Tunis and in Rabat. They assured the two advocates of their desire to lend all necessary help to the league and instructed Mr Taleb Ben Cheikh, the Moroccan secretary of state for the Plan and Development, to announce its creation publicly in a speech given over the radio and television which was

broadcast in Tunisia and in Morocco. In order to give our readers a clearer idea of the structures and programs of the Tunisian-Moroccan League for Fraternity and Cooperation, we met with its president, Mr Ahmed El Jed, who received us at the temporary headquarters of the league, located at 4 Avenue de Londres.

At 58, with silver hair, an alert expression and a strong chin, Mr Ahmed El Jed is still a young man on whom the years have not weighed heavily.

"The creation of the Tunisian-Moroccan League for Fraternity and Cooperation," Mr Ahmed El Jed told us, "is a response to the deep desire of our two peoples and is a necessity in the period we are living in, the period of regional governments and common markets; the project has its roots in the affection and fraternity which unite President Bourguiba and King Hassan II and which was rekindled by the historic visit of Mr Mohamed Mzali to Rabat. We owe it to our sense of objectivity to point out the fact that it is thanks to the solicitude and encouragement of the Tunisian and Moroccan prime ministers that this dream has become a reality."

[Question] How will the management committee be made up?

[Answer] The league was constituted in conformity with the statutes agreed to by the Ministry of the Interior. Its management committee, the composition of which was described in a communique published in the Tunisian and Moroccan press, is formed of members representing all the sectors of public life. Particular attention was given in that respect to the economic domain whose importance escapes no one. In addition, the information domain which constitutes, in the age of the telex and communication satellites, an appreciable factor in the growth of nations, has not been neglected, quite to the contrary. That was why the office of the secretary general of the league was entrusted to a popular figure in Tunisian and Arab journalism, Mr Ahmed Bougbenim, whose dynamism and contacts will be of great help in the expansion of our activities.

[Question] On the matter of activities, what are the broad outlines of your program?

[Answer] You know, as I explained to you, the principal motivation of this league is to offer, so to speak, a popular dimension to the reinforcement of the links on the official level. Our work is especially going to be done on the level of the citizen, the family, youth. We also propose to bring the contribution of the private sector to the consolidation and the coordination of the economic cooperation effort.

between the two countries so that we may be able to harmonize and unify our positions with respect to the common market, that is to say we are planning to explain and popularize for public opinion and the mass media the principles and operations of the economic and social agreements ratified between the two countries, as well as the creation of Tunisian-Moroccan multinational companies and questions of the financing of projects in common.

[Question] You have just referred to the relationships between citizens, families and the youth of the two countries. In what framework, in your opinion, should these relationships be situated?

[Answer] We will consider that the popular base is the foundation of any serious and lasting effort. We plan to act so that the exchanges of contacts and visits between citizens, families and the youth, whether on the level of individuals or corporations can only be in that respect eminently fruitful. As for the framework of that action, we are at present leaning toward various forms to be defined for that exchange and we will not spare any effort to make sure that every Tunisian in Morocco and any Moroccan in Tunisia feels at home, among his own kind.

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CSO: 4400

NATIONAL, SOVIET FORCES FIGHTING EACH OTHER; USSR EMBASSY RAIDED

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES In English 3 Aug 80 p 1

[Text]

There were reports of another mutiny in the Afghan Army and fighting between Afghan and Soviet forces, reports BBC.

Diplomatic sources in New Delhi said the mutiny appeared to involve an army unit in Maidan Shahr near the town of Ghazni where a similar incident was reported last week.

The sources said heavy military traffic still leaving Kabul airport was believed to be involved in fighting between the Soviet forces and the Afghan Army mutineers and that the artillery repositioned outside Kabul seemed to be a defensive precaution against armed attack.

BBC correspondent in Delhi quoted diplomats as saying that the unrest in the Afghan Army appeared to be connect-

ed with recent moves made by Mr. Babrak Karmal against the Khalq faction of the ruling party. Khalqis are particularly strong in the armed forces.

Radio Pakistan adds:

Mujahideen attacked and damaged the Soviet Embassy in Kabul.

It is the fourth attack by the freedom-fighters on the Embassy since the Soviet military armed intervention in Afghanistan. The Embassy was now reported to be heavily guarded. Heavy movement of Soviet jet fighters and helicopter gun-ships were also reported at the Kabul airport.

The Soviet planes were coming and going every minute. Soviet MIGs and gun-ships were also seen departing in the direction of Ghazni.

CITIZENS APPLY FOR WESTERN EMIGRATION, HELD BY KGB

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 2 Aug 80 p 8

[Text]

MOSCOW, Aug. 1: Some 500 Afghan citizens, who applied for emigration to the West, are being held against their will in Moscow, many of them in KGB prisons, one of them disclosed today.

At least four, whom he named, have been sent back to Afghanistan and shot, he said.

The source, who requested not to be identified for fear of reprisal by Soviet authorities, gave detailed information about the fate of many of his compatriots under detention in the

Soviet Union.

He said that he had spoken to members of the Afghan Olympic team now in Moscow and confirmed news reports that many of them wanted to defect to the West particularly the United States. He said that the entire Afghan team was under 24-hour military guard to prevent contact with Western countries.

He said that Afghan athletes told him that Soviet troops shoot at random at Afghan citizens on the streets of Kabul.

The sources provided some of the first detailed information about the fate of Afghan nationals who have been in the Soviet Union since the Russian invasion last December.

The Afghan source said that he himself had tried to obtain an exit visa to emigrate to the United States or West Germany, but his request has been turned down by the Soviet agency that issues visas.

He said that the KGB had called him in for questioning twice.—UPI.

CSO: 4920

SOVIET TROOPS SUFFER HEAVY CASUALTIES

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES In English 4 Aug 80 pp 1, 8

[Text]

The Soviet troops were reported to have suffered heavy casualties at the hands of the Afghan freedom fighters who were said to have been joined by 5,000 Karmal regime troops after deserting the 14th Division, reports Radio Pakistan.

The Associated Press, quoting witnesses reaching from Kabul, said that at least 200 Soviet troops have been killed during the last 10 days in the battle at Ghazni. The casualties on the side of the freedom-fighters were also stated to be high. The report said the Soviets pitted about 2,000 troops along with 400 tanks with armoured vehicles against the freedom-fighters who had earlier seized Tangi Wardak base of the Karmal regime troops killing a number of officials and capturing their arms.

It said using the captured anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons the freedom fighters shot down 12 MIGs and helicopters besides knocking down many tanks.

Describing the intensity of the Soviet attacks on Ghazni and Tangi Wardak areas, the witnesses have been quoted as saying that Soviet MIGs and helicopter gunships leave Kabul airport at an interval of about two minutes every day and come back after firing rockets. The agency said the Soviet forces have been called to surround other military bases following reported purges and arrests of Khalqi officers including those at Pul-i-Charkhi, Karagha and Peshapur in the Kabul region.

PPI adds:

Syed Ahmed Gilani, leader of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan has said the Geneva conference was "absolutely successful because all Mujahideen leaders took part in a very intimate atmosphere, jointly having considered the situation with which they are faced."

In an interview published in the latest issue of "Afghan Voice", London, which reflects the views of all Islamic resistance groups for the liberation of Afghanistan, Mr

Gilani said the members of the Standing Committee of the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference considered the relevant issues in a hopeful atmosphere. "So to my mind the conference was surely successful"

The Russians, he said have reinforced their troops with fresh and well-trained commandos who can operate more easily against the Mujahideen.

He said as a result of that announcement of withdrawal of a limited number of forces they have not reduced their military strength. Instead, they have increased it, he added.

The Afghan leader hoped that the natural curiosity of the Russian people will lead them to realise the reality existing behind the boycott of the Moscow Olympics.

He said as a result of the boycott at least the public in Russia will be obliged to ask themselves as to why so many of the athletes have refused to go to Moscow and may learn of the brutality and barbarity going on in Afghanistan.

SOVIET EMBASSY IN KABUL ATTACKED

Islamabad THE MILLER in English 1 Aug 80 p 1

(Text)

NEW DELHI, July 31: A traveller from Afghanistan said that Afghan insurgents attacked the Soviet Embassy in Kabul recently and caused some light damage.

The traveller, told a reporter that he had been told it was the fourth guerrillas attack on the Embassy, since the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan last in December last year.

He said, he had not seen the attack himself and had no details of fighting or how the Embassy was defended.

The report could not be independently confirmed.

Another unconfirmed report said Soviet troops two weeks

ago aborted a coup planned by Afghan forces stationed at the Paul-Charki base near Kabul. A New Delhi diplomatic source quoted the report from Kabul as saying that the plot by two Afghan units at the base was leaked to Soviet forces, who surrounded the base on July 18 and prevented the Afghans from moving.

The informant had no details of fighting or casualties. Another coup rumour was brought to India by an Afghan traveller who recently arrived from Kandahar, in southern Afghanistan. He said the Kandahar Garrison and air units had been preparing to attack regime strongholds in Kabul, when their plans were uncovered.

The Indian and other passengers said heavy movements of Soviet MIG jet fighters and helicopter gunships were continuing at

Kabul airport amid reports of a mutiny by an Afghan division.

"Soviet planes were coming and going every minute," the Indian said. A Westerner, who also asked not to be named, said he saw MIGs and gunships depart in the direction of Ghazni, 150 Kilometres South West of Kabul, where the reported mutiny of the 14th Afghan armoured division was earlier reported by diplomatic and other sources.

He told a reporter, he counted scores of helicopter gunships returning with empty rocket launchers after apparent stories against the Mujahideen.

The Indian said Kabul was full of rumours about the trouble at Ghazni, which reportedly, followed a move by President Babrak Karmal's government to replace the Division Commander.—APP

MUJAHIDEEN SLAY OF ACTIVITIES: SOVIET OFFICIAL KILLED

Lahore: THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 5 Aug 80 p 1

[Text]

A number of clashes have taken place between the Afghan Mujahideen and Karmal regime forces in Balkh Province, says BBC quoting a Radio Kabul report.

The freedom-fighters have killed a high official of the Soviet Intelligence outside his home, according to the report. News of the Soviet official's death, who was a Brigadier, was received a week ago and has now been confirmed by sources which in the past have proved reliable.

PPI reports from Peshawar:

According to the latest reports received from across the border, the intensified anti-government activities of the Afghan Mujahideen have disrupted means of communication.

In a fierce fight between Afghan Mujahideen and a strong army contingent, the Mujahideen succeeded in inflicting heavy casualties on the Russian troops who also lost two helicopters in the combat.

In two other ambushes, one on the military training school in Kandhar and other in the interior of the city, the Mujahideen killed 39 soldiers, destroyed one tank, two armoured personnel carriers, two jeeps and many other vehicles.

According to APP:

The chief of the Hizb-e-Islami, Afghanistan, Mr. Gulbadin Hikmat Yar, said in

Lahore on Monday the Afghan Mujahideen did not support the posting of an international peace force in their country in place of the Soviet troops.

Talking to newsmen, he said there had been various suggestions in the world Press for solving the Afghanistan crisis which included the posting of a peace force. He said the Mujahideen were of the view that there was no internal trouble in Afghanistan to necessitate the posting of a peace force. The only problem, he said, was the incursion of Soviet forces. If these forces withdrew there would be complete peace in their country, he added.

Router reports from New Delhi:

The Afghan Government said last night it would open an Embassy in Mongolia and there were reports that the first envoy to Ulaan Bator would be President Babrak Karmal's Deputy and main rival.

Kabul Radio said the Government yesterday approved a Foreign Ministry proposal to open an Embassy in Mongolia, which has close ties with the Soviet Union.

The Radio did not name any envoy. Unconfirmed Foreign press reports from Kabul last week said first Deputy Prime Minister Asadullah Sarwari had been appointed Ambassador to Mongolia.

MUJAHIDEEN SAID TO DESTROY AIRFIELD

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 6 Aug 80 p 1

[Text]

PESHAWAR Aug 5: Afghan Mujahideen have actively started operating in the northern provinces of the country and in an attack on the Mazar-i-Sharif airfield on July 21 destroyed the control tower, three aircrafts, two helicopters and some other important installations.

According to the latest reports from across the border the Mujahideen, with the assistance of the local population, is putting up tough resistance in Marmal, Balkh province and are also enjoying effective hold on the district of Sangchark. The Mujahideen are also pressurising Soviets in the province of Samangan by inflicting heavy casualties and capturing arms and ammunitions in large quantities. The Soviets were further frustrated when despite the employment of heavy army contingents not only they failed to free the Sharzad Tehsil headquarter from the control of the Mujahideen but also suffered heavy losses both in men and material during the combat.

In the province of Laghman, the Soviets were compelled to strengthen its ranks by heavy tanks reinforcement to quell the Mujahideen but were frustrated when they succeeded in destroying two tanks and killing all the occupants.

In Ghazni, the Soviets are faced with even greater uprising, and according to the reports the combined strength of the Russian and Afghan troops has also failed miserably to flush out the mujahideen.

In an attack on Musa Khel town, the Mujahideen killed and wounded several enemy soldiers and captured three artillery guns alongwith ammunition as the Afghan sepoys manning them defected to them.

However, a New Delhi report says Soviet forces appear to have quelled a mutiny by Afghan army units near Kabul, diplomatic sources said yesterday.

The sources said details of the fighting at Ghazni, southwest of the capital, were not available, but a large convoy of tanks and trucks returned to Kabul during the weekend, probably from the area.

Air activity over Kabul, which increased considerably at the time of the mutiny 10 days ago, was now back to normal with only occasional helicopter the sources said.

The sources said Soviet and Government troops were reported to have clashed with Muslim guerillas around Musai in Logar province, south of Kabul.

The Afghan Government-controlled Press and Radio reported clashes in the south between local people and what they termed counter-revolutionary band.

Meanwhile, the U S Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff says the Soviets are having trouble in Afghanistan than they anticipated, and he expected them to step up military operations now that the Olympic Games in Moscow are finished.

In London, the Foreign Affairs committee of the House of Commons has recommended, in its fifth report released today, that the British Government should "maintain the pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan allowing the Afghan people to choose their own form of government free from the interference of all outside powers."

Assistance for Afghan refugees through the U N. High Commissioner has also been recommended.

The committee report said: "although the Soviet Union is meeting great difficulties in Afghanistan, the repercussions of the Soviet presence make it imperative that the West continues to work for the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from the country."—PPI/Reuters/UPHINA

MASSIVE SOVIET AIR ATTACK ON GHAZNI

Islamabad THE MUSLIM In English 3 Aug 80 p 8

[Text]

KABUL, Aug. 2: Parts of the city of Ghazni, adjoining villages in eastern Afghanistan came under massive Soviet air attack, following a rebellion in the 14th Afghan army division stationed in the province, an Afghan army Major, who deserted said today.

The Major, formerly attached to one of the logistics offices in the 'Ministry' of Defence, defected last week and went secretly to Kabul to coordinate rebel operations against the Soviet and Afghan government forces.

The Major said Soviet MIG 21 fighter and helicopter gunships started bombarding parts of the city following reports that an unspecified number of guerrillas aided by the defected troops had entered the city.

The Major, said the defection was the largest since the Soviets invaded the country in December last year.

Soviet aircraft also bombarded villages of Silgar and Andar in neighboring Logar province following reports that a large number of guerrillas were hiding there.

In June, the same villages were devastated by a Soviet air attack with heavy casualties reported. The major said the mutiny started when the Commander of the Division, a member of the Khalq Faction of the ruling party, was replaced by an officer from the Raval Parcham faction in a continuing purge of Khalqis.

Before the replacement arrived, All Khalq officers were kept under guard for a day by Parchams, who enjoy the support of President Babrak Karmel, an unspecified

number of known Khalq troops were also dismissed, but on July 24 some of them who were not yet disarmed attempted to free their officers and a firing broke out.

Soon afterwards Soviet troops were brought in from an adjoining garrison and more were airlifted from Kabul, but when they entered the barracks they found only a few hundred of the 4,000-strong division there. The rest had either escaped or had joined the rebels with weapons which included surface-to-air missiles (SAM), the Major said.

The new Parchami Commander was found dead riddled with bullets. The fate of his Khalq rival was not known and there were conflicting reports.

The Major quoted one source as telling him that the Commander was killed before the Soviets arrived. Another report said he managed to escape with other Khalq deserters.

The Soviet air attack on the old part of Ghazni and in Logar and Vardak provinces was aimed against deserted troops who took shelter there. Reports reaching here said the bombardments were continuing but with less intensity.

Meanwhile tension is building up in Kabul with only a day to the end of the Moscow olympics. Rebel sources here said they feared a massive crackdown by Soviet troops soon after the games if after the month of Ramadan which ends on Aug. 14.

BRIG. SHOT DEAD: In Kabul reliable sources confirmed today that a Soviet 'brigadier working as a senior Advisor at the Afghan Ministry of the Interior was shot dead near his home at 41 Ave. 11th last Monday. — AFP

AFGHANISTAN

FRG PAPER REVIEWS AFGHAN EVENTS, SPLIT IN PDPA, PRIOR TO SOVIET INTERVENTION

DW202012 Bonn DIE WELT in German 19 Aug 80 pp 4-5

[Article by Ruediger Moniac: "The Soviets Never Trusted Kabul's Communists Out of Sight"]

[Text] It was the bullet of an unknown man which in the spring of 1978 triggered a decisive turning point in political developments in Kabul. Fired from a pistol during a demonstration in the streets of the Afghan capital it hit and killed Mir Akhbar Khyber, communist "trade union leader" and university teacher.

This protest demonstration had taken place because Afghanistan in the preceding winter once again had been affected by a grave famine notwithstanding massive development aid, particularly from Moscow, but also from the United States and other Western states. It elicited severe unrest throughout the country.

Moscow's assistance dates back to 1956. Since then large-scale development projects were financed by the Soviet Union, such as bread factory, several grain silos and the installation of a 70 kilometer-long canal from Jalalabad in the eastern province for the purpose of irrigating one of the most arid zones in Afghanistan. As was pointed out by Cologne scientist Hans Braeker in his book "The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan" the Soviets "in the face of the economically totally underdeveloped condition of Afghanistan" nevertheless were not particularly effective in coping with supply crises, whereas the measures taken by them "frequently have a considerable psychological effect" on the indigenous people.

On 19 April, two days after the fatal shot on the leading communist party ideologist Khyber, another long demonstration procession occurred during his funeral. A large crowd had gathered in front of the cemetery and marched through the capital, headed by Taraki, who later on became head of state, and other communists who were at feud with one another. An estimated 15,000 people shouted revolutionary and anti-American slogans. Kabul inhabitants never had witnessed such a crowd.

Even the communist leaders were shocked at this crowd, because the leaders of rank and file members of their own party, the PDPA (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan), committed to only one variant of this crowd at that. Besides, the two wings of the communist party, the "Farshad" and the "Khaliq," were strongly in variance with one another. At a "people's revolution" were ever to take place in Kabul--and that is what the communists were dreaming of, to be sure--then they had some idea where this 14 April of 1978 lay the potential would be they would mobilize by hand.

The crowd perhaps appeared to be advantageously large to ruling president of state Daud Khan, a cousin of the king he overthrew, and to his security organs. But technicians of the revolution knew that this "mass basis" was virtually too small to have a "national uprising" emanating from the "top" or from the "bottom." Nevertheless the crowd severely frightened Daud and his secret police and the almost dictatorial state president ordered a trial on communists, which in his view apparently was the only honorable measure.

Why Were the Militaries Spared by Daud?

Five days later, on 19 April, Daud ordered the arrest of the most important PDPA functionaries and let them be jailed or placed under house arrest. What remained a complete mystery, however, was that those military officers with the party's Farshad wing, namely Qadir, Ruff, and Massoud, were left unmolested, making those officers who five years ago had decisively supported Daud's seizure of power from the king, but who then were mis-tracked by him (with all three officers Abdul Qadir being banished to the post of heading the military slaughter-house).

It was quite noteworthy that the militaries were spared by Daud's secret police for evermore in Kabul kept, from past experience, about their readiness to revolt. And the militaries had ample reason for "holding back" with the Daud regime. To the leftist officers Daud's handling of justice, central power along with the (frequenting prospect of a strongly authoritarian one-party parliament which was to be convened for the first time in November 1979) appeared too much conservative. Besides, Daud's secret commission showed that the danger of a new mass revolution was in the offing. It was as early as in 1977/78 that Daud was in an increasing degree seen as an absolute tribal overlord, surrounded almost with terror and thus to take lone decisions.

Nevertheless the "Farshad" officers looked quite tough and confident to be free. They actually were not considered to be so important at all. So long they had undergone their decisive military training in Russia. And a real and rational were believed to be patriotic Afghans. All of them were, of course, also although inspired by Marxist ideas (Bolsheviks).

The fact that they nevertheless became decisive factors in the Afghan peaking for power in Kabul during those April days of 1978 is striking only

to Gulbuddin Amin, one of the later leaders of the communist revolution. Amin, who after the raid had been placed under house arrest, succeeded in escaping his guards. He got in contact with the militaries and with the means of an invented story, got them going. Amin told them that the detained PDPA functionaries were in acute danger of life. Prince Daud planned to let them be killed. This had made an impression on the officers and they were ready to strike.

Amin and the three officers cooperated closely. They quickly improvised an operation plan. Amin was taking care of the organization and the political implementation of a change of power under his ideological comrades.

The military putsch was an affair of one day. The tank and infantry units, including one aviation unit, which were mobilized by the three officers, launched an attack in the morning of 27 April at the most important centers of Kabul. Fierce fighting was taking place in the streets. Yet the putsch units in less than 24 hours achieved all aims in Kabul and exerted control over the whole country.

State President Daud and his family, about 30 people including women and small children, had been killed. The total of the putsch victims was said later on to amount to about 1,000 persons. Just 3 days later the new communist regime was sitting firmly in the saddle, headed by Taraki and with Amin playing the role of the "strong man."

The decisive question is which role has been played by the Soviet Union in this putsch. Did it support the PDPA communists? Is a direct line leading from 27 April 1978 to 27 December 1979, the day when Moscow's massive military intervention began with an airlift to Kabul and the advance of several divisions on land routes to Afghanistan?

Cologne eastern affairs expert Berner quotes a Washington analysis in this connection by writing: "The U.S. Department of State issued on 8 April a summary of official examinations on the Soviet intervention and its prior history, which has been probably compiled most thoroughly with the evaluation of all available detailed information. This statement says about the 'Marxist Putsch' of April 1978 that the Soviet Union 'if at all, has just played a minor role.'"

Berner goes on to say that one can probably believe Puzanov, the then Soviet ambassador in Kabul, who said later on with a view to the putsch day in April: "I went fishing the day it happened."

The fact that this statement of the Soviet diplomat is most likely true, becomes evident if one takes a look at the foundation history of PDPA and its activity in Kabul. The official date of foundation is 1 January 1965. At that time the first careful parliamentary steps have been tried in the "Loya Jirga," a not freely elected traditional people's representation.

In that year, in 1965, two young deputies entered the representation: the son of a general and jurist Sahrah Karmal who is today--assassinated by Soviet bayonets--the first son in Afghanistan, and the female physician Hamideh Kotebzad, the later wife [Lebensogefährtin] of Karmal. She is now Minister of Education in Kabul. The career of both has been considered by the Loya Jirga as national-heroic.

Shortly after its establishment the PDPA split in 1967 in two factions which were fighting each other fiercely. Both considered themselves as the only successors of the foundation party, naming themselves according to their short-lived publications "Khalq" (the people) and "Parcham" (the banner).

Nasir Muhammad Taraki, originally the PDPA general secretary, was heading the Khalq faction. The son of a sheep breeder from a village in Herat Province, born in 1917, came at the age of 18 as an employee of a yarn firm to Bombay. He learned English and was trained as an interpreter of Afghan tribe dialects (Pashto and Dari). After having returned to Kabul he studied national economy, graduated with a diploma and became a government official.

Taraki was working first for the Ministry of Economy, then he became an editor of Radio Kabul and thereafter the acting chief of the Radio News Agency Bakhtar, the Afghan press attaché in Washington, and finally deciding in 1963 to become a "professional revolutionary," he returned to Kabul and worked as a translator in the U.S. Embassy.

In view of such a curriculum vitae it is obvious that Taraki's Khalq faction consisted mainly of Kabul's leftist intellectuals (teachers, students, officials and journalists), some 2,000 to 3,000 people.

Their weekly publication "Khalq" wanted to implement the "National-Democratic Revolution," encompassing a patriotic-Islamist great-Afghan nationalism, a first phase toward a "socialist revolution." The publication appeared in just five issues, then it was prohibited because of its "anti-constitutional and anti-Islamic" attitudes.

The Parcham faction, headed by the lawyer and son of a general Sahrah Karmal-Khyber, who was shot to death on 17 April 1978, has been fighting for the same position--but better relations with the nobility of the court and the tribes. The faction was even said to have good relations with the police apparatus. The Parcham faction was considered until the early seventies by political circles of Kabul the "Royal Communist Party" because of its action for a reformist course loyal to the constitution, and because of its excellent relations with all influential groups of the Afghan establishment up to the royal court, and yet this group of communists had a hand in the plot of the former prime minister and cousin of the king, Muhammad Daud Khan. The plot of 17 July 1973, which led to the fall of King Zahir Shah and to the end of the monarchy, was the work of both factions.

It was generally learned later on that the air force officer Abdul Qadir, who was considerably involved in the overthrow, belonged to the friends of Karmal and Khyber.

Daud, the cousin of the king, succeeded to place important men of the Parcham group in his cabinet after having announced the Afghan republic. But after a long time of friction they withdrew again, particularly because the land reform promised by Daud and the democratization plans did not materialize. That was in the second part of 1975. It lasted for more than 2 years until a PDPA merger was achieved in August 1977 after tough negotiations between the extremist Khalq faction and the moderate Parcham communists.

Experts say with regard to these events that Soviet mediators have been involved in this merger of Afghan communists, helping to establish resistance in both camps. But the fact makes one ponder that the PDPA has been ignored for 13 years by Soviet media as well as by the publications of those parts of the International Communist Movement which are close to the CPSU.

These communist media did not take note of either the founding of the party or of the split of the PDPA, nor did they even report on its reunification. Said expert Berner in this connection: "Obviously all news and data on the PDPA, on 'Khalq' and on 'Parcham' were systematically suppressed in the Soviet media, but also in the editorial offices of the supernational communication organs of the international communist party system. Up to the seizure of power by the PDPA on 27 April 1978 even quotations from the party literature of the Afghan communists or from statements by their most prominent representatives were subject to the same publication ban." Berner added that there has not been "any model" for such a "slander or hushing-up practice" since the founding of the Komintern.

Probably the true reason for this obvious underrating and even contempt of the Kabul communists on the international stage of the communists must have been attributable to two things: to begin with, considerable distrust prevailed in the Kremlin owing to the reports on the Afghan communists compiled by the Soviet Embassy in Kabul and especially by the local KGB resident agents. It was nourished by the obvious contacts of nearly the whole PDPA leadership above all with Western foreign countries but also with the Afghan secret police.

Secondly, the Soviets obviously judged the "fighting value" of these "Kabul Farior Reds" and their political reliability extremely small. For they did not have any real mass basis among the people or even any resonance in the provinces of Afghanistan worth mentioning. There was just an infinitesimal segment of industrial workers in Kabul with its roughly 500,000 inhabitants. There were hardly any beginnings of a trade union organization, let alone of industrial or agricultural labor unions. And yet, at times leftist agitator Khyber was called a "trade union leader" in the newspapers. Probably he had loose contacts with the Communist World Trade Union Federation (WFTU), but that organization, too, did not define its stance publicly on Khyber's assassination.

Berner describes how the Kabul communists were bound to appear to Moscow's diplomats in the capital of Afghanistan: "On the whole the 'Parcham' and 'Khalq' politicians better known to the local Soviet observers presumably made the impression on the latter of being a cliche of fidgety-rebellious intellectuals who in reality were part of the establishment themselves but anticipated from a change in systems the satisfaction of their personal career ambitions."

In the opinion of the orientists there are many indications that the rivaling Parcham and Khalq functionaries used to denounce each other alternately as police and CIA spies to their Soviet interlocutors. This is why the entire PDPA merely was considered in the Kabul KGB residence as a sort of "Trojan horse" of the CIA. Hence it was obvious that the Kremlin could hardly believe that it could arrange the revolutions in Afghanistan "with such people."

Thus as a surprise to Moscow Amin on 27 April 1978 created the "fait accompli" to the advantage of the Kabul communists. All the Soviet Union could do was react just as swiftly and as businesslike. Moscow's media reported the April putsch with aloofness and without any comment. The Taraki government with the "strong man" Amin in the background was recognized immediately. The Soviet ambassador in Kabul was the first foreign diplomat to call on Taraki. Flexibly the Kremlin adapted to the new situation: As early as in December 1978 a treaty on friendship and cooperation was concluded which did not rule out military assistance as well.

Amin's Hazardous Policy Alarms the Kremlin

During the signing function in Moscow Brezhnev hinted rather broadly how very much the Kremlin had been taken by surprise by the April putsch. "The Soviet Union and Afghanistan are good neighbors. This has become a good tradition...but what happened then was April 1978. A real popular revolution caused a brusque change in the century-old history of Afghanistan. Under these circumstances it is not surprising at all that the traditionally close relations between our countries have assumed a qualitatively other character, as it were. What exists today is not simply a good neighborliness but a profound, sincere, and true friendship, joined with the spirit of comradely and revolutionary solidarity."

Taraki and the wingpulled of the revolution, Amin, now were the object of many rumors by the Soviets, even though they had been criticized by Moscow for more than a decade. Amin, the usually very sophisticated of them, said the Kremlin was far from satisfying his original desire for peace. And Moscow initially has not have his ally become a kingdom and the other Western powers, even after the change of regime in Kabul with a "new line" was aiming in the Soviet view; as if there had been an event long overdue.

In the revolution of Afghanistan the information of Afghanistan also proceeded according to the motto: "Change must be put into effect as early as long as the

counterrevolutionaries and imperialists are still too weak to prevent them. He had land reform measures accelerated, the regime applied sharp forcible and punitive measures, and thus increasingly hit oppositional mullahs. Unrest and resistance grew in the countryside.

The Kabul communists, who formerly had not been taken really seriously in the Kremlin or had been accused of playing a double game, had ventured a dangerous escalation process, feeling encouraged by the sudden Soviet backing. In this process they isolated themselves all the more quickly the more the number of their enemies and the latter's embitterment grew. Within the PDPA leadership group, too, vehement directional struggles occurred. The consequence was purges in the party, in the officer corps, in the ministries, among the journalists, and in the administrations on all levels. Soviet attempts at weakening Amin's position at first produced the opposite effect.

In the summer of 1979, just half a year prior to the Soviet invasion, Brezhnev and his Politburo probably had to come round and realize that Amin's bizarre, hazardous police suddenly threatened to destroy the yield of decades of Soviet legwork and considerable financial investments in Afghanistan. The Kremlin decided to eliminate him. Yet Amin anticipated the plot and had Taraki disempowered on 14 September.

By all indications Moscow's preparations for the military invasion had been in full swing from then on. Viewed from Moscow's angle this probably was the "ultima ratio" to save of the "revolution" in Afghanistan what could still be saved.

CSO: 4403

'TIMES OF INDIA' REPORTS 'POLITICAL CHARGES' SKETCHY, CONFUSING'

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 2 Aug 80 p 3

[Text] Islamabad, Aug 1: Although the reports about political changes in Afghanistan are sketchy and confusing they appear to be quite significant Indian English daily TIMES OF INDIA said.

Apparently the Interior Minister, Lt Col Syed Mohammad Gulbzoï, belonging to the Khalq faction of the ruling people's Democratic Party had been divested of his powerful portfolio and placed under arrest, the newspaper said in a recent editorial.

About a dozen ground maintenance staff of the National Ariana Afghan Airlines were reported to have been arrested and charged with involvement in a plot to sabotage the Kabul airport.

The staff also said to belong to the Khalq faction.

The daily said that these arrests seemed linked with the disappearance of the recently appointed President of the Airlines—apparently a formal supporter.

All this added up to a possibility that there was a conspiracy to seize power and the deposed Interior Minister was masterminding it with the help from other Khalqies.

It was possible that some carefully selected members of the national airlines staff were to engineer the crash of the plane which was to take President Karmal to Moscow.

This might also explain the disappearance of the President of the Airlines, who was appointed at an inauspicious time when the conspiracy was already well-advanced, the paper said.

"All this is admittedly conjectural but certainly not improbable considering the intensity with which faction-fighting and killings have been going on in the ruling party," the daily observed.

"It is also striking that despite their strong military and security presence, the government has no knowledge about these secret plans. After all they were in force, when a popular uprising suddenly broke out in Kabul itself, 5-6-80," the TIMES OF INDIA said.

HEAVY FIGHTING IN STREETS OF HERAT

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 10 Aug 80 pp 1, 8

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Aug 9: Armed bands of insurgents are battling the Government troops day and night in the streets of Herat, Afghanistan's third biggest city, diplomatic sources said today.

Soviet troops ring the city in large numbers, but are leaving the fighting mainly to Afghan forces, they said.

The sources, quoting what they called reliable reports from Herat, said the old part of the city had become a virtual no-good area for Government soldiers.

The main concern of the Soviet commanders appeared to be the safety of their major supply route running past Herat from the Soviet border to Kandahar, south of Herat, they said.

Convoys of petrol tankers, armoured vehicles and some times rocket launchers, ammunition trucks and loads of building material made regular trips along the route to help supply the estimated 80,000 to 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, they said.

Violence in Herat, in west Afghanistan, about 100 miles from Iran, has been increasing since the beginning of Ramadan, according to the sources.

But they had no casualty figures.

Fighting was also continuing in Logar province, south of Kabul; most recently around Baraki Barak and Pule Alam, they said.

HEAVY BOMBING

According to a report from

Laghman province, after the Russian and Afghan troops failed to capture Mujahideen's position, Russian bombers launched a big attack on July 26.

A Press release of the Islamic Alliance for Liberation of Afghanistan said that Russian planes bombarded this sub-province heavily and destroyed Qalabo Khan and Lashti Pul completely and damaged other villages.

Ninety-three persons — mainly women and children — were killed, besides the air attack, the Russians also used tanks. The Mujahideen repulsed the attack and killed 10 Russians, including two officers, and destroyed two tanks. In one incident around Kabul, the Mujahideen attacked a Russian General in front of his house in Karta Char and killed him.

In the past four days the Mujahideen have destroyed about eight tanks and armoured cars on the Kabul-Jalalabad road, the Press release said.

PETROL SHORTAGE

Afghan troops have been called to maintain order among taximen, bus drivers, private motorists and even military chauffeurs competing for the limited supply of gasoline in

Kabul, a western diplomatic report said yesterday.

Some fistfights have broken out at the gas pumps where individual purchases have been limited to five litres for the past seven days the report added. No formal rationing has been announced.

Afghanistan's entire crude oil supply comes from the Soviet Union. Occasional shortages have been reported in the past when overland petroleum convoys were delayed.

The current shortage, going into its second week, was becoming major problem in the capital, the source said.

SECURITY MEASURES

Security was reported increased on the streets of Kabul, with more armed patrols and armoured vehicles seen the past few days and spot searches of taxis and private vehicles by police and Marxist vigilantes.

Fighting outside the city, appeared to have slackened, however, with no new reports of battles and some military units apparently returning to their bases, the diplomatic report said.

AFGHAN DENIAL

The Afghan Embassy in Moscow denied yesterday that any Afghan students in the Soviet Union had asked to emigrate to the West.

A spokesman stated firmly that the embassy had "received no request for emigration nor any complaint from any Afghan citizen residing in Moscow". — Reuters/AFP/PI.

MUJAHIDEEN'S ATTACKS ON RUSSIAN UNITS

Karachi DAWN in English 2 Aug 80 pp 1, 10

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Aug 1: The Mujahideen are reported to have killed four Russian troops and destroyed two armoured cars in Surkhakan area of Qarghal district in Laghman province.

On the side of Mujahideen one Sahidul Haq was martyred, says a Press release.

The Mujahideen also attacked the Russian forces in area close to the Tashar airport.

In this attack 45 Russians are reported to have been killed and ten others wounded, while two tanks destroyed. The Mujahideen under the command of Col Mohammad Aslam, attacked a Russian convoy in Tangi Takhar on July 25. The pass was closed for two days in this collision. Six troop-carrier trucks and four tanks were destroyed, while two trucks loaded with essential goods were captured by Mujahideen.

The crew have been detained.

According to recent report received from Logar Province, the Mujahideen also attacked the members of the Provincial Revolutionary Defence Committee in Mohammad Agha High School.

In this operation, 14 Khalqis were killed only one Mujahid was wounded. Eight Communists and spies of the puppet regime are reported to have been killed in Paghman district.

In addition, 15 Khalqis were killed during an attack on Kandhar high way.

Soviet troops are still surrounding two Afghan Army Divisions near Kabul which were planning an attempted coup, according to diplomatic sources in Delhi and travellers arriving from the Afghan Capital.

Diplomatic sources said that the plan of the attempted coup by units of the Afghan Army at the main Afghan military com-

plex in Puli-Chakri on the southern outskirts of Kabul was leaked and Soviet forces moved on July 18 eve of the opening of the Moscow Olympic.

An Afghan traveller arriving from Kabul today said that there had been fighting on July 18 between the Afghan troops and Soviet forces who crushed the resistance and surrounded the area.

"The Fourth and Fifth Afghan Divisions are involved there with a lot of modern weapons," said the Afghan who added that no fighting was going on in the area at present.

A Western traveller who said he heard the fighting began on July 18 and 19 said that Afghan troops were now stationed at Puli-Chakri, an area which is also the site for the main prison for Kabul.

Reports of the attempted military coup at Puli-Chakri follow earlier reports of a mutiny by troops of the 14th Afghan Army Division at Ghazni south of Kabul.

A Western traveller said Afghan troops had also mutinied at Puli-Korka, about 17 km (10 miles) north of Kabul.

The traveller said the Russians were bringing in more troops by land and air, and an Afghan traveller said that he saw Soviet troops disembarking from a Soviet military transport at Kabul airport when he left there this morning.

The Afghan traveller said that a Soviet Colonel had been killed by an unknown gunman near the Soviet Embassy in Kabul last Sunday.

This supported an earlier report by a Western traveller that a senior Russian official had been

MOVE TO SET UP GOVERNMENT IN EXILE OPPOSED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM In English 1 Aug 80 p 1

[Article by Qaiser Butt]

[Text] Rawalpindi, July 31: Two prominent Afghan Mujahideen leaders Gul Baddin Hikmat Yar and Prof Abdul Rasool Sayaf Gul have rejected the move for the establishment of a parallel Afghan government and described the proposal as non serious.

Hassan Gailani, another Mujahideen leader on Tuesday had proposed setting up a parallel government in all the liberated areas.

Mr Gailani, the Chairman of Islamic National Revolutionary Council, while addressing a news conference at Islamabad on Tuesday stated that Islamic National Revolutionary Councils would also be set up in all the Afghan provinces.

Hikmat Yar and Sayaf Gul were commenting on Mr Gailani's news conference. Talking to THE MUSLIM at Masjid-i-Illahi Noor, where the Afghan leaders addressed a public meeting under the auspices of Tehrik-i-Islami in connection with Youm-i-Baddar, Mr Hikmat Yar said the idea was given by a non-Afghan.

Addressing the meeting Abdul Rasool Sayaf Gul said the holy war in Afghanistan would continue till the last victory.

CSO: 4920

PAKISTAN SCHOLAR EXPLORES AFGHAN, BALUCHISTAN QUESTIONS

Hamburg AUSSENPOLITIK in German 3rd Quarter 80, pp 284-301

[Article by Inayatullah Baloch: "Afghanistan--Pashtunistan--Baluchistan"]

[Text] In view of events in Afghanistan and Iran, the question of the Soviet Union's political and strategical design has once again lent crucial importance to the old problem of Pashtuns in Pakistan and Baluchis in Pakistan and Iran. In the following article Inayatullah Baloch, a Pakistan citizen of Baluchi nationality and a historian who has made available important and rare source material for the history and policy in and around Baluchistan and is currently working on a history of Baluchistan at the seminar for history of the South Asian Institute at Heidelberg University, offers an explanation of the attitudes and interests of all those involved: Since the departure of the English from Southern Asia Afghan Governments have considered the Pashtuns either simply as Afghans separated from their homeland or asked for a Pashtun state which was to reach to the Arabian Gulf and include Baluchistan (thus subsuming the Baluchis under the Pashtuns) and later accede to Afghanistan. The Baluchis reject the coupling of their problems with those of the Pashtuns and talk of autonomy or independence. The Soviet Union has championed the Pashtunistan policy of the Afghans, though it refers only to the Pushtu speaking population of Pakistan, not the Baluchis who do not speak Pushtu. In other words, though the Soviet Union was involved in Kabul's Pashtunistan policy, it has conducted its own, differing from Kabul's in some respects and certainly with regard to Baluchistan. In fact Baluchistan is an issue concerning not only Afghanistan nor only Pakistan but Iran also, so that Soviet Baluchistan policy represents an explosive charge for the entire Mideast region. Consequently the Russians have no intention ever to leave the handling of it to the Afghans. It cannot therefore be reckoned an accident that, in Kabul, Moscow prefers the Parcham wing of the Afghan Communists, led by Babrak Karmal, to the Khalq wing, because the former, though championing the

the establishment of Pashtunistan, accepts a Baluchestan separate of Afghanistan. As a Baluch, the author concludes therefrom that Pakistan will continue to be confronted with the Pashtunistan issue and, in Baluchestan, must expect a development by which the moderate majority in the Baluchestan National Party would be prepared to agree to compromises while a radical socialist and communist minority opts to follow the Moscow line.

In December 1979 the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan took the world by surprise. The Aminullah Hafiz Government of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was overthrown in a coup executed by the rival wing, led by Babrak Karmal. This intervention initiated a new stage in the Cold War between the superpowers.

The United States and its allies are anxious about the future of the strategic regions on the Makran coast of Baluchestan (Iran-Pakistan), because Soviet intervention produces serious effects on the balance of power and the oil supplies on which the industrial nations depend.

To understand the Russian intervention in Afghanistan and its effects on politics in and around Baluchestan, it is necessary to study the ethnic composition of Afghanistan, Russo-Afghan relations, the Marxist revolution in Afghanistan and Baluchi politics.

The Country and Its Ethnic Groups

Afghanistan is a melting pot of various cultures. It cannot be classified with any of the traditional regional groups in Asia. It is linked to South Asia, Central Asia and the Near East. It has long borders with Iran, Pakistan and the USSR, a short border with China. Its area comprises some 250,000 square miles. It is landlocked; the nearest ports are Karachi in Pakistan and Bandar 'Abbas in Iran. Its population is 18 million and consists of many nationalities. The numerically strongest group are the Pashtuns at 6.5 million, followed by about 3.5 million Tadzhiks who live in the northern region of the country and speak Dari (the Afghan version of Persian). Other ethnic groups speaking Dari are the Aymaqs (some 800,000), the Hazaras (about the same), and the Farsiwan (600,000). They also are Dari speaking and live in large and small cities. Southwestern Afghanistan is populated by 300,000 Baluchis and Brahuis. Living in the Faryab province are about 125,000 Turkmens, members of the Turkic group of languages. About 100,000 Nuristani live in the eastern part of the country. At one time they were called kafirs. They were forcibly converted to Islam by the Afghan ruler Amir 'Abdur Rahman. In addition to these peoples the following small ethnic groups are to be found in Afghanistan: Gujars, Arabs, Jews, Punjabis, Sikhs, Hindus and Parsees.

On the Early History of Soviet-Afghan Relations

Earlier as well as present USSR policy is at least in part determined by the country's geographical situation. It is general knowledge that the major section of the Russian coast is frozen over for several months of the year. Long before the rise of communism and the Soviet Union the Russians aimed to control regions, such as Baluchistan, which boasted warm water ports. The cornerstone of that Russian conception dates back to Peter the Great's last will and testament: "Get as close as possible to Constantinople (Istanbul) and India. He who governs there will be the real ruler of the world...and should Persia succumb, push forward to the Persian Gulf..." These Russian dreams did not materialize until 1919, because British influence ruled this part of the world. All the same, the Russians made several attempts with the Afghan rulers Amir Sher 'Ali, Amir 'Abdur Rahman and Amir Habibullah Khan. In 1919, following the assassination of his father, Amir Amanullah ascended to the throne and continued to champion the independence and sovereignty of Afghanistan. He headed the so-called Afghan nationalists and, appreciating that the Soviets no longer represented a threat to Afghanistan while Britain was weakened by World War I, he embarked on the Third Afghan War. At the end success crowned his efforts; by the Treaty of Rawalpindi (1919) he achieved sovereignty for Afghanistan. Subsequently, Amanullah renegotiated Afghanistan's international status and established contacts with Soviet leader Lenin. His letter was answered on 27 May 1919. The Afghan masses were congratulated on their struggle and diplomatic relations proposed.³ In 1929 Amanullah was overthrown by a rebellion which had broken out in response to the reforms he had instituted. The British were also involved. The Soviets tried to aid Amanullah, but their efforts were ineffective.⁴ Amanullah was replaced by Nadir Khan, a pro-British Afghan general. In today's "revolutionary" Afghanistan Jihad is a taboo, and the descendants of his branch of the royal family have not been rehabilitated. From 1931-1978 the Nadir family treated Afghanistan like a family fluff.

In 1947 the British left the Indian sub-Continent, and the issue of the Pashtuns right to self-determination was raised by 'Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the founder of Pashtun nationalism.⁵ The Afghan Government, no longer afraid of the British, supported the demand for the establishment of "Pashtunistan." At that time Afghanistan opposed Pakistan's membership in the United Nations. In 1950 border incidents erupted, and Pakistan closed its borders. Also in 1950 Pakistani anti-Soviet policies enabled the Russians to enter into close contacts with Afghanistan and aid the movement for Pashtunistan.

At the time Pakistan was a member of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. The Afghan Government tried to obtain American arms aid; Washington, however, was willing to grant this aid only on condition that Afghanistan joined these military alliances. When the Afghan Government failed to obtain arms, it turned to the USSR. In August 1956 a treaty was signed between the USSR and Afghanistan, as a result of which weapons to the value of \$25 million were supplied to Afghanistan. The most serious crisis in the Pashtun issue occurred in 1960, when Pakistan closed its borders. However, the Soviet Union and India

helped Afghanistan. Despite Soviet aid, though, the blockade resulted in a great deal of hardship which, in March 1963, led to the ouster of Daoud Khan.

Soviet Policy in the Pashtunistan Issue

In this connection the Soviet attitude to the Pashtunistan issue is of the utmost importance. Since 1947 Pashtunistan has been a cornerstone of Afghan foreign policy. The two Afghan demands are:

1. The Pashtuns in Pakistan are Afghans who were separated from their homeland by British imperialism.
2. A state of Pashtuns is to be created on Pakistani territory, from Chitral and Gilgit to the Persian Gulf. Later this state should join Afghanistan, in view of the two countries common culture, language and history. This second demand also applies to those regions of Baluchestan, which are not part of Pashtunistan but are claimed by Afghan rulers for economic reasons. That emerges in the will of Afghan ruler Amir 'Abdur Rahman (1880-1901): "If Afghanistan had access to the sea, the country would certainly soon become wealthy and flourish...If, in my lifetime, no opportunity offers to achieve this goal, my sons and successors will always have to keep an eye on this corner (Baluchestan)."

Yet Afghanistan's claim to Baluchestan has no base in law. The region has been sovereign since Ahmad Sha's Durani Empire. This fact is confirmed by the following two sections of the treaty signed in 1859 by the Afghan ruler Ahmad Shah and the Baluchi ruler Mir Nasir Khan Nuri.⁸ They were the centerpiece of the treaty:

1. In future the King of Afghanistan will not interfere in either the internal affairs of Baluchestan or other affairs affecting Baluchestan.
2. All Baluchi regions occupied by the Afghan ruler will be returned to the ruler of Baluchestan.

In 1955 Marshal Bulganin and Krushchev visited Afghanistan and expressed support for the Pashtunistan concept. In an address to the Supreme Soviet Marshal Bulganin described Pashtunistan as "a country inhabited by Afghan tribes." In 1959 Soviet author N.A. Khalfin wrote an article on "The Pashtunistan Problem." In this he said that the Durand Agreement which, in 1893, established the borders between Afghanistan and the Indian Empire, "split off Afghanistan the regions of Waziristan, Swat, Bajor, and so on, where Afghan tribes were living."⁹ In his article "Afghanistan" in the Soviet Encyclopedia, 2d edition, Vol 3 (1950), Keysner described Soviet concern about the division of Afghanistan into two regions but showed little liking for the Afghan Pashtunistan plan: "The Afghan Government, obligated to the great landowners and profoundly bourgeois and nationalistic, refuses in Afghanistan itself to acknowledge any right of national self-determination to the non-Afghan tribes; at the same time it aids the movement for national self-determination of Afghans living on the Indian sub-Continent by calling for the

population of the country. The Soviet Union, which is a member of the United Nations, has a responsibility to ensure the security and stability of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union has a long history of supporting the Afghan people in their struggle for independence. The Soviet Union has provided the Afghan people with the necessary support and assistance to achieve their goals. The Soviet Union has a strong commitment to the Afghan people and their future. The Soviet Union will continue to support the Afghan people in their struggle for independence and stability.

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2. Before the rise of the Soviet Union, the Afghan people were in a state of chaos and confusion. The Soviet Union has provided the Afghan people with the necessary support and assistance to achieve their goals. The Soviet Union has a strong commitment to the Afghan people and their future. The Soviet Union will continue to support the Afghan people in their struggle for independence and stability.

The Rise of the Afghan

The Afghan people have a long history of fighting for their independence. The Soviet Union has provided the Afghan people with the necessary support and assistance to achieve their goals. The Soviet Union has a strong commitment to the Afghan people and their future. The Soviet Union will continue to support the Afghan people in their struggle for independence and stability.

Marxist orientation. It stated that Afghanistan was governed by landowners, feudalists, bureaucrats and landlords. It called for the unity of workers, peasants and progressive intellectuals.¹² The program also demanded elementary education in their mother tongue for all children. The forerunner political program of the party adhered to the Moscow line. In 1966 the PDPA published its first newspaper and gave it the name KHALQ [The Masses]. Taraki was the publisher. After only six issues had been printed, the government banned the newspaper. The first issue had an editorial in Dari and Pashto, 20,000 copies were sold.

In 1966 four future PDPA members were elected to the Loya Jirga [lower house], and the party gained recruits among teachers and students. At one time Taraki claimed that most Khalq members were teachers.¹³

After the first PDPA Congress the Taraki and Karmal groups were united in the party for a brief time. As far as we know the Taraki and Karmal wings split in June 1967. Involved here were political, ethnic and personal factors. The first clash occurred in May 1966 and concerned the line to be taken by the KHALQ newspaper. Taraki was no longer interested in continuing an underground publication. Karmal, on the other hand, maintained his interest and, on his own, began publishing the weekly PARCHAM [The Flag]. The new name was assumed by the radical revolutionary wing of the PDPA. PARCHAM's co-editor was Mir Akbar Khyber¹⁴ whose death in April 1978 triggered the revolution. The second difference of opinion involved the nature of the revolutionary forces in Afghan society. The Khalq wing insisted on building up a working class party with strict Leninist discipline, while the Parcham wing advocated a broad national democratic front.¹⁵

The other important issue in dispute was Pashtunistan. The Khalq wing supported official Afghan policy in the Pashtunistan issue. In 1979 Khalq established contacts with the leaders of the Baluchestan National Party and the Pakistan People's Party. Subsequently Khalq changed its policy regarding the Pashtunistan issue and emphasized the need to resolve the nationality question within Pakistan on the basis of provincial autonomy. Parcham demanded the right of self-determination for the Pakistani Pashtuns as the first step toward reunification with Afghanistan and offered support for an independent Baluchestan. Khalq maintained closer ties to the Communist Party of India, while Parcham was linked to the Pakistani National Awami Party (pro-Soviet) and the Iranian Tudeh Party.

In 1973 Parcham concluded an alliance with Daoud in his struggle for power on the basis of the PDPA program. On 17 July 1973 Daoud Khan carried out a successful coup with the help of officers who were secret members of the Parcham wing. A few months later Daoud Khan's republican regime had reached its domestic and foreign political limits. Influenced by the Shah, Daoud's financial and military policies for the region turned sharply to the right. Following Iranian pressure, Daoud abandoned his earlier attitude on the Pashtunistan and Baluchistan issues. In October 1973 he closed the borders with Baluchistan, earlier used by Baluchi guerrillas. Parcham came to

appreciate that the Assad regime would not even carry on its outrageous democratic role and, in 1975, lost all hope of influencing Assad. Assad meanwhile established a network of followers in the armed forces, led by Hafizullah Amin, which resembled that of Parcham.


In 1976 and 1977 Assad approached the Shah and stated that Afghanistan would support the plan for a Common Asian Market. He also refused any support for the Baluchi national movement. In April 1978 Mir Akbar (Shaher, publisher of PARCHAM, was killed by the police. He was popular both with Parcham and Khalq. His murder brought about the reaction of the two 1978 wings, and the party feared that the assassination meant the beginning of an attempt by Assad to wipe out its leaders. When the news of Assad's death spread, the echo was immense. The cortege was led by Taraki. On 26 April 1978 Assad reacted: he had Taraki, Karmal and Amin arrested. Say A. Kadir, an officer trained in the Soviet Union and a secret member of the PDPA, attacked the presidential palace, killed Assad and handed over power to the reunited PDPA. Taraki became its leader. Government power was divided equally. Later, though, when disputes arose between the two wings of the PDPA, the Khalq group obtained the majority of posts, leaving only a few to the Parcham wing. The revolution was welcomed by the Muslims and their allies. Fidel Castro described Afghanistan as a new member of the revolutionary family. The reaction of the United States and its allies was hostile. An American expert stated: "The big game is over, and the Russians have won." 16 Pakistan, China and Iran also were alarmed.

After this brief survey of Afghan politics let us turn now attention to politics in and about Baluchistan.

Baluchistan--Political Geography

Baluchistan is an administrative and geographic term; its exact ethnic and cultural boundaries are not clearly defined. The term simply covers the country or region of the Baluchis and consists of the eastern and mainly eastern part of Iran, from Dasht-i-Lut in the west to the lower half of the Indus River valley in Pakistan, including the southwestern part of Afghanistan also. In the northwest the Gomal Pass and the Gomal river form a natural and ethnic barrier with the Pakhtuns. The Indus and the Arabian Sea make for a natural border with the Indian sub-continent.

The country is divided between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. According to data from the Baluchistan People's Liberation Front the population is estimated as 70 million.¹⁷ The region includes some 30,450,000 square miles. Zaidar is the capital of western Baluchistan (Iran) and Quetta the capital of eastern Baluchistan (Pakistan). The Baluchi region of Afghanistan is now controlled from Herat. The Baluchi regions of Afghanistan are administered from Herat, Farah and Kandahar. The Derajat and Jacobabad divisions (Baluchi region) in Pakistan are governed from non-Baluchi centers (Hyderabad-Lahore and Karachi). The language is Baluchi. There are two dialects, one eastern, the other western. The eastern dialect is spoken in the district



of Badkhi, Jambouzi, Chaghi, Buzi and others, also in the Turkestan Agency. The western dialect is spoken by the Iranian Baluchis, in the eastern part of Pakistan, the Baluch regions of Afghanistan and the Baluchistan Soviet Union. These Soviet Baluchis are of tremendous importance for policy regarding Afghanistan (Pakistan-Iran). They could well serve as a communist vanguard in Baluchistan if and when this should be necessary. In Soviet Turkmenistan the Baluchis have 9 villages and 23 educational institutions where Baluchi is spoken. Very many interesting in the last few years state publishing issues in Ashkhabad (Turkmen 1938) printed communist literature in the Baluchi language strictly for export.¹³ The first publication printed in Baluchi was Lenin's "On the State," followed by Stalin's "Peace and Citizenship."

The Baluchi population in the USSR originated in Chakmakur in Afghanistan, who also migrated from the Iranian provinces of Baluchistan, Kandahar and Chirchik. The migrations occurred in part as a result of the anti-Baluchi policies of the Iranians and Amir Abdurrahman of Afghanistan, in part for economic reasons. At the time of the Russian revolution and the 1920's and 30's Baluchis lived at the Turkmen-Iranian border, where they worked together in plundering horses and roamed the border regions. This earned them the hostility of Iranians and Turkmens. Just around this period a Baluchi leader by the name of Karim Khan appeared on the scene. He was the most successful of the leaders and managed to collect a large following around him. At the time of the anti-Soviet and counterrevolutionary attack of the Soviet Central Asian Muslims, the so-called Basmachi (Basmachi is a Russian word meaning "bandit"), Karim Khan took the side of the Soviets and fought for the Soviet revolution. At the end of the 1930's the Soviets decided to compel the Baluchis to lead a settled life, far off the border regions. They were offered no land in the Basmachi region, where most population facilities had been provided. However, the settlement of the Baluchis turned out to be a most difficult undertaking.

Though given fertile land and large sums, the Baluchis had a lot of difficulty in leaving the traditions from nomadic to settled life. In the course of the colonization of the Baluchis the Russians encountered another complicating factor: the leaders. These hereditary tribal leaders took over the functions of the Soviet administration. Under Soviet rule they not only controlled the herders and the taxes, they also supervised the distribution of state resources. And they claimed and used pressure over all the herds and villages around, including large ones, were either regarded as belonging to Baluchis or Turkmens. Consequently the Soviet administration was forced to exercise a more direct control of the Baluchis.

At the present time the native Baluchi population in the USSR is about 100,000. The main sources of income of the Baluchis are today growing on irrigated land and sheep raising. Farming is mechanized, and modern methods of fertilization and fertilization are used, resulting in a noticeable rise in their income level.

As regards their culture, they are keeping up their traditions, and their life-style is still governed by the tribal system. Though their language (Baluchi) displays strong indications of Turkic and Russian influence, the Russian anthropologist Gafferberg points out that the Baluchis manage to maintain a strong feeling of national identity. The followers of the Fada'i Party and the illegal Baluchistan National Awami Party intensively publicize the successes and privileges enjoyed by the Baluchis in the USSR.

Baluchistan and the Soviet Union

Long before India and Pakistan gained independence in 1947 the Soviets were deeply interested in political events in Baluchistan. That is evidenced by the reports of their officials and diplomats as well as the writings by Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, Khan of Kalat, the former ruler of Baluchistan. The British were highly suspicious of the Russian "forward policy" which aimed to influence Baluchis domiciled in Iran and Afghanistan by political propaganda glorifying and propagating communist doctrines. In 1927 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, at the time crown prince of Kalat and an officer in the Indian Army, sent a report to the British Resident in Baluchistan: "Influenced by Russian propaganda from the other side of the frontier, the Baluchi left their homes and small groups migrated to the Russian regions of Merv and Ashkhabad. It was noted that these emigrants sent glowing reports to their relatives and friends in Baluchistan to make the benefits of a pro-Russian attitude palatable to them. The Russians wished to break the imperialist fetters by which the English were binding them. These emigrants paint a most impressive image of Russia. They say: 'Russia is real happiness. There is such an abundance of food that we use grain as a building material. The Soviets provide free education for our children, we have no housing problems, and so on and so forth.' Simple people of course fall into the trap baited by the powerful Russian propaganda apparatus."²⁰ In another report, dated 1928, he warned the British Government that Amanullah Khan, ruler of Afghanistan, was receiving aid from the USSR and gaining the approval of the Afghans for his progressive ideas and his strong championship of Pashtun nationalism. The progressive ideas and pro-Soviet tendencies of the Afghan ruler was liable seriously to undermine the British position on the sub-Continent and encourage the communist infiltration of Baluchis and Pashtuns.²¹

According to Mir Ahmad Yar Khan the Baluchi people at the time tended to favor the Soviet "forward policy" in view of the anti-imperialist role of the USSR. Hosh Azam Jan, Khan of Kalat (1919-1933) and father of Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, as well as Nawab Mehrullah Khan, father of the present Haji leader Sardar Khair Bakhsh, were also convinced followers of the USSR.²²

According to British military reports on Khurasan (Iran) most Baluchis in Iran were definitely anti-Iranian and therefore took the part of the Soviets.

I will now describe a few details of Soviet operations in the British sphere of influence in the period 1945/1946. This material comes from a secret report by the British Consulate in Zanidan (Iran). "The Russians tried to

establish a branch of the Jirga Tuden in Zabul and are now showing a great deal of interest in tribal affairs in Makran. The Russian consular agent in Zabul occasionally visits Zahidan, Khash, Iranshahr and Sarwan, and distributes propaganda material and is said to have entered into some contacts with tribal leaders. He tells them that they may rely on the compassion of the Russian people for their sufferings which had resulted from bottlenecks in the supplies of sugar, tea, clothing, and so on, in their region. He promised to improve the situation and send goods in the very near future. (It is not clear how he is going to do that.)"

"In the period under review a Russian reading room was opened in Zabul. Recently the Russian consular agent investigated the possibility of opening another one in Zahidan. Efforts are under way in Zabul to start evening classes in the Russian language and organize weekly meetings in the reading room for discussions about Islam such as are the practice among Muslims in Russia, and about the privileges Muslims enjoy in the Soviet Union. It was also proposed to discuss general farm issues for the benefit of the peasants."

"Russian agents are very active in Makran. They distribute Russian propaganda material and try to gain recruits among the working classes by painting glowing images of future prosperity, provided they approach the Russians for help in resolving their difficulties."

All successful Russian operations in western Baluchistan followed upon Iranian attempts to "iranize" the Baluchis by political and cultural oppression and economic exploitation. Eastern Baluchistan was ruled directly or indirectly by the British Government with the avowed aim not to burden the Anglo-Iranian treasury with development expenditure. The British "forward policy" caused some strategically important railroad lines and roads to be constructed for defense purposes, for example the Bolan-Iranian railroad line to the Afghan border and the Quetta line to the Iranian border. As for the administration in Baluchistan, the region was always administered by the British from a political aspect only. For that reason great efforts were made to strengthen the tribal system. This was achieved by offering the tribal chiefs privileges, subsidies and pensions. The Jirga system (council of elders) was introduced to break down any anti-British feelings. In fact the villages of Baluchistan were deprived of all educational opportunities and political, social and economic development. British policy in Baluchistan culminated in leaving untouched the illiteracy and lack of knowledge of the people. The result was dissension and tribal warfare. Some tribes took up arms against the British, but the latter were always saved by the lack of tribal unity.

In 1930, in view of these injustices, a group of people turned to the Soviets and represented Baluchistan at the famous Baku Conference, convened by the Soviet Communists to support the nationalist struggle in the East. Miran Khan Baluch, leader of the Baluchi delegation at the Baku Conference, exercised a great deal of influence on Baluchi youth, and the first Baluchi party was established. Unity and independence for Baluchistan were its main goals. In 1934 the Khan of Kalat appointed Jirani his legal adviser."

order to prepare for an independent and sovereign Baluchistan. In 1947 Pakistan recognized the Khanate of Baluchistan as an independent and sovereign state.²⁵ At that time the Khanate consisted of the Kalat, Lasbela and Aharan districts of Baluchistan. Soon after, though, Pakistan demanded the Khanate's accession which followed without the approval of the Baluchi people. This contradicted the provisions of the treaty. In 1948 Prince Abdul Karim Khan, younger brother of the Khan of Kalat, rose against Pakistan and applied for help to the USSR Embassy in Kabul. The Soviets expressed sympathy but did not give aid.²⁶ As for British Baluchistan, the people of this region had joyfully looked forward to a new and prosperous age. They hoped that they would necessarily and soon come to enjoy socio-economic advances. As early as 1937 Jinnah had demanded autonomy for the province. In 1948, however, he rejected the Baluchis wish to obtain the status of an autonomous province.²⁷ Baluchistan continued to be a "burden" to the central government in Karachi.

In 1954 the Punjabi wing of the Moslem League proposed the merger of all provinces and states (that is Baluchistan, Baluchistan States Union, Sindh Province, Khairpur State, Punjab Province, Bahawalpur State and the North-West Frontier Province) in a single West Pakistan Province, the so-called One Unit Plan. The originators of this plan stated that it corresponds to the teaching and the spirit of Islam.²⁸ The chief motive was the suppression of the progressive forces and the national democratic movements, enabling the Punjabis to maintain their dominant status in the country and get a grip on the problem of the Bengali majority in East Pakistan.

It should be noted that the United States supported the One Unit Plan, because a West Pakistan Province as per this plan would enable the Pakistani Government to strengthen their domestic position and confront communist pressure from abroad.²⁹

The smaller provinces resisted the plan, and thousands of politically conscious workers as well as many political leaders were jailed. In 1957 the West Pakistan Assembly adopted a resolution favoring the dissolution of the One Unit. This constitutional achievement of the smaller nationalities was fought by the Pakistan Army, and the people in the small provinces continued to be held fast in the yoke of the ruling Punjabi classes. The pressure of public opinion among the Baluchis caused the Khan of Kalat to rise against Pakistan in 1958, but his attempt was put down by the Pakistani Army. From 1958-1969 Baluchistan continued to be restless. The pro-Soviet elements in the Baluchistan National Awami Party (NAP, set up in 1955 with the goal of provincial autonomy, secession from the One Unit, and a socialist economic order) supported the Baluchi rebels. Rebel leader Sher Mohd Harri published the weekly KHINGARI in Baluchi, Urdu and Bengali; he demanded the right to self-determination and a socialist economic order on the model of the USSR. But the following 11 years of military government were characterized by controls and the rule of force.

The rise of the Baluchi Left

In 1969 Yahya Khan, president of Pakistan, announced the dissolution of the One Unit, and Baluchistan was accorded the status of a province. In 1970 free elections were held in Pakistan (see table).

In the course of the 1970 elections Pakistan's foreign policy came under discussion. The NAP objected to the defensive alliances such as SEATO, CENTO, and to the Shah's policies in the Persian Gulf. The Soviets supported a "collective security system" for Asia, drafted first in 1969 by Brezhnev, general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. Many comments were recorded on the Soviet project for security in Asia. The most important and largely accepted interpretation holds that the project is designed to keep in check and isolate China which is at odds with the USSR. The second assumption is the wish of the Soviets to extend their influence in the region. Pakistan, a long-time ally of the United States and close friend of China, refused to accede to the security plan while Baluchi NAP leader Bizenjo favored it.

Party	Social Stratum/ Strongholds	Program	Foreign Policy	Seats
1. National Awami Party	Tribal leaders, educated middle class/Baluchi/Urdui regions	Socialism	Nonalignment and close contacts with the USSR and India	10
2. Jamiat-Ulmai-Islam	Upper middle class/Pashtun regions	Islam	Nonalignment	9
3. Pakistan Muslim League (Baluchi branch)	Upper middle class, industrialists/Lasbela, Naseerabad, Quetta	Islam	pro-U.S.A.	2
4. National Awami Party (Pashtun Khan)	Large landowners, middle class, tribal leaders/Zia and Khuzdar districts	Islam	Nonalignment, close contacts with Afghanistan	1
5. Independent (two joined the NAP)				

In 1971 General Yahya Khan's Pakistani Government failed to achieve a compromise with Sheikh Mujeeb, leader of the Awami League and winner of the

1970 elections, he was arrested. This led to war in East Pakistan, the establishment of Bangladesh and the fall of the pro-Pakistan (AP). In 1971 Bhutto became president of Pakistan. He called on the NAP to govern Baluchistan Province as the majority party. In the meantime he visited the US and Henry Kissinger told him "Should history repeat itself, we would assume the same attitude (in an Indian-Pakistan war), because we are convinced that it is correct."³¹ In 1971 the Pakistani Government dismissed the majority government in Baluchistan when Russian weapons were discovered in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad. At the time the Pakistani Government suspected that the Iraqi Government was supporting the plan for a "Greater Baluchistan." The NAP rejected any responsibility for the smuggled weapons discovered in the Iraqi Embassy.³² In 1974 the party was declared illegal because of its anti-Pakistan activities. The dismissal of the majority government and the arrest of members of the provincial assembly as well as of Baluchi members of the National Assembly provoked a revolt and the establishment of the Baluchistan People's Liberation Front (BPLF) with the aim of national independence. Aided by the Iranian Air Force Bhutto's Government was able to wipe out the movement within 4 years.³³ Still, the BPLF did manage to establish bases in Kandahar and Baghdad as well as within the country. In the meantime Nawab Akbar Bugti, chief of the Bugti tribe and from 1973-1974 Bhutto's governor in Baluchistan as well as a former close confidant of the Baluchi NAP leaders, tried to discredit his old friends. He claimed that for a long time past three goals had been discussed in addition to national independence: Federation with an independent Sindh state; accession to Iran; accession to the Soviet Union.³⁴

The Political Forces in Baluchistan

At this time the following strong forces may decide the future of the country:

Group I:

Baluchi National Party (BNP)

Group II

- a) Baluchistan People's Liberation Front (BPLF)
- b) Baluch Students Organization (BSO).

The Baluchistan National Party, established in 1979, is led by Mir Ghaus Bahsh Bizenjo, former governor of Baluchistan (1972-1973) and former general secretary of the erstwhile Baluchistan National Awami Party. Bizenjo comes from the middle class, studied at the Muslim University of Aligarh (India) and was a member of the All India People's Conference which was founded by the Indian National Congress for the Indian princelings and led by the late Prime Minister Nehru. He advocated an independent Kalat state and opposed accession to Pakistan.³⁵ He is a moderate and progressive leader from Baluchistan who champions socialism, secularism and federalism. At the 1970 elections his party gained the majority in the Baluchi assembly. He is

known as the "Father of Baluchistan" (I-Baluchistan) and as "father of the people" (Baba-i-Ustman). With the support of the nationalists he founded the Baluch National Party. It has a firm base in Baluchistan, Upper Sindh and Derafat (with the exception of the Marri-Bugti districts where the BNP is stronger). If there should be elections in the future, this party would emerge as the majority party though it has lost its former strong following among the students. The party calls for the support of the middle class, intellectuals, officials, small landowners and businessmen.

The Baluchistan People's Liberation Front was founded in 1972 by militant Baluchi students led by Nawab Khair Balush Khan Marri (chief of the Marri tribe). It was joined by the members of the Pakistani Study Group in London, followers of the Fourth International. This study group was established by Pakistani students in London. The majority of these students came from the Pakistani upper class. Two students, for example, who joined the Baluchi guerrillas, were the sons of a retired judge at the West Pakistan Supreme Court. In 1973 the BPLF established a military branch. Its leaders were Mir Hazar Khan, commander of the guerrilla stronghold in the Miani district, Aslam Gichki, Khair Jan (former chairman of the BSO) and Hakim Jan Lahri (commander of Nushki and Jhalwan districts).

The chief aim of the Front is the establishment of a socialist Baluchistan by force of arms. The Front enjoys wide support among students and tribal members. It has branches abroad, for instance in Baghdad, London and Paris. Mir Hazar Khan, leader of the Baluchistan Liberation Forces, and 10,000 of his followers live in a training camp near Kandahar. The future aims of the Front may be noted in a declaration by Mir Hazar Khan: "If we are able to obtain modern weapons...we will decide the time and the place, and we will accept aid from wherever we can get it. Initially the Bengalis did not wish independence. Should Pakistan continue to use force to destroy us, we will have no alternative but to choose the same approach."³⁶ The strength of the Baluchistan People's Liberation Front is reported to be 60,000.

The Baluch Student Organization (BSO) was founded in 1968. Its goal: The agreement of Baluchi students on educational, cultural and national Baluchi issues. The BSO is a frank and strong spokesman for an independent Baluchistan on the basis of national communism. Up to 1973 the BSO was controlled by a section of the moderate and progressive groups of the Illegal National Awami Party. At the 1970 Pakistani elections the entire NAW election campaign was conducted by the students. In 1973 occurred the military intervention of the Pakistani Government, leading to the dismissal of the elected government. The policies of Islamabad had an important role in the withdrawal of the BSO's radical wing. In 1973 the BSO split off from the constitutional and constitutional struggle of the NAW and declared its withdrawal from the BSO program which appeals to British-Indian as the only possible resolution of the Baluchi problem. BSO statements show dissatisfaction with Islamabad's policies. At the present time the unpopular military regime in Pakistan has limited any political actions in the country. This suits the BPLF and BSO program, because it might result in the prohibition of

the Baluchestan National Party. In October 1979 the military government issued arrest warrants for 168 members of the BSO and 20 students were in fact arrested. The BSO claimed that the government had set up military camps in each subdistrict of Baluchestan (with a total emplacement of 100,000 men) in order to wipe out the Baluchi movement for national rights.³⁷ The BSO announced that the leaders of the Baluchestan National Party were traitors because their struggle for a constitution remained ineffectual. The strength of the BSO is estimated at 10-15,000 followers.

The Soviet Attitude to the Issue of "Greater Baluchestan"

The first map of Greater Baluchestan was prepared by Mir Abdul Aziz Khan Kurd, the first general secretary and founder of the Baluchi national movement Organization for the Unity of Baluchestan. It was published on 20 August 1933 in the Anjman weekly AL-BALUCHI in Karachi. It claimed the districts of West Baluchestan in Iran, the Baluchi states of Kalat and Lasbela, and British Baluchistan, Derajat and Sindh.³⁸

In 1973 the Baluchestan Liberation Movement, domiciled in Iraq, published a map of Greater Baluchestan.³⁹ The Greater Baluchestan plan was sponsored by the Ba'ath regime in Baghdad (pro-Soviet). The bulletin JABAL (Mountain) of the Baluchestan People's Liberation Front supported the concept. The PEOPLE'S FRONT, organ of the BPLF, also published a map of Greater Baluchestan.⁴⁰

One aspect of Soviet policy in matters of the Greater Baluchestan issue may be noted in the Pikulin article "The Issue of the National Consolidation of the Baluchis," which was published in IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK UZBEK SSR No 4, 1960. He wrote that the issue of Greater Baluchestan "has not disappeared off the agenda."⁴¹ Moreover the Soviet plans regarding Baluchestan may be observed by way of the following events in Afghanistan:

1. On 20 September 1978, unprecedented in the annals of Afghanistan, a monthly magazine was published in Kabul with the title SOUB (which means "victory" in Baluchi). It is designed for the Baluchi population of Iran and Pakistan who are deprived of their cultural and political rights.
2. The land reforms carried out by Kabul assign the Baluchi nomads land in the Afghan section of Baluchestan. This is intended to mobilize the common man in Baluchestan (Iran-Pakistan), who lives in a feudal and tribal system, thereby strengthening the influence of the Parcham regime.
3. Baluchi guerrillas, led by Mir Hazar Khan and stationed in the vicinity of Kandahar, are trained with the help of the Marxist regime. If Pakistan continues its reactionary policy toward the Baluchi and refuses to withdraw its army from Baluchestan or seek a rapprochement with the moderate progressive forces such as those led by Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, the Soviets may well be able to influence the Baluchi people and advance to this strategically vital region which controls the oil route. Lastly: Are Washington and

Western Europe able to compel the Pakistani Army to remain in its barracks and grant national democratic rights to the various nationalities in Pakistan? If not, the Soviets will use the Soviet and Afghan Baluchis as their vanguard in Baluchestan (Iran-Pakistan); they will exploit for their own political advantage in Baluchestan the economic-cultural and political contradictions as well as the reactionary policies of Islamabad and Tehran. The unpopular government in Islamabad and the fanatical government in Tehran cannot cope with the challenge of a Soviet Afghanistan. The only possible solution is offered by the following: 1. Resolution of the national issue of the Baluchis in Pakistan and Iran. 2. Recognition of the moderate and progressive forces, negotiations with the radical elements. 3. Economic and cultural development of Baluchestan without interference in its autonomy.

FOOTNOTES

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ALGERIAN NATIONALISM, GENDER IDENTITY DISCLOSED

PATRIC PEUTRE NEUTERLANDERS In French *Algeria* 31 (1997) 11-17

(Article by Mohammed Saïdi: 'Algerian Nationalism and Berber identity')

[Text] Algeria is a recent political construction. The regions which it comprises have different histories. The specificity of Kabylia resides in the interweaving of several particularities: the balanced and limited absorption of Arabization and continued existence of the Berber culture. The Kabyle policy of French colonization which contributed to the formation of an important elite, its role as a reserve of men for internal and external migration, and its social cohesiveness.

For all these reasons Kabylia is right in the middle of Algeria's socio-political and cultural problems. There is no need whatever to look for the meaning of the events that shook it in the old stereotypes of colonial ethnology or Berber irredentism, the theories of anti-eastern Berberism or the sociological glibness with respect to the primordial communion of the free republics of Kabylia.

After the disappearance of the long-suppressed Berber cultural vision, the colonialist and Pan-Islamic vision of Algeria which nationalism gave one (the other very beginning was scattered). The national identity inherited from the revolution which in reality is nothing more than the reverent return of the colonial tradition on Algeria is brought up again.

Discourse of civilisation likened Algeria to a conglomerate of races without any commonness, and considered it as a gateway land where the inhabitants had demonstrated throughout history a congenital hostility to order and form systems. Colonial history disguised history to provide grounds for the legitimacy of French domination. Nationalism would have borne this message but it is now making little of reality. It would not for the socio and political phenomena of Algeria, will make reference to the existence of an Algerian nation prior to subordination, identifying it with the Arabic language and the Muslim religion. At the same time this idea concealed the historical dimension of the nation and the

problems of national integration. Its objective was immediate: to set up a dike against Francization and strengthen the distinctive features of budding Algerian nationality.

Elitist and middle-class with the oulema, populist and radical with the Algerian People's Party, Arab-Islamism was for the majority of the victims of colonial domination a patriotic reaction and a self-affirmation. Retrospectively it magnified the danger of French action in Kabylia. According to Charles Bruneau-Audoin, in the Port-National region which provided schooling for 1,000 children per year, the number of those naturalized was only 513 out of 78,000 inhabitants (1 percent)¹ in 1932.

French policy in Kabylia took its stand on the specificity of that region; its negotiation through nationalism was loaded with future dangers. The nationalism's Arab-Muslim definition did not allow recognition of a Berber identity. Jacobinism was to be unable to lessen the differences which would vigorously reappear throughout Algerian history in periods of political obstruction. In this article we will deal only with the hidden or repressed manifestations of the Berber movement. This movement was to be presented either under the banner of cultural demands or under that of the defense of the interests of the region.

1. The Berber Movement in the Algerian People's Party in 1949

Until 1945 the Berber movement in Kabylia essentially recruited its followers among the francophile intellectuals who did their utmost to reevaluate the Berber past. Pro-French, naturalized or converted to Christianity, their defense of a Berber identity suffered from the systematically maintained mixture between Berberism and speaking French or even Francization. One of them, Si Said Boulifa, the author of "Djurdjura in History," (1925) was the first editor of *Si Mohand*.² But during the second world war nationalism gained some ground. Within the ranks of the Algerian People's Party³ there occurred the influx of a cynosure of young schoolboys and students who would not embrace the Arab-Islamic ideology of their movement to bring up the cultural question.

The novelty of this even resides in the fact that the Berber specificity was insisted on by right wing supporters, and most especially the advocates of an immediate uprising. Undenominational or distant with respect to religion, the Berberists--that was what their adversaries called them--felt that the party was sinking into electoralism. But actually behind this grievance lay a problem: the phenomenon of co-optation stood in the way of the advance of the young cadres to the benefit of elements which were more amenable to being led. The battle had as its starting point the bringing back into question of the party's antidemocratic functioning; it was extended to the rejection of the Arab-Islamic concept of Algeria, and in the end, under the guise of cultural pluralism, raised the question of the territorial organization of the party on the basis of the language criterion. The bureaucratically resolved crisis ended with the exclusion

of the principal spokesmen of the Berber movement. The most extreme group was that of Ali Yahia Kaddou² which reaccepted responsibility for the statements of anticolonial Berberism and rejected any thought of Algeria's belonging to the Arab world. It found a certain echo in emigration in France. But combatted in Algeria in the name of Islam as Berber-materialists, it was to be eliminated through violence. Those men were to achieve distinction in the struggle (against Berberism): Abbass Roudane, Krim Belkacem, and the future Colonel Amirouche³ who--one of history's paradoxes--would be considered Berbers by certain of their adversaries during the war.

In the struggle against its discontents on the inside, the leadership of the Algerian People's Party was to find unexpected support among the ulama and fanatics who would call Berberism a "reactionary doctrine of imperialistic discord." A campaign without limits was undertaken against anything from far or near connected with the Berber domain. In a jumbled fashion the existence of the Kabyle chain in Edlis Algiers, "The Message of Youssouf," a historical work by the patriot, Mohammed Cherif Saouli, and the stage play by A. Nehli on "The Kahena" were all denounced.

The Algerian Communist Party which had a certain number of sympathizers among the Kabyles was to take a favorable view of the Berber movement. Its argument about Algeria as a nation in the throes of formation recognized Berber specificity. But since this put it on equal footing with that of the Europeans, the nationalists essentially understood it as a refusal of independence.

II. The War Period.

The wounds opened by the crisis in the Algerian People's Party did not leave the matter of repressed Berber identity was to move along clandestinely, and the relations between the Arab-speaking militants and the Kabyles would not always be free from mental reservations. It becomes difficult to make allowances in the personal and political struggles for the instances of regional open defiance which mutual opposition to colonial domination pushed into the background. Regional specificity is, however, a line of cleavage within Algerian nationalism. For example the discussions on the constitution of the National Liberation Front during the summer of 1954 bear testimony to this. The fear of Kabyle regionalism rising up as a political force was to weigh upon the dialogue between Didouche Mourad, spokesman of the FLN,⁴ a man from Algiers of Kabyle descent, and Krim Belkacem, a representative of Kabylia.

Exacerbating the refusal of the leadership of the Algerian People's Party to organize the party on the basis of the language criterion, Didouche was to propose a territorial partition that would divide Kabylia into two parts, one attached to the Algiers region and the other to the Constantine region. On account of its importance in military matters, Krim Belkacem ended up getting Kabylia constituted as a political-military region during a meeting with Boukhal and Boumedjenid.

Recognition of diversity, therefore, for all intents are deeply alien to the political culture of the nationalist Algerian leaders, whether they are Berber-speaking or Arab-speaking.

Jacobin and authoritarian, they were acutely aimed to approach the problems of national integration without great setbacks. Thus it was that during the war for liberation the setting up of a centralized political-military apparatus was to be constantly haunted by regional struggles and the tendency of each group to try to subordinate this apparatus for its own advantage.

On the eve of the uprising the notion of a centralized leadership commanding all loyalties belonged to a small nationalist minority. The peasants who got into the revolution in 1954 identified themselves essentially as members of a tribe or a region. Now from its inception the National Liberation Front proclaimed its will to take over the different identities and absorb them. It therefore considered regionalism to be a bringing back into question of the nation and the state which it embodied. Between 1954 and 1956 this same National Liberation Front was, however, a movement that broke out without any unity whatever. Its unification was to come about in 1956 around the pole which was the strongest, militarily speaking: Kabylia which controlled the region of Algiers as well as part of the south. Certain regions disputed the form taken by this unification, and did so in agreement with Ben Bella and Boudiaf⁷ who disapproved the program.

Ben Bella and Boudiaf were to try to revive the memory of the crisis of 1949 against the leaders of Kabylia. "The Kabyles are going to take over the revolution," went the saying in their circle. Abbane would come back at them with: "You distrust us because we are Kabyles." Until 1959 the representatives of Kabylia were to have the upper hand over the military apparatus of the revolution. The task of reestablishing order in Aures, tormented by factional struggles, was to fall to them. The regions of the south, hostile to any outside authority, were to rise against them. The prestige of Krim Belkacem, the leading man from Kabylia, was to begin to decline because of the military difficulties due to the building of the Merice line, to the Challe plan of action, but also to the interplay of the centrifugal forces of other regionalisms.

In the struggle that got under way to take control over the Army for National Liberation away from Krim Belkacem references to a Berberist danger played an important part. Krim's adversaries manipulated to their advantage the links of solidarity with the Algerians east, Orania and Aures-Somentcha. Losing speed, and overtaken by the questions raised by the unification of the army, Krim, to keep his place, used a style of argumentation based on the defense of Kabylia's interests and demanded equal representation between Arab speakers and Berber speakers. The Jacobin reflex action of his adversaries and his supporters would work against him. He was to lose the leadership of the army, dragged with him in his fall the officers from his region who had followed him.

The unification of the inside army was to be achieved in the struggle against the "Berberist danger." The general staff's reports referred explicitly to the crisis of 1949. In reality, behind the denunciation of regionalisms stood the profile of the interests of a bureaucracy in the process of formation, the arbitrary nature of which provoked self-defence reactions and the formation of dependents.

III. Reemergence of a Berber Cultural Claim

Upon accession to independence, the integration of the army was to be carried out around border region troops, mainly forces coming from the east, through the absorbing of inside resistance first (summer 1962), then through eliminating higher-ranking Kabyle officers. Including Colonel Mahand Ould Hadj⁸ (October 1963) following the uprising of the Socialist Forces' Front.⁹ Originally this organization gathered together all opposition to Ben Bella. At the time of the war with Morocco it was to transform itself into a Kabyle party around Ait Ahmed who, unlike the other leaders of the movement, would refuse to disarm. Kabylia, already cleaned out by the war, was to pay dearly for the undertaking of the Socialist Forces Front, an adventure brought on by the quest for a less dictatorial political framework. It was to worsen the traumatism created by the crisis of the summer of 1962, of which, in point of fact, it was simply an extension. The cadres rooted in the native soil who knew that the army was the thrust of the state's power experienced the bitter feeling of having been ousted at the moment when others, less involved in the battlefields, reaped the benefits of the fruit of their action. Ben Bella first, then Boumedienne, were wary of the reservations of Kabylia, which was represented from that point on by undistinguished co-opted elements.

They thought they would be able to overcome these reservations and put across a dictatorial regime by giving Kabylia privileged treatment on the economic and social level. Now at the same time their Jacobin policy, haunted by the fear of Kabyle separatism, was mortgaged by the culamas' old watchwords against all manifestations of a Berber identity. There were several attempts to suppress the Kabyle chain on the radio and lower the requirements developed by the culamas before 1934. Prompted by the will to assert the state's authority and standardize society, Arabization was originally conceived as a social control operation. Entrusted to men who were about managing the words of the people, it would serve as an indicator of all of the ways of the state, first employer and only cultural agent. Administrative Arabization, with its daily vexations in the courts, in the control of the roadways and in the schools, created tension and resistance. A tendency to reject Arabic, previously unheard of in Kabylia and arbitrarily likened to French-speaking, was to take shape gradually. The sign grew. In 1967 in Paris the Berber sign was born, and through reaction it resumed all the ideological excesses and simplifications of Arab-Islamism.

In 1971 the Algerian government took an additional step in cultural repression by suppressing the Berber professorship held by the writer, Mohamed Mammeri. The assertion of cultural identity left the university benches

and from the streets. It would find expression in the privileged use of Berber and French in a number of cafes, hotels and restaurants and even in certain administrative services of Algiers (Popular Communal Assembly and *Kiyaya*). Everything became a pretext for refusing the arbitrary decisions of the state. Under the cover of sports (the J. S. E., a football club at *Hisi-Chaou*, served as a rallying point and drew increasingly irrev- erent crowds. And in May 1977, at the stadium of Algiers, in Boumedienne's presence, the national claim became explicit. It would from then on put its stamp on all of the wrangling and all the protests against the iron curtain which was suffocating society.

The *Tijdmagijn* explored (takes aim at the ideological state and places be- fore all Algerians the problem of democracy and the right to be different. A national integration that wants to deny diversity jeopardizes the unity of Algeria which no Kabyle today questions. It is an illusion to believe that the army will escape from the struggles which are rending society. As for the leaders, it is no time for them to be talking about unity; since Boumedienne's death they have been openly trying in the barracks to use to their advantage the regional feelings of the officers. What other explana- tion could there be for the underhand campaign which Colonel Be'chaouch¹⁰ has been waging against Colonel Merbah¹¹ of Kabyle descent? And also what explanation is there for the eviction of the commanding officers, Tahar Boughouch, designated director of Air Algiers, that of commanding officer Ali B. Yaho, designated Wali at M'Sila, and of Lieutenant-Colonel Larbi Lachemi, sent from Algiers to Biskra, lest it be fear of seeing a Kabyle group — one constituted at the leadership level of the army? Algeria is in the hands of mercenaries's apprentices who without principle have played classes against each other and who are capable of playing the regions of Algiers in opposition among themselves in order to retain power. Mean- while men are in prison, accused of undermining national unity. Paris. May 1980.

FOOTNOTES

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2. El Mahoud, author of the *DEFBA*, oral poems recently published by *Moussine Nemouri* (Ed. Maspero, 1980).
3. PPA, *Front Libérateur Nationaliste* Party, founded by Messali Hadj (11 March 1931).
4. Ali Yahoia Rachid, chief of the PPA-MTD in France (1948-49). He mili- tated in the Algerian Communist Party, then in the FLN and in the FFS. He leaves Algeria after the Arabization of the bar. In Paris he founds the United Front of Algeria, Berber nationalist.
5. Aboune Hamdane, PPA leader. Principal member of the PPS (1955-57), assassinated in 1958 by his colleagues in the leadership.

--Eym Belkacem, founding member of the FLN and signer of the Evian agreements, assassinated in Frankfurt in 1971.

--Amirouch, colonel in the Liberation Army, died in combat in 1959.

6. Didouche Mourad, leader of the paramilitary organization of the PPA (1947-50), founding member of the FLN of which the Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action (April 54-July 54) was one of the promoters. Died in combat.
7. Ben Bella and Boudiaf, leaders of the paramilitary organization of the PPA, founding members of the FLN, separated for good in 1962. Boudiaf created 20 September 1962 the Party of the Socialist Revolution. Living in exile since 1963.
8. Mohamed Ould Hadj, colonel in Kabylia during the war of liberation, member of the leadership of the FLN (1964-67).
9. The FFS founded by opponents of Ben Bella among whom were Ali Ahmed, Mohamed Oul Hadj, Commanding Officer Lakhdar Bouregaa, Commanding officer Benfamed, Ahmed Taleb, etc.
10. Colonel Beltaouchet was a member of the Council of the Revolution set up by Boumedienne in June 1965, currently a member of the Political Bureau of the FLN and Inspector General of the Armed Forces.
11. Colonel Merbah, director of Military Security (1962-1979), currently Secretary General of the Ministry of Defense.

BRIEFS

RATS DEVASTATE CROPS--Cairo--Migrating rats from Canal Zone where they multiplied during the pre-October war in deserted houses and slums have destroyed 78,000 "feddans" of crops in the Governorate of Sharkia and Dakahlia in Egypt. The Egyptian Gazette reported that they are increasing daily and are threatening plants, animals and even human beings in about 102 villages. According to experts, one main cause was the indiscriminate use of pesticides and extermination of wild kites, owls and other field animals which attack rates. Even cats are reportedly unable to deal with the rat invasion in the affected areas. Another cause of rat plague is speculated to be loss of the alluvium brought by the Nile flood every year which filled the cracks in dry land where rats might breed. The open cracks provided winter homes for rats where they bred and multiplied in swarms, and now they are attacking the villages. According to authorities concerned, majority of the rats are coming from the Canal Zone where they multiplied during the pre-October war period. Following the invasion of rats a state of emergency was declared recently by Egypt's Agriculture Ministry in the two affected governorates. /Text/ /Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 8 Aug 80 p 5/

CSO: 4820

'KEYHAN' REPORTS BORDER FIGHTING WITH IRAQ

LDL211113 Tehran KEYHAN IR Jerslan / Aug 80 p 2

[Article: "Iraq's Largest Arsenal in Border Zone Burning Since Monday"]

[Text] Qasr Shirin--Iraq's biggest arsenal in the border zone near Qasr Shirin, which was blown up by Iranian forces Monday (4 August); continues to burn. In a conversation with the KEYHAN correspondent in Qasr Shirin, a reliable source in the border zone declared: "The arsenal at Shahrak [township] (Charkala) in Iraq which was blown up during clashes Monday with Iranian forces is still burning, with smoke visible throughout the region. This was Iraq's largest arsenal in this region, and supplied both the outposts in the area and the Ba'athist assailants. Iraqi border forces are carrying out intensive operations involving reinforcement and redeployment of troops."

Elsewhere, the situation in the border zone at Qasr Shirin and Kuy-e Naft was calm from 2/00 hours 2 nights ago until 1800 hours yesterday, with exchanges of fire taking place only at Tilah Kuh and Bayozai. From 1800 hours yesterday, Qasr Shirin again came under fire from Iraq. Most of the artillery fire from (Ash Daghi) hit the area around the Guards Corps, the gendarmerie regiment of Qasr Shirin, and the houses opposite the Falahat Park. As a result of the shelling one woman was killed in the area around the Guards Corps in front of the Falahat Park, and 1 children were wounded, one aged 11 years, Mahvash Ayazi, and the other aged 4 months, Babak Amiri. They were admitted to the Mehdi Jena'i Hospital in Qasr Shirin.

There was also damage to several houses. Iranian forces immediately began to confront the Iraqi forces. As a result of the shelling in front of the Guards Corps and the village of Kalashtar, the Qasr Shirin power transmission line was cut, following which Qasr Shirin was in total darkness from 1900 to 2000 hours.

GOVERNOR DESCRIBES TURMOIL IN WEST AZARBAIJAN

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 12 Jul 80 p 11

[Text] Urumiyeh--Specially dispatched KEYHAN correspondent--Dr Jamshid Haqqi, governor general of West Azarbaijan, participated in a special conversation with a KEYHAN correspondent specially dispatched to Urumiyeh concerning current issues and difficulties of the province. Concerning the rumor of the arming of the region's feudalists, he said: We have not armed the feudalists. Only a very large number of tribes have been supported by higher authorities, and they have in turn been of the greatest use to the government.

Dr Haqqi replied to the specially dispatched KEYHAN reporter who asked: Has the Revolutionary Council approved your mobilization of the feudalists in order to confront counterrevolutionaries? He said:

Arming the Feudalists

The Revolutionary Council has never said that we should arm the feudalists, and we have armed no one. We have no feudalists here. This area is made up of tribes that have tribal lives. A large number of tribes have been supported by higher authorities, and they in turn have been of the greatest use to the government. But raising the issue that they have armed the feudalists, this is truly propaganda against the government. The government had no such intention and could not have such an intention. In a region in which each member of a household has at least one weapon, what need have they of being armed? Did the government arm the [Kurdish] Democratic Party? In an entire region from Qotur and Urumiyeh upwards in which each household has a weapon? Who armed them?

There was a plan that paltry assistance be given to a limited number of tribes that had cooperated with the government for a time. Now our enemies raise this as a pretext against anyone that wishes to serve here. The limited assistance that I mentioned was a program affirmed from above, and it was not my part nor my assistant's to introduce it. These are self-interested persons who have no proof to speak against us, so they raise these issues. They themselves know they are lying. We are the government's representatives, and we execute the government's policy.

We give our views as far as we are able and also criticize the government. But we do not stand up against the government. We must strengthen the government. In this region hundreds of firearms a day are brought in from Iraq alone. Now if someone gave a few firearms to the tribes? These people are manufacturing a pretext. They are firing cannon and lay mortars. When did the government give them mortars? Did the government give them tanks? They are political bankrupts and because they have no logical proof, they resort to rumors, aspersions and lies.

We Do Not Sacrifice a Tribe for One Person

It was asked: Have you given weapons to persons from the Jahangir Dori, Omar Dori and Sami? And why are you in contact with your nephew Sanar Mamdi? Is this too a request of higher authorities? The governor explained:

They have told lies to you. They have lied so much that a person does not know how to respond. The Sanar Mamdi is a large family that lives in Salmas, and they come and go freely. We are not unbelievers that would destroy one tribe for the sake of one person. Even some of Sanar's relatives very courageously wrote letters against him during the recent events, and did things such that "Sanar" officially announced that they be killed. Even one of Sanar's closest family members wrote a letter, saying, even if you go to the end of the world I will find you, signed Hekmat Mamdi, Sanar's son. They have thought so much about it in retrospect that they say that whomever is named Mamdi is a counterrevolutionary. Suppose that we assisted one individual. They do not know under what conditions this assistance was made. They only heard that we helped someone. After all, this region's policy is in our hands. We know what the conditions and situation in this region are. They are backseat drivers always telling us what to do. However, when we want to gather a popular force and bring it to the region, no one can be found. We cannot address everything. They who are irresponsible go on making lies. It is correct that the people should know everything, but of what service is it to set forth this truth when the enemy hears it? Do you want us to say everything openly and forget about the consequences for the country? These are pure lies; they look at the issues afterward and do not understand. They do not know what aim or what advantage the government had in assisting such and such a place. They do not consider these matters, and say these things in order to confuse public opinion.

West Azarbaijan is a War Zone

Dr. Jamsid Baqru, governor of West Azarbaijan, was asked: Members of the Regional Security Council went to Khay to hold talks with persons from Sanar Mamdi; on their return they were attacked by armed Sanar Mamdi members and taken hostage. Could you please tell us what they had gone to confer about? He answered: They did not go to confer with Sanar. This region is our region, the region of officials. Officials are duty bound to go to the region occasionally by some means, and contact the people.

There are not only Sanat there, other peoples are also there. We have very important tribes in this region. Well, a person who is governor and a responsible man must visit the region. However, upon their return, perhaps because of lack of experience they fell into a trap. This is a separate issue. But what is certain is that they had not gone to confer with Sanat. Mr Kuchari, governor of Khoy, was a very responsible man, God pity him. After all, there was an attempt on my life yesterday. These problems come up. Their fate was that and our fate is this. Subsequently it is also not clear what will occur. This region is a war zone, and whoever wants to work here, the situation is thus.

Dr Haggu, concerning nightly battles, and the opposition of the people and the Military Guards to himself said:

In connection with the nightly shooting, I must say that as long as the people have weapons and real disarmament has not occurred, there will be these problems. Particularly with open borders it is not possible to prevent these problems. Of course this is one side of the story. Meaning that we must do some separation. We must separate the revolutionaries from the counterrevolutionaries. There are troublesome and devilish persons, and persons who perhaps got involved in events in other ways. Or they had no escape, and as a result of threats, intimidation and lack of confidence were trapped. We must not consider these the multitude. In Kordestan and West Azarbaijan there are many realistic people, and I have said so from the first. Even in some of these groups which had conflicts and battles with the government so many times, there were elements who considered themselves more realistic. Eventually these elements must be differentiated from other elements.

Dispute Between Governor and Guards

Another question was raised concerning the dispute of the Military Guards with us. I must say that the Guards have no dispute with us. There is only a small group whose members can be counted on the fingers which occasionally controls the Guards. They raise this issue on the basis of their own personal grudge-bearing. How much this issue affects the region is another question. However, that which is certain is that there is a group which considers us an obstacle to their purposes, and thus provokes these incidents. The people have slowly become aware, and are becoming aware; they have isolated this group. Each day their number grows less. It is unfortunate that they consider themselves associated with the Guards. The Revolutionary Guards are a revolutionary institution, which truly rendered valuable service after the revolution. They are still a revolutionary institution, and this must be taken into account. They must be organized and their organization completed on the basis of Islamic principles and rules. Elements which penetrated them with influence, and who bring up these issues are a separate matter. Those opposed to us are not Guards, because the Guards in other regions recognize us and are friendly with us, and there is mutual respect between us. It is only a minority who

have fallen out with us, and I do not know the reason for it. However, that which is certain is that first they fell out with my political assistant. They came to me and said that your political assistant is such and such, and wanted me to replace him. But I saw no reason to replace him. But since I did not act according to their taste, they also opposed me. They wish to harm us with insults, aspersions and libel.

Dr Haqqi added: That which they do here in the name of being truly faithful and revolutionary weakens the government. They produce destruction and decline in the administrative pillars and officials. They do nothing other than rain blows on the revolution and Islam. I am not the issue. This responsibility that I have undertaken is not at all important to me. This work is the continuation of those struggles which I made for many years in this path; I raised the banner of struggle against the idol's regime, and I continued to do so. This now is a continuation of the same course. If I put this responsibility aside, I will crusade in another front or position. This is our goal. Our goal is Islam and the creation of an Islamic government. One cannot joke with Islamic government and Islam. One cannot make Islam according to one's personal taste. Islam is definite and has two pillars: The tradition of the messenger, and the book of God. I will continue my path on the basis of these two standards. But if they want to apply their personal taste, we are not with them. I am not afraid of booting and uproar. They must think a little and not play with the revolution and with the pure feelings of the people. They should not consider themselves the nation's tutor. They should come and really work. Not in the fashion whereby in any meeting that is held, they immediately pull a declaration out of their pocket and force the television, radio and newspapers to publish it, and if they do not do so, threats are also made. Those surrounding them have fled and they have no one left.

Hostage Exchange

The governor of East [sic] Azarbaijan, concerning hostage-taking, said: Last year a number of different groups began to speak about exchanging a number of hostages. Of course a number were exchanged because of a number were in the government's hands. There are still a number in prison. Recently more than 60 to 70 persons were freed by the Feda'i-ye Khalq guerillas without any conditions. When you consider that the Feda'i guerillas have branched in two, this shows that probably a kind of good will has appeared in one of the branches, and that perhaps they have come to their senses and are choosing a correct path. They have a considerable number, about 100 persons, hostage in the villages of "Dul Tu" on the border. I am hopeful that some persons or groups who have made official announcements and clarified their position will free those one hundred prisoners.

The governor of West Azarbaijan was asked: For what reason did a large number of Savakii and associates of the former regime and non-Islamic groups flee to the western regions after the revolution's victory? He

SCHISM IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

We asked: what is your view concerning the schism in the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan? Mr. Hage responded:

Schism in the Democratic Party was foreseeable from the first, because there was a group in this party which thought themselves more realistic. In particular, some persons came from Japan and they had clashes with other groups. These "realistic" persons were set to thinking a bit about Gorbachev's (Mr. Hage) views. They asked this wing to change its direction.

END

END 1996

KORDESTAN DEVELOPMENTS BECOME CRITICAL

[Copy] View For News Distribution

Tehran KEYHAN In Persian 10 Jul 80 p 2

/Text/ Ghani Ballurian, a member of the Central Committee of the Democratic Party of Kordestan of Iran, who broke away a short time ago with six other people, stated in an interview with KEYHAN's correspondent, "The Ba'thist regime in Iraq is strengthening mercenary elements along the Kordestan border strip through its bases and is intending to declare a free government in Kordestan by forming a so-called liberation army."

By Ghani Ballurian's statement, Iraqi mercenary agents, by distributing an announcement along the Kordestan border area, have persuaded tribes to bring Iraqi weapons into Iran and form an army under such people as Ali Qazi, Hamed Bey, Col Aliar and Sannarmamed's agents. Through this process, they have started extensive campaigns in the past few days. Informed border sources have also reported that these people are receiving instruction directly under the supervision of Sardar Jaf, Palizban and Oveysi and are regularly attacking this border strip and the towns of Paveh, Qasr-e Shirin and Behran by means of Iraqi mortars.

This time the Iraqi government has changed its tactics and is subjecting the Iranian forces' positions to fire at night but the guards, the army and the gendarmerie are defending Iranian soil with full preparedness.

Following the nocturnal operations of the Iraqi army, which has directly engaged in committing aggression against the Islamic republic, spies and agents connected with imperialism have also engaged in extensive sabotage activities in the towns of Kermanshah, Qasr-e Shirin and Sar-e Pol-e Zahab in Kordestan.

In connection with this matter, Kermanshah police armed personnel were again attacked in an area situated in Ebrahimabad yesterday evening. In this incident, the attackers withdrew in an immediate confrontation with police officials.

The armed attackers, who have created an operations base in the areas of Kurzan and Sanjahi, were subjected to severe pressure from guards and the gendarmerie strike force strongholds and abandoned their positions one after the other.

According to a report from the Kermanshah army of guards, the guards managed to force the attackers to retreat in a severe encounter which began yesterday evening between the mercenaries and members of the army.

Likewise, information was given to the army yesterday at about 1400 hours that a group of attackers were intending to invade the village of Kurehna, and surround it. Informed of this occurrence, the army of guards stationed in the Khurezard district of Sanjahi brought their forces to the village situated on the line of attack along with the gendarmerie strike force. At the stipulated time the word was given that this village was being attacked from four sides. However, the attackers withdrew under unopposed fire from the guards and the gendarmerie forces.

The armed personnel, who were not able to carry out their objective of stealing the livestock and possessions of the inhabitants of this village, attacked another village, name of Sabzeh Barrac. This clash also continued until the early part of the evening and the attackers succeeded in escaping.

Regarding the status of the Sanjahi and Kurzan areas, where the inhabitants have repeatedly been subject to attacks and raids by counterrevolutionary elements, Parta'i, who is in charge of public relations for the army of guards in Kermanshah, stated "With the formation of the army of guards in the region, in coordination with the gendarmerie and the people of the area, we have to a large extent succeeded in bringing security to the region."

Following the raids in the border strip areas in the west of the country yesterday afternoon, the border posts of Bavar, Bialekan, and Baranlu and the border posts of Khosravi and Qasr-e Shirin once again fell under the direct artillery fire of Iraqi forces and their mercenaries yesterday evening. The guards and other Iranian forces responded to their attacks. A report has yet been presented on yesterday evening's probable casualties in the border areas.

By the report of KETAN's correspondent from Qasr-e Shirin, the army of the Iraqi Ba'ath subjected the border posts of Bavar and Bialekan, where the guards were defending, to intense artillery and mortar fire yesterday evening at 2000 hours, and the attacks were resisted by the army of the army of guards and the regular army.

These attacks lasted in sporadic fashion until 2400 hours. No information is available on the casualties on either side.

contact with Yasser Arafat was put off. After this period of 7.3 (that is, the period from 0:00 to 0:03 hours in the morning) the transmitter resumed its normal program at full strength."

Also, the following statement has been jointly issued by the legal government of the Islamic Revolutionary Court, the 25th Army of Kordestan and the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary guards situated in Sananda):

"In the name of God almighty:

"Those who possess faith and repent the evil and unpleasant acts which - we have committed unknowingly God and the prophet will spare (the holy Koran, honorable and Moslem people of Kordestan, that is, people who unknowingly have risen and followed the deviationist anti-Islamic and anti-Moslem group and have wandered from your home and hearth, think once more about this appeal for justice which calls upon you to return to the embrace of Islam. The Islamic revolutionary court of Kordestan, the army of the Islamic revolution of Iran and the army of guards of Kordestan are hereby giving you the opportunity to return to your home and hearth, in the event you have not participated directly in the clashes and the killings, hand over your arms and continue your lives in the shelter of Islam and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is clear that this opportunity will last until the region is purged."

Page 3. PARS/IRAN 10/01/80/100

Tehran KEYVAN in Persian 10 Jul 80 p 13

Yesterday afternoon, members of the Movement of Persons Driven out of Iraq held a meeting in the Higher Institute of the Martyr Motahari, condemned the actions and the conduct of the Iraqi Ba'athist government and declared their utmost aversion and contempt for imperialism.

At this conference, which was held in the presence of Islamic organizations of Iraq with the objective of protesting against that country's fascist regime, representatives of the fighting Islamic revolutionary clerics of Iraq, the Movement of Persons Driven out of Iraq, the Movement of the Moslems of Iraq, the Islamic Liberation Front of Bahrain and Hojjatoleslam Hamidzadeh gave talks.

After describing Iran's international situation, Hojjatoleslam Hamidzadeh stated, "In a world in which great war and cry is raised from the court of the Hague to the Defenders of Human Rights when two or three thieves and three smugglers are executed and people describe Iran as the slaughterhouse of human rights, how is it that these defenders defending human rights fall silent, as if they have died, when thousands of women, children and oppressed people are driven from their home and hearth by fraud and deceit and driven to the Iranian borders in trucks like bricks, stones and dirt?"

[illegible]

in consultation, organizational employees should be Maximize of their own
efforts to provide information, activities and policies regarding the event
who are being requested. According to a report from RAYMOND's correspondence,
a representative of the Maximize of Jackson Prison and of Long Island Prison
to a list of his only at the same meeting.

*anyone with a GUY 101 and a JOURNAL OF THE 100 can get a copy of the book. All you need to do is send in a letter to the publisher, J. B. Lippincott, and you will receive a copy of the book. The book is available for purchase at a special price of \$1.95. The book is available for purchase at a special price of \$1.95. The book is available for purchase at a special price of \$1.95.

¹¹ V. A. Kargin, *ibid.*, no. 20, 1966, p. 1066 (Russian translation *Izv. Akad. Nauk SSSR*).

¹ $\alpha = 0.05$ and $\beta = 0.10$. For configuration 41, the 100% sensitivity approach was used; for 11, 100% sensitivity was used for 2, 75% sensitivity was used.

[illegible]

"Muslim people of Iran, know that if you do not respond to the cry of the deprived people of the world you will have betrayed your own revolution."

On the question of what the objective in forming the Movement of Persons Driven out of Iran was, the representative of the Movement of Persons Driven out of Iraq state, in an exclusive interview with KEYHAN's reporter at the conclusion of yesterday's meeting:

"This movement has been formed by brothers who have been driven out of Iraq. The motive in forming this movement was for us to draw the world's attention to those people who have been expelled and for it meanwhile to be a stronghold for people who are in Iraq and with whom we cooperate. We have now formed military branches to overthrow the government of Iraq." In response to the question on what goal the Iraqi government had in driving the Iranian brothers out of Iraq he then said, "Their goal was to avoid the exportation of the Islamic revolution of Iran there; among the persons they have expelled there are merchants, young intellectuals, students and workers who were active there, responded to the emam's statements, listened to the news of Iran and the emam's words with their souls and hearts, and informed people about the fundamentals of Islam. Of course, they had introduced spies and saboteurs into the midst of these people and meanwhile this exodus which the Iraqi Ba'athist government caused took place at a time when Iran was undergoing an economic boycott; this was America's role."

In response to our correspondent's question "What expectations do you have of the Iranian government and people?" the representative of the Iraq movement then pointed out, "At the start of the exodus, Emam Khomeyni issued a declaration regarding the people who had come to this side of the border and, regarding assistance for them, stressed that the Iranian government had unfortunately not yet responded to the emam's statement. We have seen no type of activity on their part which would introduce us to the world,

"One of the plans which we presented to the office of the president was for them to invite all the correspondents and international organizations, the Red Cross and Human Rights to go to the border and see our situation, but unfortunately this has not been done yet. The second was for all the foreign ministers of the Islamic countries to be invited so that an Islamic conference could be held here and so that a practical program could be prepared to attain the rights of the people driven out of Iraq. The final subject concerns the housing of refugees, which they should study, and we have asked the government to form an investigating committee which will give loans in various towns to those who have been driven out - not of course for free but payable in the form of long-term instalments."

Excerpt of Communications

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 19 Jun 80 p 4

Yesterday, on returning to the Tehran office, the correspondent sent out by JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI reported that Kordestan's communications tower had been

entirely destroyed by counterrevolutionary elements. This explosion occurred Monday at midnight in the Harvard-e Kermani Pass at Bazar-e Kordestan's telephone contact with all areas of Iran was thus severed. In this connection the Islamic Communications Society has published a declaration, as follows:

"In the Name of God the Most Gracious and Most Compassionate"

"Once again the hand of the western and eastern criminals has emerged from the sleeve of the agents of the satanic parties (the Komala, democratic and fedai's), the Islamic communications tower has been destroyed, and telephone communications between our brothers and sisters in Sanandaj and the other parts of Iran have been severed. We severely condemn this unprovoked revolutionary act and request the army of the Islamic republic to be more vigilant in preserving and fully securing the area.

"The Islamic Society of the Holy War of Construction of Communications of Iran,

Security Has Returned to the Kermanshah-Sanandaj Highway

In another report, our correspondent states that the Kermanshah-Sanandaj highway has opened, with complete security for travelers. The army of guards, in the course of a declaration, has advised the immigrant travelers to have an identification card or their identity card with them when passing over these highways.

Counterrevolution Has Deprived People of Sanandaj of Restful Sleep

Monday about 10 Komala, democratic and fedai's sympathizers in Sanandaj, most of whom were girls, made a demonstration in the vicinity of the Bazar-e Mosque and cried out slogans against the Islamic revolution. The demonstrators, who were also armed, finally began to act crudely and wounded the commander of the Muslim Peasants' March team, Khalil Raza'i, in the leg with some gunshot. The Muslim Peasants' March gave notice that they condemned all forms of disturbing in the name of demonstrations and would behave severely. Three major agitators were arrested in these clashes.

The Muslim Peasants' March Organization has said the counterrevolutionary forces are depriving the Muslim and people of the town of tranquility and even fear at night will limit decreased sleeping.

A Counterrevolutionary in Sanandaj Is Sentenced to Death

According to the same report, one person named Ali ibn Is'fari was sentenced to death by the Islamic revolutionary court of Sanandaj on Monday for the crime of taking up in arms against the Islamic revolution in the Republic of Iran and actively participating in the western classes. The verdict was immediately carried out.

Counterrevolution Is Disturbing the Work of the Holy War of Construction
in Sananda]

According to the most recent item of news received from the Holy War of Construction in Sananda], this organization has begun its work with the utmost seriousness and so far has succeeded in preparing a municipal waste disposal canal by hiring 600 workers. Of course the counterrevolution is causing a lot of problems in the work, partly by spreading the rumor among workers that that is not a sewage [canal] but a trench or grave for burying the dead, and they are obstructing work in various areas. However, in spite of all this activity, the Holy War of Construction is progressing well.

In another area, 200 people have been expelled so far in the purge in the education department on grounds of cooperating with armed groups and not standing in the revolutionary path.

1184]

CSO: 4 96

NEW OFFENSIVE UNDERWAY IN KURDISTAN

NC241345 Paris AFP in English 1323 CDT 24 Aug 80

(Text) Tehran, 24 Aug (AFP)--Iranian Government forces have launched a new offensive in Kurdistan that is intended to regain control over Mahabad, the last city still in the hands of the rebellious Peshmergas.

In clashes yesterday in the Kermanshah region of southern Kurdistan, according to the Iranian army, 153 members of the rebel forces were killed. The report was published on the front pages of Iranian newspapers today.

Official reports said that the commander of government forces ordered the civilian population to evacuate Kermanshah late yesterday. Troops then gathered the city to flush out Kurdish dissidents.

Government losses in the operation were given as one dead and four wounded. The figures are impossible to verify since Kurdish autonomist leaders are all underground and the embattled region has been closed to foreign newsmen. Telephone communications between most of the Kurdish towns and other regions of the area have also been cut.

Fourteen representatives of Mahabad conferred Friday with the governor of Western Azerbaijan, who told them that government forces would soon retake control of the city. Mahabad is the headquarters of the democratic party of Iranian Kurdistan (DPKI).

According to the Iranian News Agency Farsi, the 14 representatives obtained from the government a 3-day delay in operations against the town. Troops are now scheduled to move against Mahabad tomorrow.

In operations yesterday at Deywandrud in Sarminakhan Province, 50 km (30 miles) from the Iraqi frontier, 11 pro-government revolutionary guards were killed, with 144 reported. Eight others die in fighting yesterday at Sardasht in Azerbaijan, which is also close to the Iraqi border.

The newspaper KORDA reported today that a PDKI military commander, a Mr. Ahmadi, had been assassinated late yesterday at Mahabad in front of the party's headquarters.

KEYHAN said that one of the assassins and an aide to the colonel were killed in the attack.

Meanwhile, the government has ordered the civilian population of the frontier provinces of Kermanshahan, Kordestan and Ilam to extinguish all lights at night because of "the possibility that Iranian air space will be violated."

The commander of the revolutionary guards at the frontier town of Qasr-e Shirin told KEYHAN that two Iraqi MIG fighters had entered Iranian air space late yesterday.

Military sources in western Iran told KEYHAN that the decision to impose the blackout was based on information that an attack by Iraqi forces was imminent.

CCO: 4920

HOJJAT AL-IBRAHIM BAHMANI ADDRESSING KORDJESTAN GATHERING

LM122510 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1930 GMT 12 Aug 80

[Text] According to a PARS report from Shar-e-kord, Hojjat al-Islam Dr Bahman, a member of the Council of Cultural Revolution and a Mujlis deputy, today addressed a meeting of the people of Shar-e-kord at the majlis al-Zaman Mesqua on the occasion of 'Id al-Fitr.

Explaining the achievements and features of the Islamic revolution under the leadership of Imam Khomeyni and the importance of the people's role in bringing the revolution to fruition, he stressed the necessity of increased contacts between the nation's officials and the masses.

He said that the anti-people regime of the past, which confronted the masses and was the enemy's appointee, made great efforts in suppressing, exploiting and plundering the nation, in a way that the nation suddenly realized that agreements worth \$42 billion had been concluded with the United States whereby this money would have been paid to the American government and the American Government would give to Iran whatever it wanted.

He added: 'Yet under the shadow of the Islamic revolution of Iran, under the leadership and blessing of Imam Khomeyni, the regime fell into the hands of the oppressed and all the agreements were canceled.

Referring to the appointment of Mr Rafsaji as prime minister, Dr Bahman added: 'Mr Rafsaji is an Islamic, revolutionary and dedicated personality in line with the Imam. He expressed the hope that the new cabinet will be formed on the basis of the Imam's directives and it will work with the cooperation of the president for the creation of a society of Islamic justice.

At the conclusion of his speech he asked the people to accept a greater role in the construction of their cities and villages through participation in the social, administrative and reconstruction activities, and to attend gatherings to neutralize counterrevolutionary conspiracies.

IRAN

GOVERNMENT ISSUES DIRECTIVES ON SOVIET CONSULATES

[JN241920 Editorial Report] Tehran International Service in Arabic at 1800 GMT on 24 August 1980 carries the following press headline, among others, in its press review program without further elaboration: "The Islamic Republic asks the Soviet Union to close its consulate in Rasht in view of its sensitive location and the uselessness of its presence in this region, which is close to the Soviet Union. The Iranian Government asks the Soviet Union to open its consulate in Esfahan instead, in view of its necessity due to the many Soviet subjects present in this city."

CSO: 4920

SHAH'S MEMOIRS REVEAL WEST'S POLITICAL GAME

LD081217 London NOW! in English 8-14 Aug 80 pp 13-15

[Extracts from the Shah of Iran's Memoirs: "The West's Cruel Game With the Dying Shah"; first four paragraphs are editorial introduction; passages between slantlines represent editorial insertions]

[Text] When the Shah of Iran was thrown out of his country in January last year he was already a dying man. For six years he had kept from his people the secret that he had lymphatic cancer, although this was known to most world leaders, including President Carter.

In the year and a half of his sad and often pathetic exile, the Shah travelled the world in search of the medical treatment he so urgently needed. Often, the sanctuary he sought was denied him in a cruel diplomatic game played by the United States and Britain.

Denied permanent residence by countries who once called themselves his allies, the Shah was forced to wander from Egypt, to Morocco, Mexico, the Bahamas and Panama, then back to Egypt. During this period, he worked on his memoirs, answer of history, parts of which were exclusively serialized in NOW! last December. As he lay dying in Cairo, he revised the last chapter which covers his months in exile.

It provides a poignant record of the Shah's exile before he was finally given refuge by President Sadat in March this year--and shows that even that move was opposed by his one-time allies for fear of disturbing the Middle East power balance.

/The extracts begin with the Shah being urged by his doctors to go to New York for an emergency operation:/

I had planned on going there soon after leaving Iran (January 1979) but while in Morocco I began receiving strange and disturbing messages from personal friends in the U.S. who were in touch with the government and from sources within the Carter administration. The messages although not unfriendly were very cautious: perhaps this is not a good time for you to come; perhaps you could come later.

About a month after my departure, the tone of the messages became warmer and suggested that I could, of course, come to the United States if I were so inclined. But I was no longer so inclined. How could I go to a place that had undone me?

/Instead, the Shah and his family found temporary sanctuary in the Bahamas:/

My contacts there with the United States were minimal. Through various channels I was assured that my family was always welcome in the U.S. and that I could always go there for medical treatment.

But increasingly Washington signalled some uneasiness about my presence. Perhaps that feeling was transmitted to the Bahamian government.

Then, 10 days before the visas were due to expire, we learned they would not be renewed. We had 10 days in which to leave the Bahamas!

I now have my own theories, as to why we were asked to leave. Although the Casino interests are the financial mainstay of the Bahamas, the government has always responded like a puppet when Britain pulled the strings. British influence in his former territory has remained strong, as it has elsewhere in the crown's colonies.

I have a longstanding suspicion of British intent and British policy which I have never found reason to alter. With the U.S. distant and cool, and the British, as always, hostile, Bahamian Prime Minister Pindling wanted me out--despite the enormous sums I spent there for my 10 weeks' stay.

/In June last year, following approaches to Mexico's president, Lopez Portillo, by Henry Kissinger and White House officials, the Shah took up residence in Cuernavaca, near Mexico City. Four months later he was flown to the U.S. for medical treatment:/

During my stay in New York hospital there was little direct contact with the U.S. administration. President Carter never phoned or sent a message, neither did any other high U.S. official. I watched some television and wondered again at the media's obsession with the small groups of anti-Shah demonstrators that paraded near the hospital. As usual, little note was taken of expressions of support.

Two weeks after my arrival in New York, militant fanatics in Tehran occupied the American embassy. Although Washington did not communicate with me directly, the signals were unmistakable. The administration wanted me out of the country just as quickly as was medically possible.

It is increasingly difficult not to believe that Western policy in Iran, and indeed around the world, is dangerously short-sighted, often inept, and sometimes downright foolish.

I base these conclusions upon many recent observations.

To cite just one, a television broadcast of UN Security Council proceedings on the hostage crisis. There on my screen was Anthony Parsons, now the British ambassador to the United Nations. A year before he had been her Majesty's envoy in Tehran. I could hardly believe my ears! I can only recall the gist of his remarks. "Let these people come, and explain their revolution to us"--and he meant the members of the Revolutionary Council who had already massacred so many innocent people.

This was the same Parsons who told me in 1978, when I planned free elections, that if I lost them--and my throne--I would go down in history as a ruler who had lived up to his democratic ideals.

This performance was a classic example of the West's double standard. As I watched Parsons' incredible performance I began to wonder if there had ever been any coherence to Western policy toward Iran beyond a successful effort to destroy me.

By the end of November the U.S. wanted me out of their country at almost any cost, and I was as eager to go. Then the Mexicans dropped the next bombshell. One of their diplomats arrived at New York Hospital with a note from the Mexican Government: I would not be given a new visa.

/The Shah accepted Washington's offer of a convalescent stay in Lackland Air Force Base, near San Antonio, Texas:/

Our departure from New York Hospital resembled a "getaway" scene from a 1930's gangster film. About 30 heavily armed FBI men guarded all the doors and exits and were posted in the street and the inside hallways. In making arrangements for my arrival at Lackland the Pentagon had issued few instructions.

The base command has little idea of how ill I was or what security requirements were necessary. When we arrived, therefore, we were put in a hospital van and driven to the most secure part of the hospital--the psychiatric ward, rooms with barred windows and locked doors. It appeared as if we had been imprisoned. Once we were installed in the officers' quarters, things began to improve.

/White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan and Special Counsel Lloyd Cutler pushed ahead with arrangements for the Shah's next destination--Contadora Island, Panama--after other options failed:/

Austria and Switzerland were asked to take us and both again said no. South Africa was discussed, so was Britain. Shortly after I left Iran I was informed that Margaret Thatcher had assured us we would be given asylum in English should she win the upcoming British elections. But after she became Prime Minister, we were told it would be awkward for her to have us come. That position did not change.

An oral agreement was reached, guaranteeing full U.S. support for me should any medical and safety problems arise in Panama. Cutler and Jordan promised full White House support for the move; I would be assured access to Gorgas Hospital in the former Canal Zone, an American military installation with modern and up-to-date equipment.

Dr Benjamin Kean (who was in regular attendance to the Shah) had some doubts about how well the hospital had been maintained but acknowledged that it had once been among the finest. What is more, the administration's men said, the Panamanian hospital at Paitilla was also first rate. And, in case of any real emergency, I would still be able to return to the U.S. Jordan assured me of President Carter's full support.

After we reached an agreement with the White House, President Carter telephoned. He warmly wished me good luck and reiterated the assurances of his aides. It was the first and only time I had spoken with the President since wishing him farewell on New Year's Day 1978 when he was visiting Tehran.

/The Shah moved to Contadora:/

On January 12 Iran's new rulers opened the next phase of their unrelenting war on history and on myself: they demanded that the Panamanian Government arrest me. The move did not surprise me but the hesitation shown by my hosts did.

Instead of treating the demand with the contempt it deserved, Panamanian authorities began contributing to Rumours that they were indeed in contact with Tehran, and negotiating better arrangements than the UN had offered. They would exchange me for the hostages.

It was the beginning of a strange and ominous double game. For even as the stories circulated, the Panamanians simultaneously hastened to assure us--in secret--that there was no way I could be extradited since such extradition would violate Panamanian law.

Sadeq Qotbzadeh (the Iranian Foreign Minister) fired the next salvo. He claimed I had been placed under house arrest in Panama. On January 24 the Panamanian Government issued an official denial. Yet days later the government waffled on the denial.

This cruel game continued into February. On February 7 Panama's foreign minister said I was a "virtual" prisoner because I was not free to leave Contadora without Panama's permission. Gradually government pressure was increased, directly and indirectly.

The 25 or so Panamanian security men--a motley group dressed in jeans and t-shirts and toting M-16 rifles or UZI submachine guns--seemed to be our guards rather than our protectors. My staff noticed security growing lax while the tapping of our phones grew cruder.

Increasingly I began to sense that an effort was underway to isolate me from the rest of the world. Both the White House and General Omar Torrijos (commander of Panama's national guard) had assured my staff that we would not be victimized by price gougers. Torrijos had gone out of his way to direct any complaints to his office. When my aides finally did complain about high prices, the White House promised to look into the matter but never bothered.

On one occasion I flew to Panama City for a secret meeting with the American ambassador who said he had a message from President Carter. The message was almost meaningless. He told me not to worry, that everything was under control and would be all right. But things were not all right. Pressure mounted.

Early in March one of my American aides, Mark Morse, was arrested by Panamanian authorities and held for several hours before U.S. embassy pressure obtained his release. I began to wonder if I would ever get out of Panama, or get out in time.

The die was finally cast by my illness. The cancer had flared up again in February and spread to my spleen. Surgery was recommended and it was suggested that the famous Dr Michael de Bakey perform the operation at Gorgas Hospital.

Then another bombshell exploded. The U.S. ostensibly had always held Gorgas Hospital open to us. However, the Panamanians now demanded that the operation be performed at their Paitilla Hospital.

/According to the Shah the next act in the bizarre drama "resembled a medical soap opera":/

Early in March, Dr Kean and one of my American aides, Robert Armao, met with Dr Garcia, General Torrijos' private physician and part-owner of Paitilla Hospital. Garcia was adamant that the operation be done at Paitilla. Dr Kean argued the facilities there were not adequate, that we had purchased an expensive IBM blood-separator and installed it at Gorgas. Blood would have to be taken from Paitilla and rushed to Gorgas for analysis.

The discussions grew heated. The Panamanian doctors were emotional and hot-tempered. My people found it difficult to understand why any medical professional would let false nationalist pride override the welfare of a patient. Dr Garcia then bluntly said that "we're just following Carter's orders" and that we were to do what we were told.

On March 11 we decided on the inevitable surgery. Dr de Bakey had agreed to perform the surgery at Paitilla. Arrangements were made for moving my entourage from Contadora to Panama City. When Dr de Bakey, Dr Kean, and their U.S. medical team arrived, security guards refused to let them in. Tense and hostile negotiations followed. Garcia was rude and unyielding. There was "no need" for the American team, Panamanian doctors were "perfectly capable" of performing what he called simple surgery.

Of course I considered his attitude insane, but in the end it helped me. I understood that my life was at stake here, and I was not about to lose it to the personal insecurities of mediocre doctors. Dr Kean and Dr de Bakey counselled against an operation at Paitilla, and said surgery could be postponed for a while without imminent danger. The next morning I left the hospital and returned to Contadora.

/The Shah decided to accept President Sadat's offer of asylum. Lloyd Cutler tried, without success, to change his mind:/

My trip to Egypt, he said, could endanger Sadat's position and with it the whole peace process in the Middle East. Houston was a possibility for my surgery, of course. The terms of the Lackland agreement had been specific on that point. Nevertheless, any such move during the delicate negotiations now underway could endanger resolution of the hostage crisis.

The best solution, clearly, for Carter, was for me to remain in Panama. Now the concessions came quickly. Of course, the operation could be performed at Gorgas; Panamanian doctors were anxious to apologise to Dr de Bakey. Cutler was persuasive but my decision was virtually made.

I did not have to think very hard. For the last year and a half, American promises had not been worth very much. They had already cost me my throne and any further trust in them could well mean my life.

/Last March the Shah left Panama for his final exile in Egypt:/

We boarded a stripped down DC-10 in Panama City. It was a long, uncomfortable flight. The plane resembled a tourist cattle car. At dawn we landed in the Azores. A Portuguese general and the American consul were waiting at the airport. Though sick and feverish, I rose, straightened my clothes and prepared to receive them. I have always believed in protocol and the manners it requires. Civility is the lubricant of international discourse.

Finally we landed in Cairo where President Sadat and his wife waited to greet us in the bright sunshine. An honour guard was posted behind him; I could see I was being greeted with full military honours. I walked proudly over to President Sadat and his wife and warmly embraced them. "Thank God you are safe," Sadat said in English, and I was safe indeed.

CSO: 4920

'KEYHAN' CITES AYATOLLAH'S REMARKS ON ATTACKS AGAINST POLITICAL PARTIES

LD121127 Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 7 Aug 80 p 15

[Unattributed report: "Ayatollah Musavi-Ardabili: 'Attacking [Political] Groups is Not Imam's Line'"]

[Text] Prosecutor general for the revolution Ayatollah Musavi-Ardabili was asked the question [place, occasion not specified] "Attacks on political groups and offices are regularly taking place in the holy name of Islam; what effect will the action of these individuals have on the course of the revolution?"

In reply, he stated: "Any sort of agitation, lack of discipline, assault on judicial security or opposition to the stipulations of the law of the country and the explicit laws of Islam constitute irreparable injury and damage to the revolution."

In reply to a question regarding the occupation of [political] party offices, the reason why this problem has arisen at this juncture and what should be done to prevent a repetition of this type of incident, he added: "Certain speeches, incitement, an atmosphere conducive [to these attacks], the people's passion for reform and perhaps many other factors are bringing about these problems."

In reply to the question "Under what conditions does the constitution allow political parties to operate?" the Ayatollah Musavi-Ardabili stated: "Honest political activity, far removed from conspiracy and incitement. Of course, these groups must prove their legitimacy by following the orders of the government and submitting to the current laws of the land."

In conclusion the prosecutor general added: "The Imam's line consists of exposing the [political] parties; attacking them is not the Imam's line."

CSO: 4906

FARS GOVERNOR ASKS QASHQAI TRIBE TO SUPPORT REVOLUTION GUARDS

GF161738 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1400 GMT 16 Aug 80

[Announcement published by Mohammad Nabi Habibian, governor general of Fars and officer responsible for coordination headquarters for the tribes of Fars--no date given]

[Text] In the name of the Almighty. To the citizens of Fars Province and the courageous and faithful tribesmen: For the general safety of the courageous citizens of Fars and in order to establish discipline throughout the province, the members of the armed forces, in unity and cooperation with the Revolution Guards, are acting in accordance with their religious duty and conscience. These forces, which are the arms of the glorious Islamic revolution, are completely ready to fight against all counterrevolutionary elements and to declare their identity with the Iranian nation in cooperation with the courageous and faithful people of Fars and courageous tribesmen.

These forces, under the leadership of Imam Khomeyni, are therefore ready at any time to stand up to any plot and to stamp out any foreign and traitorous element. This headquarters is certain that our brothers in the Fars tribes fully support the Islamic Revolution of Iran. It is certain that any plot will be stamped out by these courageous brothers, providing the answer to rumormongers trying to upset them with their false rumors. The armed forces will always protect the suppressed tribes.

[signed] The governor of Fars and officer responsible for coordination headquarters, Mohammed Nabi Habibian.

CSO: 4906

FOREIGN SCHOOL CLOSURE DEPRIVES THOUSANDS

Paris LE MONDE in French 4 Aug 80 p 2

[Text] Msgr Hilarion Capucci, apostolic delegate for the Melchites of Europe, arrived in Tehran on Friday, 1 August. He will deliver two messages from Pope John Paul II, one to Imam Khomeyni and the other to President Bani-Sadr. The Palestinian prelate said that his mission would be limited to a search for a solution to the question of the Catholic schools which were recently closed at the same time as all foreign educational institutions.

Tehran. The recent closure of all foreign schools in Iran particularly affects French-speaking institutions. In reality, the first measures limiting the activities of foreign schools date back to the previous government: in 1976, Mr Hoveyda's government decided to nationalize education. At that time, it is true, this was a matter of extending state control to private schools; and an agreement had been concluded with foreign institutions.

Among them, the Saint-Louis de Tehran Secondary School, which was established 18 years ago by the Lazarist Fathers at the request of the Count of Gobineau, had 500 students, including 30 Christians, when the revolution broke out. Three priests were working there up to the recent closure. Another Lazarist school in Tabriz gave French classes to about 600 students. For their part, the Sisters of Charity up to this year taught 4,000 pupils in their four private schools in Tehran (the Jean d'Arc School where former Empress Farah had studied), Espahan, Rezayeh and Tabriz. For their part, the Italian congregations (Salesian Fathers, Daughters of the Helping Hand of Mary [Marie-Auxiliatrice]) taught about 4,000 students.

Remaking the School System in Persian

One common objective of these schools maintained by Western Catholic orders was to provide education in a foreign language on a half-time or part-time basis: French or English. Students who came from the middle class, for the most part Moslems, found themselves in a select group in these schools since, although education in Persian was free there, the part in a foreign language required a fee; and openings were scarce.

To the institutions mentioned here, we must add those which are in the service of Christian, Jewish or Zoroastrian minorities. Many of them in reality have been largely open to Moslems over the last several years; e.g., the Hamadan Jewish school, where only a few Israeli children are still enrolled and whose non-school day is now Friday, as elsewhere in Iran. These institutions are threatened today by the requirement that boys and girls be separated and, therefore, the need to double the classes and permit a normal Islamic curriculum for the Moslems of the district. Only the "internal director," a kind of deputy, continues to be a non-Moslem in the administration.

Finally, the foreign lay institutions, at times very large, provided education highly valued by the elite. This is the case with the Razi Secondary School, which is run by the French lay mission, whose many imposing buildings near the posh districts of Tehran, which were inaugurated in 1967 by General de Gaulle, accommodated up to 3,000 students from nursery school through secondary school.

Among these students were children of Frenchmen residing in Iran, but also of French-Iranian or even Iranian couples. The chaotic existence of the Razi Secondary School since the revolution, its provisional closure on several occasions, the sharp decline in teaching personnel due to departures for the homeland and, finally, the ban imposed last year on the enrollment of new students, fostered the belief for some time that the school was going to be closed. However, the decision was doubtless delayed out of regard for the handful of children of the new leaders who, owing to the fact of an involuntary exile in France, had begun their schooling in the language of Voltaire.

Now it will be necessary to remake the entire school system in Persian. For those mentioned above, most of whom are French-Iranians, transitional measures have been announced, such as remedial classes, in addition to the mandatory Iranian program.

The several thousand students whom the foreign institutions accommodated certainly are insignificant vis-a-vis the million or more Iranian students. Nevertheless, under the previous government they played an important part in Iranian educational policy and in ties with the West.

8143
CSO: 4900

PRELATES PROTEST TREATMENTS OF HOSTAGES, CHURCH SCHOOLS

Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Aug 80 pp 1, 6

[Article: "Tehran Parliament Expected to Form a Committee to Prepare Hostages' Trial"]

[Text] During its next session, the Iranian parliament will consider the possibility of forming a committee to "prepare the trial of the American hostages," the president of the assembly, Ayatollah Rofsandjani, announced on Monday, 4 August. He added: "The United States do not care about the fate of the hostages. They used this question for their elections, to arm themselves and to repress our revolution."

For his part, Imam Khomeyni, on reading Sunday evening, 3 August, a message from John Paul II brought to him by Mgr Hilarion Cappucci, criticized the pope for being "on the side of the oppressors, not on that of the oppressed." He mentioned the "maltreatment" inflicted on 171 Iranians imprisoned in the United States after their arrest following demonstrations near the White House.

In his letter, John Paul II interceded with the guide of the revolution on behalf of the Christian schools which have been closed recently.

Tehran--A true "lesson in Christianity" is what Imam Khomeyni just gave to Monsignor Cappucci. Following the failure of his mission with President Bani Sadr, two weeks ago, when he had asked that the measures taken against foreign Christian schools in Iran be suspended, the Vatican envoy had come back to Tehran with a message from the pope to the Shiite religious leader.

Those who know the very firm position taken by the latter against western influence in Iran, which, in his opinion, had intended to tie the country's elite to foreign interests, may be surprised to see the Palestinian prelate

attempt to reopen a question which had already been settled by Iranian authorities. While the French congregations (Lazarist Fathers and the Sisters of Charity) have resigned themselves to the closing of their schools, this does not appear to be the case of the Italian Salesian Fathers. It is probably at their request that the pope has made this new attempt in Iran, which was doomed to failure.

In his answer, the "guide of the Islamic revolution" recalls that the first message from the pope, transmitted in December by the papal nuncio in Iran, Mgr Annibale Bugnini, had undertaken the defence of the American hostages without mentioning the oppression to which the Iranian people had been subjected as a result of the policies of this "imperialist nation which claims to be Christian."

"I am well aware," the imam added, "that the Lord Jesus took the part of the oppressed. What could I answer to our people when they notice that the Christian clergy is in the service of the great powers? His Holiness is sending messages to urge me to listen to the brawl of the oppressor. He would do better," the imam also told Monsignor Cappucci, "to send you to President Carter to remind him of the demands of Christianity. As I am speaking to you, our Moslem students are disgracefully maltreated and beaten by the American police, and the pope's message does not even mention it..."

At the end of the conversation, the imam recognized the principle that Christian schools could continue their activity in Iran for, he said, in Iran "one is free to teach and to study." However, he warned all those who would take advantage of such teaching to cover up other activities, an allusion to the accusations made against the Salesian Fathers of the Andisheh school who were suspected of spying for Israel.

The Ravages of Intolerance

The imam is leaving the final decision concerning the schools to the authorities in charge: this is a surprising statement when one knows that all priests, friars and nuns working in establishments which were not directly servicing Iranian Christians have already been deported! It is equally surprising to hear him affirm the "freedom to teach" at a time when the intolerance of the Iranian "cultural revolution" initiated in June is causing ravages in the country's universities. No university will open its doors for the first semester of the 1980-1981 school year. Only courses at the faculties of medicine will reopen in spring.

The imam's insistence in recalling the situation of the Iranian students arrested last week in Washington reflects the will of the Iranian authorities to stress police brutalities in the United States to revive the anti-American feeling in Iran at a time when the hostages question will be discussed in the parliament. For the past few days, the Tehran radio has devoted most of its news programs to the situation of the imprisoned students and their hunger strike.

A few demonstrations of solidarity have taken place in Tabriz and in Tehran, in front of the American "nest of spies." In addition, it is becoming increasingly evident that members of the powerful Islamic Republic Party intend to try and convict the hostages as "representatives of imperialism." This is confirmed by an interview given by Mr Hassan Ayat to the newspaper MATIN: according to Mr Ayat, the hostages question is the "second question" which should be examined after a government has been formed, the first one being that of the "cultural revolution." The conviction of the 52 American diplomats, he said, will also be a condemnation of 25 years of direct intervention in the affairs of Iran. As our readers will recall, some deputies, including Ayatollah Khomeini, have already clearly taken position in favor of deporting the hostages, as suggested a few months ago by President Bani Sadr.

9294

CSO:4900

PURGING OF JONDISHAPUR UNIVERSITY UNSUCCESSFUL

GF161622 Ahvaz Domestic Service in Persian 1230 GMT 16 Aug 80

[Excerpts] Unified noon and afternoon prayers took place in Municipal Park No Five yesterday. They were led by Friday Imam Musavi-e Gazayeri and attended by the governor general and a large number of Ahvaz citizens.

At the beginning of the ceremony the representative of Jondishapur Islamic Society, referring to problems and shortcomings in the university, made a speech in which he said: The university, this sacred place, should always remain the stronghold of freedom and freedom-seekers and teach the Islamic Republic's aims and achievements on an international basis. It is therefore necessary to purge the university of all corrupt elements, those who do not work for the people, professors who have leanings toward East or West, members attached to the wretched Pahlavi regime and, in general, all enemies of the Islamic Revolution from whatever segment of society.

He added: Large numbers of corrupt counterrevolutionary elements are still working in the university. According to my information, some of those who have been fired are still using houses and other facilities of the university. Large salaries and overtime are still being paid to those who have not done a minute of work for this university or for the suffering nation. This matter is an act of treason by responsible officials of the university, an unforgivable crime.

The representative said: Actions by Muslims and by those who have undertaken obligations, such as the students and workers of the university, to change the situation did not have any result. Their actions were even halted. The purging committee's action at the start of work was noticeable, but due to unknown reasons--maybe actions by known elements including some university officials--its achievements were nil.

At the end of his speech he read a resolution which was passed to chants of "God Is Great."

CSO: 4906

KHUZESTAN HEALTH DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES DISMISSED

GP171750 Ahvaz Domestic Service in Persian 1230 GMT 17 Aug 80

[Text] Twenty-one employees of the Khuzestan Health Department have been purged. The public relations department of Khuzestan gave the news division of the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ahvaz Center, the names of the following employees who have been purged:

(Moluk Tada'un), nurse; (Shahin Safa'i), son of (Asadolah), auxiliary nurse; (Farzana Qorbani-Taqizadeh), daughter of (Gholam Hoseyn), auxiliary nurse; (Tahereh Qorbani-Taqizadeh), daughter of (Gholam Hoseyn), nurse; (Redwan Rabani), auxiliary nurse; (Sodabeh Abas Attay'i), daughter of (Aziz), midwife; (Ezatolah Khaliqi), son of (Fazl-lolah), laboratory technician; Ahmad (Rostami), son of Mohamad, information official; and (Bozorgmehr Shahreza'i), son of 'Abbas. The abovementioned persons are accused of political deviation and unlawful employment. They are dismissed permanently from government employment and shall not benefit from retirement allowances.

Mansur (Sabzehqaba'i), son of Mirza, official of Postan District; accused of active cooperation with the outlawed SAVAK under secret number 1319; he is dismissed permanently from government employment and deprived of government benefits.

Dr Abdul Hoseyn (Zia'i), son of (Nasrolah), retired dental hygiene expert; accused of being a freemason, of sexual deviation and financial mismanagement; accordingly, the order of his permanent dismissal from government employment was issued.

Dr (Dawood Alawi), son of Mohamad Hoseyn, retired dentist; accused of being a freemason and of active cooperation with the wretched regime; he is dismissed from government employment and deprived of government benefits.

Haydar (Qoli Staraki), son of (Zahrab), head of environment hygiene [as heard]; accused of wide-ranging activity with the Rastakhaiz Party and of being a lackey of the bloodsucker Pahlavi regime, of trying to spread the bloody regime's power all over the country, of weakening the Islamic

Republic of Iran and giving written and moral support to the counterrevolution; an example of his activity was the publication of KHALIJ-E FARS and the VOICE OF KHALIJ-E FARS, all used by the counterrevolution and the United States, as well as misusing his position to gain different posts, denunciation of the clergy and the faithful images of the revolution and the revolution, active participation in the (Pan-Iranist) Party. He is dismissed permanently from government jobs and referred to the Islamic Revolution Court of Khuzestan.

Mohamad Reza (Atashbar), son of (Qafani), employee of the social welfare organization: accused of active cooperation with the outlawed SAVAK; he is dismissed permanently from government employment and deprived of benefits and referred to the Islamic Revolution Court.

Naser (Gafani), son of Ibrahim, nurse: accused of cooperation with the outlawed SAVAK; he is retired and demoted two grades.

Khalaf (Saradat), son of (Abdurasul), office employee: accused of cooperation with the outlawed SAVAK under secret number 1043, of giving reports against people, and of having commitments to SAVAK concerning enforcement of values of the cursed Pahlavi regime; as the mentioned person is retired, it was decided to demote him two grades and award him a pension.

(Khosro Samanian), son of Ja'far Qoli, operational officer: accused of cooperation with SAVAK, receipt of a medal, cooperation with the previous regime and support for the Izeh governorate office in the 2,500-year anniversary; he is retired with pay with his period of service to be taken into consideration.

Dr Daryush Farahmand, son of Hani: accused of membership in and cooperation with SAVAK, cooperation with the Zionist Government of Israel in Imam Khomeyni Port, and participation in idolatrous celebration for support of the previous regime; he is dismissed from government service.

'Ali (Saiahi), son of Mehdi, malarial diseases technician: accused of active participation in the Rastakhiz Party and of being the director of that party's chapter in Izeh, and also for cooperation with the previous regime; he is retired with pay and will be deemed to have served 2 years.

(Mola Taal), son of Mohammad, assistant auxiliary: accused of cooperation with SAVAK, forging government documents, working for the Rastakhiz Party, and idolatry; he is dismissed and barred from government service without pension.

Naser (Anvari), son of Mohammad 'Ali, a laboratory technician: accused of ideological deviation and illegal employment; he is dismissed permanently from government service.

'APP' REPORTS FURTHER ACCUSATIONS AGAINST ANGLICANS IN IRAN

NC241535 Paris AFP in English 1526 GMT 24 Aug 80

[Text] Tehran, 24 Aug (AFP)--Revolutionary guards in Esfahan, Central Iran, today made new accusations that clergy and members of the Anglican mission whom they have detained there had been involved in spying.

"Documents have been found proving the collusion of Esfahan's Anglican center with a coup d'etat attempt unveiled on 10 July," the local Pasdaran (revolutionary guards) headquarters said in a communique published in the ETTALA'AT newspaper.

The documents reportedly showed that "bombing Imam (Ayatollah Ruhollah) Khomeyni's residences in Tehran and in the Holy City of Qom was to be studied by the center."

The guards said they also found "\$500 million received from the CIA (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) and intended for Iranian army leaders, for members of the Bahai community (a religious sect) and for the counterrevolution" as well as 300 kg (660 lbs) of TNT.

Three Anglican clergymen are currently detained in Iran--the Reverends Iran Mottahedeh of Esfahan diocese, Nusratullah Sharifian of Kerman diocese and Dmitri Bellos, administrator of the Iranian diocese.

In addition, three Britons working for Anglican missions have been detained for the past 2 weeks--Jean Wadell, 58, and Dr John Coleman and his wife.

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

80 DEAD IN GACHSARAN EXPLOSION--Dear listeners, we have just received the following report: A warehouse near Gachsaran containing explosives belonging to a road-construction company exploded last night, killing a large number of our compatriots. Mohammad Taqi Lavasani, the governor-general of Kohkiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad, today proclaimed a day of public mourning in that province. The number of dead has now reached 80 while another 32 persons have been admitted to Gachsaran Hospital, Lavasani said this morning. The Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran, together with other revolutionary organs, are intensively pursuing relief work. [Text] [LD190416 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0330 GMT 19 Aug 80]

SEVERE EARTHQUAKE IN SHIRAZ--According to our correspondent's report from Shiraz, at 2135 today a comparatively severe earthquake rocked the city of Shiraz. The earthquake which lasted a relatively long time led the people to panic and pour onto the streets. There are no reports on the details of the earthquake and on its intensity. In a talk at 2330 with the governor general of Fars, he confirmed the news of the earthquake and added that until then he too had no reports concerning damages or casualties. [Text] [LD122144 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1930 GMT 12 Aug 80]

SHIRAZ TELEVISION WORKERS--Employees of the production department of the Vision of the Islamic Republic, Shiraz Center, will resume work tomorrow. They have been on forced leave since 19 July. This announcement was made today by the acting director of the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic at Shiraz Center. He asked all employees of the production division of Fars Television, except those who have been purged by the purging committee of this organization, to return to work tomorrow. [Text] [GF181848 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1400 GMT 18 Aug 80]

KHUZESTAN PROJECT DISCUSSIONS--Khuzestan Governor General Seyyed Mohammad Garazi, gave a speech in Musa Ibn Ja'far Mosque in Abadan last night attended by people of the city. He spoke about current events, plots and propaganda of the counterrevolutionaries against the Islamic Republic in Khuzestan Province, the Rex Cinema tragedy, and shortcomings, difficulties

and projects of the province. In his speech he described the duty of the Islamic Republic toward the oppressed people of the world. He said we must work to seize power from the superpowers and put it in the hands of the oppressed for this is the will of the Almighty. This can all be said in one sentence: "Blood will win out over the sword." During the past 18 months 800 million tomans have been committed to electricity projects in the province. This has alleviated some of the problems and shortages. Also, loans to the tune of 300 million tomans have been given to college graduates and those who lost their jobs after the revolution. For this purpose 500 cooperatives have been formed in the province and have started a series of projects using this sum. Referring to the Rex Cinema incident, he asked the people of Abadan to attend the memorial meeting for the martyrs. [Excerpts] [GF191720 Ahvaz Domestic Service in Persian 1230 GMT 19 Aug 80]

MASHHAD AIRPORT CLOSURE--The Civil Aviation Organization has announced that Mashhad Airport will be closed for approximately 17 days for repair work on the runway to prepare it for receiving Boeing 747's. [Text] [LD180701 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0630 GMT 18 Aug 80]

NMO CHIEF VISITS KHUZESTAN--Hojjat al-Islam Majd, the head of National Mobilization Organization, made a speech in Abadan's Musa Ibn Ja'far Mosque Thursday night. Describing the functions of the Mobilization Organization and the need to form an army of 20 million, he said: In most areas, due to lack of cooperation among officials, the necessary cooperation and coordination has not taken place. He added: Formation of meetings and (?seminars) in Ahvaz with discussions on this matter that subsequently took place have played an important role in coordination. In a discussion before his speech the head of the National Mobilization Organization told our reporters about the committee's trip to Khuzestan and its results. Meetings will be held to discuss problems in detail with all officials of the organizations in Khuzestan who in any way provide support to the Mobilization Organization. In this way we can look into the problems of mobilization and find solutions and implement them at a later date. Thus the needs of our society, which are great at the moment, can be taken care of. He added: This committee has had many meetings in Ahvaz with Khuzestan officials. Fortunately, these meetings have had very tangible results so far. [Text] [GF161700 Ahvaz Domestic Service in Persian 1230 GMT 16 Aug 80]

ARMED CLASHES IN PAVEH--The public relations office of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps of the western part of the country, citing the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps of Paveh, reports that at 1100 yesterday a serious clash developed in the village of (Deshar) in the Nowsud Region, which was recently reoccupied by security forces, between the guards and Kurdish democratic assailants and Ba'thist forces, who launched their attack from the direction of Nowsud. In the clash the assailants, using heavy and light weapons against the forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran,

were forced to flee, having suffered heavy casualties and several wounded. The forces of the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran suffered no losses in this clash. I beg your pardon. I will repeat that: in this clash the assailants were attacked with light and heavy weapons. The clash continued until 0400 this morning and eventually the attackers, having suffered heavy losses and many injured, were forced to flee. In this clash the forces of the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran suffered no losses. Also on 11 August 47 teachers and employees of Nowsud secretly fled from Nowsud to Paveh as a protest against the anti-revolutionary activities of mercenary little groups belonging to the Komeleh, the Fadai Rastegari and joined the other refugees who had gone to Paveh in Nowsud. These people demand the presence of the forces of the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps of Iran in the region. [Text] [LD131110 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0930 GMT 13 Aug 80]

LARISTAN GOVERNOR APPOINTED--According to the public relations department of the Fars governor general's office, Daryush Hosseyni has been appointed governor of Laristan by the governor general. [GF161845 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1400 GMT 16 Aug 80 GF]

ABADEH POLICE CHIEF--Lieutenant Colonel Qorbani has been appointed chief of police of Abadeh. [GF181851 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1400 GMT 18 Aug 80 GF]

KOCHKILUYEH VA BOYER AHMAD DEVELOPMENT--The governor general of Kohkiluyeh Va Boyer Ahmad said in an interview with a Shiraz Radio reporter that 2 billion rials have been allocated for the development of tribal regions in the province. The projects cover roads, health, education and water and food projects. [GF181851 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1400 GMT 18 Aug 80 GF]

KURDISH ATTACK FOILED--Tehran, 13 Aug (AFP)--Iranian troops defeated a new "plot" against the government yesterday at Paveh in Kordestan, the newspaper AZHDEGAN reported today. "A group of counter-revolutionaries heavily armed with modern weapons provided by Iraq's Ba'th regime wanted to attack the military base at Paveh Tuesday, the holiday marking the end of Ramadan," the newspaper said. According to the publication, a few rebels escaped but the others were killed and their weapons confiscated by the revolutionary troops. [Text] [NC130822 Paris AFP in English 0813 GMT 13 Aug 80]

DYNAMITE EXPLOSION--Tehran, 19 Aug (AFP)--At least 80 people were killed and 45 injured last night in an explosion at a dynamite depot near Gatchisaran in Kohkiluyeh Province, south of here, Radio Tehran said today. It said the blast was an accident. [Text] [OW190539 Hong Kong AFP in English 0538 GMT 19 Aug 80]

DIPLOMATIC BREAK WITH CHILE--Tehran, 17 Aug (AFP)--Iran today broke off diplomatic relations with Chile, a foreign ministry spokesman announced. The spokesman said the Chilean charge d'affaires was notified today. He gave no reasons for the break but said a statement might be issued tomorrow. The Chilean ambassador, retired General Felipe Geiger, returned to Santiago some time ago for "personal reasons." [Text] [NC171540 Paris AFP in English 1537 GMT 17 Aug 80]

COLONEL COMMITS SUICIDE--Tehran, 19 Aug (AFP)--An alleged participant in an abortive attempt to overthrow the government committed suicide yesterday as members of a revolutionary committee arrived to arrest him, the daily AZADEGAN reported today. Colonel Hassan Yazdi asked the committee members for permission to go into another room to dress, then shot himself twice in the head with a handgun, the newspaper said. Colonel Yazdi was the head of the sixth SAVAK (secret police under the ex-shah) bureau, and had been in hiding since the beginning of the revolution, the report stated. More than 60 alleged plotters have been executed in connection with the coup attempt revealed by President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr on 10 July. [Text] [NC191004 Paris AFP in English 0949 GMT 19 Aug 80]

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

FRENCH CEMENT CONTRACT--The increasingly close commercial ties between Iraq and France have been given another boost with a contract worth FF 600 million (\$145 million) for a cement works in northern Iraq. The contract was awarded to Fives-Cail Babcock, a firm which already has extensive experience in Iraq. The contract calls for an extension with a capacity of 3,200 tonnes per day to an existing complex at Badoosh, near the northern city of Mosul. The extension is due to become operational late in 1982. Fives-Cail Babcock last year completed a cement works with a daily capacity of 1,500 tonnes at Hawman al-Alil. The purpose of the next plant is to reduce Iraq's dependence on cement imports, which are still of the order of 2 million tonnes per year. Domestic production is scheduled to top 10 million tonnes per year by 1983, when complete independence in the field should be achieved.

CSO: 4420

DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER COMMENTS ON LEBANON OPERATION

TA221953 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1720 GMT
22 Aug 80

[Interview with Deputy Defense Minister Mordekhay Tzipori by military correspondent 'Amiram Nir, time and place not give--videotaped]

[Excerpts] [Question] Mr Deputy Defense Minister, do you estimate that calm has now returned to the northern border, for some time at least?

[Answer] There is a reasonable chance that it has returned, but it certainly cannot be taken as something certain. The war with the terrorists is not a one time thing. This is a long, continuous effort in which the more initiatives we take, the more calm will prevail.

[Question] Despite that, the katyushas and artillery shells that have been fired at our settlements in the north during the last 2 days, and also at major Haddad's enclave, were fired from the areas where the IDF acted in the middle of this week. Does this not raise a certain question mark about the value or the efficiency of operations of this sort regarding targets of this sort, which can rapidly be rebuilt?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the ability to rebuild targets is unlimited, but there is no doubt that the state of Israel must be constant in the war against the terrorists. There are 15,000 armed terrorists in Lebanon, who are there with one objective: to initiate and plan actions against the state of Israel. We have constant information about their intentions and so we must keep them constantly in a situation in which they must think about how to defend themselves, not how to go on the offensive. This action is a part of the moves we initiated to put the terrorists in their place.

[Question] But should it actually be aimed at this sort of target, which can be rebuilt so rapidly?

[Answer] Any objective can be rebuilt. The terrorists have no financial restrictions, they have no restriction in aid. I think there are several ways of fighting the terrorists. Personally, I prefer this method. The

terrorists can be hit by artillery actions: artillery blows. We can hit them through aerial bombing and we can do this through a direct attack. I prefer the direct attack, which has supreme importance. In the case of other types of attacks, the terrorists can delude themselves and the public that the Israelis have artillery, they have planes and so they can cause a certain harm. In the other sort of war, the Israeli soldier faces the terrorist and, in this case, they were also in a relatively high state of alert, and in face-to-face fighting they put them in their correct place and sometimes, in direct battles, cause heavy losses in manpower and equipment and each one of the terrorists knows in the depths of his heart exactly what his worth is and this will travel through the ranks of the terrorists, that they are not capable of competing with us.

[Question] Mr Deputy Defense Minister, does the fact that there is no full-time defense minister today in the Ministry of Defense, that is, a minister who is in his post 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, in the ministry itself, does this not make the ministry's activity somewhat difficult?

[Answer] There is no doubt that a 24-hour minister is better than a 12-hour a day or an 8-hour a day defense minister. But we are living in a more advanced era. The defense minister--there is a telephone system, there is a communications system, there is also transport. The ministry is structured in such a way, and the defense establishment is structured in such a way that it functions and can fulfill its tasks without alarming the Israeli nation.

[Question] Last week Minister of Agriculture and Reserves General Ari'el Sharon said the absence of a full-time defense minister is irresponsibility in the period in which we are living, with the challenges the defense establishment is facing at this time and this is a post that demands at least 20 hours a day. Do you disagree with Reserves General Sharon on these two claims?

[Answer] Since the minister of agriculture himself has retracted his remarks, I have nothing with which to disagree.

[Question] And he did retract them, by the way, on the Moqed television program, to a certain extent. Do you disagree with the claim that the post of defense minister demands 24 hours a day and that this post not being filled by a man only dealing with this job is irresponsibility?

[Answer] As I said, there are various possibilities. There is no doubt that the scope of the work is broad. We must also take into account that there has not always been a deputy defense minister in the Ministry of Defense and there is now both a minister and a deputy minister and we are trying to fulfill all the tasks.

BEGIN'S PURPOSE FOR ESCALATING POSITIONS DISCUSSED

TA261503 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 26 Aug 80 p 11

[Commentary by Avraham Schweitzer: "The Purpose of Escalation"]

[Text] His fellow cabinet ministers think--as Jerusalem Radio reported yesterday in the morning newscast--that Begin is adopting an escalating line toward the terrorists. One may supplement this thought with the sentence: Not only toward the terrorists. The exchange of harsh messages with Al-Sadat and the not-so-restrained condemnation of the United States indicates that the prime minister is in a belligerent mood.

However, the question is not one of moods but that of the implementation of a strategy which began last summer. After the peace treaty with Egypt was signed in Washington, Begin wanted to put into effect the clauses referring to Judaea, Samaria and Gaza--as he viewed them. He soon reached the conclusion that he had made a bad bargain. Of the two main alternatives--to adapt himself to the situation and reach an agreement on the autonomy which would leave the question of Israel's continuous rule over the entire Eretz Yisra'el unsolved or to jeopardize the so-called Camp David process merely to realize what he had assured himself of in the treaty with Egypt--Begin chose the latter.

The appointment of his devoted Dr Burg to conduct the negotiations with Egypt and the United States, the dismissals of Moshe Dayan and 'Ezer Weizman and his plans regarding the manning of the vacated portfolios--all these indicate a stiffening in the prime minister's approach.

It is difficult to tell whether Begin calculated all his moves--including their impact on domestic policies--in advance. However, Begin's strategy regarding the elections to the 10th Knesset became apparent, at least in the last 6 months. This will be the prime minister's campaign and it will revolve around a subject he will choose. Obviously, the situation would have been the same had his government been successful in the socio-economic sphere; all the more so when it failed in this field. Begin has placed Israeli rule over Judaea, Samaria and Gaza--as well as "the eternal capital of the Israeli people" ever since the world did him a favor by launching the struggle for Jerusalem--at the forefront of his election campaign.

There is no better way to attract the attention of the Israel public to the subject than by exacerbating the difference between the government's positions and the positions held by the Arabs, the Europeans and, recently, by the United States. The entire world is against us: the opposition intends to sell the land of our forefathers to Israel's enemies; we can trust nobody but ourselves; the people of Israel have no other choice but to align behind Mr Begin--this is the tone prevalent in the prime minister's utterances. Since escalation provokes counter-escalation and so on and so forth in a vicious circle, Begin on the one hand and the Arab leaders on the other hand (on this issue we should accept President Al-Sadat's testimony since he knows his fellow Arabs better than the Europeans and the Americans) have managed to drastically change the atmosphere prevailing in March 1979 when the peace treaty was signed in Washington.

It is estimated that the heating-up of the northern front fits in with Begin's elections campaign. Israel did not dream up the terrorists and their presence in Lebanon. However, the offensive launched against them last week fits in very well with the general trend of challenging everything around us. The lack of political talent on the part of the U.S. and European administrations and the split in the Egyptian political establishment--which consequently weakened President Al-Sadat's moderating positions--makes it easier for Begin to bring into focus the picture--whether he believes in it or not--he has worked so hard to draw, that Israel is faced with a general confrontation with the world which can only be sustained under his leadership.

It was destined--or perhaps a human factor also played a role in it--that there would be nobody left in the Israeli cabinet to point out to Begin the terrible menace inherent in continuing a policy of confrontation. The influential ministers were expelled from the cabinet and only the NRP--a dubious restraining element as far as Begin's national religious visions are concerned--was left. The government has now also been deprived of this dubious strength. The police investigation of the Ministry for Religious Affairs--which is bound to cast heavy suspicions on one of the NRP ministers--has politically neutralized the NRP. Knowledgeable circles say that in private talks the interior minister has expressed his doubts regarding the prime minister's sanity. The NRP is tied to the prime minister, whether he is sane or insane, and it will accompany him to the same wasteland where Begin is leading the Israeli people.

CSO: 4805

SETTLEMENT MOMENTUM 'UNPRECEDENTED'

TA251333 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 25 Aug 80 p 5

[Report by Hayim Shibi: "A Settlement Project in the Territories Is Being Carried Out With an unprecedented Momentum"]

[Text] The veterans of the Gush Emunim settlement operations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip speak with satisfaction these days about what is happening in the settlements: the reason: Minister Ari'el Sharon's settlement project is being carried out with an unprecedented momentum and its first phase, the setting up of "the settlement backbone" which will serve as a basis for any future construction, is just about to be completed.

"We cannot rest on our laurels yet, but most of the settlements are well established," Hanan Porat, of the first Gush Emunim activists says.

Where will "the last 10 settlements" to be set up by the government be constructed?

The decisions in principle have already been made, but the precise location of each settlement will ultimately be determined largely according to legal considerations of state ownership of lands.

Uri Bar-on, Minister Sharon's assistant on settlement, explained: "In the Rehan block in North Samaria at least one more settlement will be set up, Rehan E. Another settlement will be established near the road crossing Samaria, as an addition to the city of Ari'el and the settlements Elqana, Tapu'ah and Ma'ale Efrayim. In the region where Palestinian terrorists have often been pursued, between Rimonim and Kfar Adumim, a settlement skeleton will be completed through the new settlement, Mikhmarsh.

Special emphasis will be placed on the Hebron Hills region. Four new settlements will complete the picture there: Teqo'a B, Ma'on A, Karmel, and Mitzpe Govrin.

Three more settlements in the Samaria region, whose definite location has not been chosen yet, will complete the first phase of Sharon's settlement project.

What will the next phase be?

The plan is to expand and solidify what already has been established, Bar-on replies.

When one tours the territories these days one can easily observe the actual implementation of the project especially in three areas:

--The establishment of industrial plants: a metallurgic plant will be set up in Tapu'ah, two electronics plants will be established in Qarne Shomron, and a computer project to be used for teaching is being operated in Shave Shomron.

--The improvement of infrastructure: the Elqana settlement has been recently connected to the national electric network, and by October most of the Samaria settlements are expected to be connected as well. Water wells are being drilled in the Qarne Shomron area, in Shilo and in other sites in the region. An effort has also been made to improve the access roads to the settlements.

--Permanent buildings in the "build your own home system": the chief of the settlement division in the Zionist organization, Matityahu Drobles, gave instructions to stop bringing temporary buildings to the settlements and decided on setting up only permanent buildings. In Qedumim, they started preparing 50 to 100 plots for do-it-yourself construction; in Shilo ground has been broken for roads in the new construction site. In Shave Shomron 35 permanent units are being built with a new industrial method. The price of a permanent building for an average family will be over 1 million Israeli pounds. The families will be requested to pay a 700,000 pound first installment and the remainder will be financed by the Jewish Agency Loan.

CSO: 4805

EFRAT NEW TOWN COMMISSIONED IN WEST BANK, SHARON COMMENTS

TA191919 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 19 Aug 80

[Text] The new town of Efrat, opposite Gush Etzyon, was today dedicated. In the ceremony, Agriculture Minister Ari'el Sharon said that Israel's response in reaction to the decision to transfer embassies from Jerusalem should be building new settlements around Efrat. Our correspondent Avraham Ben-Melekh is transmitting from the broadcasting van in Efrat:

The first dozen inhabitants arrived in Efrat 3 weeks ago. They are students at the Hesder Yeshiva of Shevut Yisra'el. Cabinet ministers, rabbis and settlement officials arrived today in Efrat, opposite Gush 'Etzyon, to attend its dedication ceremony. Finance Minister Yita'el Hurvitz said that the government was conducting an unprecedented settlement operation throughout the country. Agriculture Minister Ari'el Sharon said that Efrat was the appropriate answer to the opposition in the world to the Jerusalem law.

[Begin Sharon recording] I think that on a day when foreign embassies are leaving Jerusalem there is no better response than establishing more and more settlements--and there are many settlements [which should be established]. We are currently completing the plan decided upon by the government about 3 years ago.

Today we have no better response to the threat about the establishment of a second Palestinian state--in addition to the Palestinian state existing in Jordan--a PLO state, than Jewish settlement. [end recording]

The cornerstone for Efrat was laid about 6 months ago. A new neighborhood was founded today. The founders said that the construction of the first 200 housing units will begin even before the onset of winter.

CSO: 4805

'HA'ARETZ' COMMENTATOR ON BEGIN'S JERUSALEM POLICY

TA200346 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Aug 80 p 9

[Commentary by 'Uzi Benziman: "A Premature Shot in the Air"]

[Text] It is not an unknown phenomenon that a statesman sees quickly and in an unequivocal manner the results of his decision. Political decisions are by nature vague and their implications indirect and involve complex social and international processes. These days Menahem Begin has been enjoying a rather unique satisfaction: He can see, in a manner which leaves no room for doubt, the immediate results of his decision to be dragged after Ge'ula Kohen's initiative and to support the Jerusalem law she submitted to the Knesset.

The reaction to the Jerusalem law is like turning off the light: you press the button and the light goes off. The Knesset passed the law, and that same small group of countries that were friendly to Israel and maintained their embassies in Jerusalem are now closing the gates and moving to Tel Aviv. The effect is swift and clear-cut: in the field of symbolism, which constitutes a central part of every nation's political efforts, Israel has scored a speedy checkmate. The last of the countries whose friendship toward us was strong enough for them to maintain their embassies in Jerusalem are now turning their backs on the capital. Begin threatened the world with a checkmate, but was bitterly defeated. After the Jerusalem law was passed by the Knesset, the city's esteem and the status of our control over it are now lower in the eyes of the world than before Ms Kohen's initiative.

One can ignore the world's attitude toward Israel's hold over Jerusalem, but if this is the approach, why are cabinet ministers worried and the heads of the Foreign Ministry deeply concerned and why does even the prime minister feel an urge to pat the ministers on their shoulders and encourage them to continue walking with their heads proudly held high? The gloom caused by the political landslide proves that it is not so easy to pay little attention to the world's attitude and that it is not so easy to ignore it. In that same undefined area of symbolism it was important for Israel to have 13 countries recognize Jerusalem. Now this recognition is diminishing. One nut dropped from this little pack of countries having their embassies in the capital, and the whole pile is collapsing.

In retrospect, people have tried to explain the Knesset legislation and argue that Israel has long had reports on immense Arab pressure on the Netherlands, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama and the rest of the countries whose embassies are located in the nicer districts of Jerusalem: Talbiya, the German colony and Qatamon. The oil and the Arab capital are a huge steamroller capable of forcing the will of Arab countries on many other countries, government sources claim. Hence, even without the passing of the Jerusalem law by the Knesset the Arab countries would have forced those 13 countries to remove their representations from the capital to Tel Aviv.

It is legitimate to question the credibility of the official argument, if only for the simple reason that before the Jerusalem law was passed those 13 countries still had their embassies in the capital, in spite of the Arab oil and capital. The official pretexts have ignored the fundamental element of the relations between nations; the legitimacy of one country's moves in the eyes the others. In addition to such tangible assets like territory, military strength or economic resources, the status of a country in the international arena is influenced by the degree of legitimacy of the acts it commits.

This, as we all know, is rather foggy and cannot be measured. Certain steps taken by a country can be considered legitimate in its own eyes and illegitimate in the eyes of others. Different countries react differently to moves of another. And yet, it would seem justified to understand the legitimacy component in the context of the passing of the Jerusalem law and the world's reaction to it.

Within the complex entity of international relations between Israel and the nations of the world, the Knesset resolution was considered illegitimate, resulting in the political landslide expressed in the closing of embassies in Jerusalem, even those who regard this illegitimacy as marginal in comparison with the very declaration of United Jerusalem being Israel's capital should ask themselves whether it was all worth it, in the final analysis.

The Jerusalem law has not changed a thing with respect to the status of the city and has not had an iota of an influence on Israel's actual control over both parts of the capital. Is it not clear even now to even the most fervent supporters of the resolution--those who contend that the Arab pressure would in any event have forced the friendly countries to move their embassies to Tel Aviv--that Ge'ula Kohen's initiative provided those countries with excuse to comply with the Arab countries' demand? In this Israel has failed inexcusably, since it is the duty of wise statesmanship to avoid creating, at its initiative, opportunities and excuses for other countries to materialize their intentions against it when those intentions are based on the loss of legitimacy of some (or all) of its positions.

Moreover, the official logic which claims that Arab pressure would in any event have brought about the closure of the Jerusalem-based embassies says that the Arab countries are capable of moving the countries friendly to Israel to take additional negative steps against it, such as forcing them to sever their diplomatic relations with it. Yet, such an approach is a bit simplistic: not only oil and money determine countries' attitudes. Nations conduct their international relations on the basis of other considerations, too (and certainly do not want to be regarded as countries who easily succumb to the desires of Arab shaykhs), and Israel's legitimacy is not among the lesser of these considerations.

The struggle over the status of Jerusalem and the degree of Israel's control over it is still ahead. No doubt in this battle Israel will stand against (almost) all the world and its (in itself) legitimate claim over the city will conflict with the demands of the Muslim world (and other countries). Jerusalem is really an issue that can justifiably be regarded as something over which one would rather die than give up.

The question that arises in view of the Knesset resolutions is whether the time has come for a bitter struggle against the entire world over Israel's status in Jerusalem and whether the Ge'ula Kohen bill is indeed an important buffer in this battle for which it would be justified to pay the price of having 13 embassies removed from Jerusalem. There is room to question the wisdom of having "played into the hands of" Al-Sadat--who knowingly placed the problem of Jerusalem at the center of the autonomy negotiations--by directly confronting the world (but, alas, in an empty manner) by means of the Ge'ula Kohen bill.

Some people believe that Egypt's maneuvers on the Jerusalem problem are not yet the real battle on the status of the city. They say that these maneuvers could have been handled not as a head-on collision but by bypassing them, by warding them off or by biting off their trailing ends (such as recognition of the fact that the issue is a subject worthy of discussion in the context of the autonomy negotiations or the submission of a proposal to defer the matter until the deliberations on the final arrangement after the 5 autonomy years and the like). According to this assessment, the decisive battle over Jerusalem has not yet begun and in order to guarantee Israel's chances of success it would be better to devote resources and manpower to fortify Israel's real hold over the city rather than be captured by the noisy declaration rising from the articles in Ge'ula Kohen's bill.

Some maintain that Ge'ula Kohen, with the Knesset and the government dragged along subsequently, have fired the shell (with the Ramadan cannon, one should remember) even before the battle has begun and have thus revealed their positions and attracted enemy fire. The embassies closing in Jerusalem are the first casualties in the Israeli camp, even before the battle has begun.

PERES CRITICIZES BEGIN'S AUTONOMY PLAN, ECONOMIC POLICY

TA191856 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 19 Aug 80 p 2

[Report by Avshalom Ginat: "Peres: Begin's Accusations Against Me Are Character Assassination"]

[Excerpts] "The Likud government has got us involved in the autonomy. If it is realized, this will become a future Palestinian state," Labor Party Chairman MK Shim'on Peres said yesterday evening at the Political Club of the 'Afula Labor Council.

The second alternative the Likud has, namely the annexation of Judea and Samaria, will result in Palestinization of Israel and, in fact, the Likud has been leading us toward a wall.

In view of the situation, Peres said, the alignment is proposing to implement autonomy in the Gaza Strip only and to invite King Husayn to discuss with him Jordanian-Israeli peace. "We do have things to discuss with him. About a year ago I was about to meet with Husayn and asked for Begin's opinion. He refused to permit it. Now it is he who has leaked this plan. Begin is the leak. There never was a prime minister before him who behaved this way. He charged me with being the source of the leak during the alignment administration. This is character assassination."

Commenting on the Likud government's domestic policy, Peres noted that in the Likud's 3 years in power inflation has reached 360 percent and food price rises have reached 1,000 percent. He claimed that these price hikes mainly affect the lower strata of the Israeli society.

The balance of payments gap shows that this year Israel will spend \$4 billion more than it will produce. In an effort to correct the situation, when the alignment assumes power, a large portion of the burden will be placed on the wealthy as well. Peres remarked that 20 percent of the higher income bracket in Israel consumes 47 percent of the overall demand whereas 80 percent of the population, belonging to the lower strata, only gets 53 percent of the overall demand.

During the Likud's reign, it has transferred 70 billion Israeli pounds from the pockets of hired labor to the pockets of the rich and the alignment will put an end to this phenomenon, Peres said, emphasizing that first of all it is "necessary to cut the budget allocating billions of pounds for Judaea and Samaria and this must be done even before the defense budget is cut."

CSO: 4805

COMMENTATOR REJECTS AL-SADAT SUMMIT PROPOSAL

TA181503 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 18 Aug 80 p 5

[Commentary by Yosef Harif: "The 'Paper Bridge' Is Not Melting the Freeze"]

[Text] When a man as restrained and cautious in his speech as Interior Minister Dr Yosef Burg says of the latest letter from Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat that "This is vulgarity," this means that he, Al-Sadat has succeeded in arousing doubts in the Government of Israel about his genuine intentions and not just among the "extremists," as represented by Landau and Hurvitz, who in fact claim that the rest of Sinai should not be handed over (with the firfields) without an agreement on the nature of the autonomy having been achieved.

Indeed, the paper bridge between Cairo and Jerusalem may be the best proof of the yawning chasm underneath it. Each additional letter from here to there and from there to here only underlines the lack of purpose in this strange diplomatic process. This is political striptease in correspondence leading to the falling off of the last fig leaves without which the Camp David agreements will never be implemented. Now autumn has set its mark on everything, and it is doubtful whether any reblossoming can follow it.

In fact, nobody is speaking to anybody else any more; neither Al-Sadat to Begin nor Begin to Al-Sadat. What is said is for the world communications media, and even this is marked with clear signs that the two leaders have despaired of each other. How did Begin phrase it at yesterday's cabinet session: "He can write what he wants, we are here in our homeland and he is in Egypt!"

Begin tried to strengthen the cabinet members' morale: There is no need to panic. We will stand firm!

It is doubtful whether, after the Israeli reply, Al-Sadat will see any point in continuing with the correspondence. If, nevertheless, he takes the trouble to compose another letter (as far as can be assumed, each

of his letters, which are marked by conflicting sentences and interpretations, are the creative fruits of Usamah al-Baz, a talented legal expert, who has always done all he could to undermine the peace process), it will be nothing but an attempt to conquer yet another objective in public opinion in the Arab world, Europe and, mainly, in the United States.

Almost everyone now agrees that Al-Sadat wants to retreat from the Camp David agreements because they are not convenient for him: they do not mention Jerusalem, they do not ban settlements (in his latest letter he claimed--without any realistic basis for this--that Begin committed himself to a freeze on settlements during the autonomy negotiations, not just for the period of negotiations between Egypt and Israel over Sinai. But even so he must admit that the body of the agreement does not make any mention of a ban on settlements)!

Al-Sadat knows that his latest moves are a great gamble to the point of being a danger to the entire peace process. Nevertheless, he has taken this gamble. Why?

If the entire European community backs up the demand to grant the Palestinians "self-determination" and in fact demands the incorporation of the PLO into the negotiations, how can he litigate over "autonomy for the inhabitants?" And if all the members of the Security Council, including the United States(!), have demanded the uprooting of all the Israeli establishments in the territories, including Jerusalem, how can he not demand this?

But, beyond this "right" he has been given we can learn of the hypocrisy embodied in his stalling. Was Ge'ula Kohen's Jerusalem law really the reason for the cessation of the talks? After all, the first time the autonomy talks were suspended was before the Jerusalem law arrived in the world! As for the settlements, did he not once say himself (in an ABC television interview in the United States) that the settlements were a "marginal issue?" So how was it that they did not disturb him before he got back the Sinai oil fields? Now, all of a sudden, they hurt him!

"I was sorry to read in your letter," he wrote to Begin, "that not one of the existing settlements in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights will ever be removed." This was a discovery for Al-Sadat? Yet, he had heard this at every discussion between himself and Begin. It is true, there was no agreement between them on this matter, but was it because of this that he suspended the talks?

The tone taken by Al-Sadat in his letter is arrogant and patronizing, permitting himself to make false accusations. He claims that Israel is increasing the "repressive actions in the territories" and setting a curfew for "prolonged periods of time without justification."

"Without justification." If a curfew is imposed after six Jews were murdered from ambush in Hebron, this is "without justification?" He determines that a "summit" is needed, with "the unknown soldier of peace" Jimmy Carter, as soon as he is released from his "occupations"; that is after the presidential election.

First, which of us can be sure that Jimmy Carter will be elected president. Why, then, must we wait until he is released from his "occupations?"

Second, let us assume that he will win. What is the point of a "summit?" After all, this is nothing but a certain technique for deliberations and negotiations. Can all the contradictions exposed by Al-Sadat really be expelled by a summit alone?

No. There is nothing behind the summit idea but a trick. What cannot be achieved before the summit will not be achieved at it, either. It has been impossible up to now to achieve any real progress in the autonomy talks for one reason only: because from the very first minute Egypt demanded that East Jerusalem should be Arab (how did he phrase it: Jews and Christians have religious rights in Jerusalem; the Palestinians have national rights; and that the autonomy should, in fact, be a Palestinian state where Jews will have no right to settle in Judaea and Samaria, Gaza and the Golan Heights, which are "conquered Arab lands." When Israel was not prepared to agree to all these ultimatums (and what government in Israel would agree to all this?), he unilaterally stopped the talks, with the justification that there was no point in vain talks, as he phrased it....

Until Al-Sadat gets down off that summit he climbed there is no point in any "summit" he is now proposing. It is nothing but a doubtful ruse and bluff. There at the "summit" nothing different from what he says in his letters will be said. And what he says in his letters will be said. And what he says in them, in essence, is this: "You must evacuate Arab Jerusalem and all the conquered Arab lands."

Only then will peace Al-Sadat style be founded: Who will come to Arab Jerusalem and the evacuated conquered lands--the PLO. This has already been admitted by Al-Sadat, as he phrased it. It is not for me to conclude the negotiations in the name of the Palestinians. I "only" want to prepare the groundwork for them.

CSO: 4805

'HA'ARETZ' COMMENTARY DISCUSSES EGYPTIAN TACTICS

TA180952 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 18 Aug 80 p 9

[Commentary by A. Schweitzer: "Carrot and Stick"]

[Text] Last week Egypt used the carrot and stick approach on Israel. Whatever one thinks about the immediate benefits of the visit by the president of the state, Yitzhaq Navon, to Cairo, and whatever we think about the timing of the invitation, one thing is undisputed: this is a demonstratively friendly move. While acts of dissociation and severance from Israel are increasing in the background (see, for example, the removal of embassies from Jerusalem), along comes the president of Egypt who invites the president of Israel for a state visit with all that involves--including widescale television coverage, speeches with tactical significance and, in general, raising the profile of the Israeli-Egyptian settlement.

As opposed to this, President Al-Sadat wants to suspend the autonomy talks and his representative, Butrus Ghali, has reached a general declared agreement with Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu about internationalizing the peace process--that is: getting out of the Camp David agreements. Signs have also appeared that Egypt is in some way helping terrorists, by giving them equipment, to infiltrate the Gaza Strip.

And so we have the carrot and stick approach and it is worth recalling that this system is said to be effective when dealing with a donkey. It is true that a similarity can be found between that animal's obstinate lack of intelligence and an Israel piloted by the present government. Anyone with any views of his own should be able to perceive the dissociation and hostility demonstrated by most of the world's governments toward Israel. The Washington Camp David agreements were intended to break the ring of isolation and the United States and Egypt (obviously not for altruistic reasons) offered to be partners in this Israeli effort. And now the government of Israel is conducting a policy--if we can use such a word to describe a series of moves which are mainly symbolic, but which have been given broad publicity--which are arousing, angering or embarrassing its two partners.

It is not hard to guess the meaning of the Egyptian moves. Egypt is adhering to the policy of peace and it is prepared to be seen in Israel's company, as represented by Mr Navon (the Egyptians have apparently arrived at the general view that the president of the state has different views from those of the current government of Israel). However, if the government of Israel continues to conduct its affairs in the spirit of the negative amateurishness characteristic of it, then there will be no way out of severing the partnership with Israel which is the basis of the Washington Camp David agreements.

There are those who speak in President Al-Sadat's name, saying that in his opinion, Mr Begin has come to the end of the road in exhausting the agreements issue. Anyone who preceded the president of Egypt with this evaluation will certainly not be able to disagree with the actual opinion or the conclusions Egypt is drawing from this (and, with it, the United States, except that the latter is prevented from saying so specifically until November).

But Mr Begin is a free man: in principle and in fact, he is capable of breaking the line of thought and surprising us by a return to the initiating, constructive policy of his first 2 years as prime minister. In any event, this is his duty and we must demand that he behave accordingly, if he does not want to leave his heirs the heritage of an Israel resembling Rhodesia, a country completely isolated, without an ally or prop in the region or in the world.

CSO: 4805

'MA'ARIV' COMMENTATOR FAVORS SUMMIT PROPOSAL

TA181806 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 18 Aug 80 p 5

[Commentary by Shmu'el Segev: "The President Will Make a Bridge for the Continuation of the Dialogue"]

[Text] The cabinet decision to approve in principle the trip to Cairo by President Yitzhaq Navon, at the invitation of President Al-Sadat, is a wise decision and comes at the right time.

Despite the "war of letters" being conducted between Israel and Egypt ever since the autonomy talks were suspended on 7 May, Israel has no interest in stopping the dialogue with Egypt. Even if the president has no real authority and his role is more ceremonial than real, we may fairly assume that Mr Navon will be clever enough to firmly and skillfully present the points on which there is a consensus in Israel, such as the matter of Jerusalem, even on issues on which there is no such agreement it is doubtful that he will want or be able to deviate from the government's official policy.

In clarifications held with Cairo yesterday it was said that there is some vagueness about the expected visit by the president of Egypt. After Al-Sadat's visit to Haifa last September, Prime Minister Menahem Begin made a return visit to Aswan at the beginning of this year. Therefore, according to protocol, it is now the Egyptian President's turn to make another visit to Israel before Begin's turn comes again to visit Cairo. This does not apply to President Navon's visit. This visit was mentioned on President Al-Sadat's two visits to Beersheba and Haifa. Therefore, it is only natural that the president of the state should pay a return visit to the capital of Egypt.

Menahem Begin did well when, after listening to the reservations expressed by his ministerial colleagues in the cabinet yesterday, he used his full weight in favor of approving the visit and so guaranteed the continuation of the dialogue with Cairo and the fostering of the normalization, which is still being conducted "over a small flame."

Over and beyond President Navon's expected visit to Cairo, Israel must invest some thought in the question of how to get out of the "autonomy crisis" it is facing. Since the beginning of the summer Al-Sadat has been constantly aiming at a suspension of the talks in an attempt to lay the responsibility for the deadlock on Israel.

Although this aim was clear, Israel did not take any action and found itself being towed after the Egyptian president's predictable moves. Israel is now faced with a new Egyptian proposal for a tripartite summit conference after the U.S. presidential election, with the aim of melting the autonomy crisis. Israel does not have to "panic" at the convening of a new summit conference under the aegis of the United States. But it must not agree to postponing the meeting until after the U.S. election.

First, right now--with Carter and Reagan competing for the "Jewish vote"--Israel has a clear interest in holding a new summit under "conditions of pressure" and not postponing the tripartite conference until after the election, when the Jewish vote will carry less weight. Secondly, and this is the main point, postponing the summit until after the election would perpetuate the deadlock and prevent even a glimpse of a continued dialogue between Israel and Egypt on the autonomy issue. A deadlock of this sort is not serving Israel's interests.

Since the battle over Jerusalem began, the pressure put on President Al-Sadat by the Islamic countries has increased, and he now finds himself in a situation of having to defend himself against the rejectionist front countries and the conservative Muslim countries such as Morocco and Saudi Arabia. A continuation of the deadlock could invite increased Muslim and Pan-Arab pressure on Egypt, and any such pressure will only make Al-Sadat's positions more difficult and make it impossible for him to be flexible in the negotiations over the foundation of the autonomy.

Because of this, when it gets down to texting its reply to President Al-Sadat's latest letter today, the government of Israel must keep before it not only the claims included in that letter but also the broad range of considerations influencing Egypt's positions. The Pan-Arab pressure on the countries of Latin America on the matter of transferring their embassies from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv; Western Europe's preparations for a new initiative in the United Nations, which will be a sort of "completion" of the Camp David agreements; and Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu's attempts to initiate a new international conference under UN patronage, with the participation of the PLO and the Soviets--all these must guide the government of Israel during the formulation of the reply to President Al-Sadat's latest letter.

The letter from the president of Egypt does not leave much room for hopes of a resumption of the dialogue over the establishment of the autonomy in its previous format. Fifteen months of deliberations in principle between Israel and Egypt, with the participation of large delegations of ministers and advisers, did not lead to any progress in the negotiations, and they aroused the president of Egypt to search for new horizons for more rapid progress. Al-Sadat has chosen a new summit. Even if Israel did not initiate this move, it does not have to reject this idea out of hand, and if it is clever enough to set a convenient time for the convening of such a conference, its interests may be served better than matters appear now.

POLL INDICATES POPULARITY OF BEGIN, HURVITZ RISING

TA201130 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 20 Aug 80 p 3

[Pori Public Opinion Poll: "Hurvitz's Popularity Has Risen by 5 Percent; Begin's Popularity Has Also Increased"]

[Excerpts] Finance Minister Yigal Hurvitz's popularity has risen by 5 percent and Prime Minister Menahem Begin's popularity by 3 percent in the last month. The finance minister is more popular than the prime minister. However, the percentage of those dissatisfied with both the finance minister and the prime minister is considerably higher than the percentage of those satisfied with them. These are the conclusions of a nationwide public opinion poll conducted by the Pori Institute at the request of HA'ARETZ.

The number of those satisfied with Mr Hurvitz has risen from 25.2 percent to 30.8 percent. The number of those dissatisfied with the finance minister has remained stable at 47.3 percent. Some 15.9 percent are "more or less" satisfied with the finance minister and 5.8 percent do not have an opinion on the matter.

The number of those satisfied with Prime Minister Menahem Begin has risen from 24.2 percent to 27.6 percent. The number of those dissatisfied with the prime minister has remained stable at 49 percent. Some 19.4 percent are "more or less" satisfied with Mr Begin and 3.7 percent do not have an opinion on the matter.

The poll was conducted on a representative sample of 1,200 women and men who were interviewed in their houses throughout the country.

CSO: 4805

POLL SHOWS 40 PERCENT FAVOR MOVE OF BEGIN'S OFFICE

TA221150 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 22 Aug 80 p 1

["YEDI'OT AHARONOT Poll: 42 Percent Favor the Transfer of Begin's Office to East Jerusalem, 40 Percent Object"]

[Text] The percentage of those who in principle support the transfer of the prime minister's office to East Jerusalem approximately equals that of people who oppose the move.

About one-fifth of the public does not express any opinion either way. Among those who do not oppose the transfer in principle, the opinions differ regarding the desirable timing. Half of them think that the office should be moved right away. Another half think the transfer should be postponed.

These data emerge from a public opinion poll by YEDI'OT AHARONOT conducted by the Institute for Applied Social Research and the Communications Institute of the Hebrew University. The question asked was: In principle, do you favor or oppose the transfer of the prime minister's office to East Jerusalem?

<u>Favor</u>	<u>Object</u>	<u>No opinion</u>
42	40	18

Question: What about the timing of the transfer:

<u>The time is now</u>	<u>Transfer should be postponed</u>
51	49

From among the people polled, the Likud supporters and religious people support the transfer of the office now. Alignment supporters object in principle to the transfer of the office. Among the respondents who have not identified themselves politically, opinions are roughly equally divided between those two stances.

CSO: 4805

COST-OF-LIVING INDEX FOR JULY RISES BY 4.4 PERCENT

TA151131 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1100 GMT 15 Aug 80

[Text] Israel's monthly cost-of-living index has gone up by 4.4 percent. The figure was released a few minutes ago by the Central Bureau of Statistics. With me here in the studio is the bureau's spokesman, David Neumann.

[Question] David, what were the main increases?

[Answer] We found this month a very high increase in two items: health insurance went up by nearly 10 percent and foodstuffs went up by an average of 7 percent, whilst food, obviously, has a much higher impact on the total index than health insurance. However, one should remember that, with the high quantities of fruit and vegetables coming in to the market in July, which is a normal trend in July, we have a decrease of nearly 2.5 percent in fruit and vegetables average this month, with also the seasonal sales of clothing and footwear, which brought the index down by another 0.1 percent.

[Question] Finally, what can we expect in the month to come? I know that in the last few days we have seen a lot of increases in prices. I would imagine that next month's index will be much higher than the 4.4 percent, or so it appears.

[Answer] It appears that it might be higher. I do not know whether much or if it will. Anyhow, we have the increases in fuel and foodstuffs, electricity, communications, post services, oil, margarine, meat, cigarettes: these will have an impact by themselves of over 3 percent this month, so that the total might be considerably higher than 4.4.

[Question] Okay, thank you very much.

SUPREME COURT CONSIDERS JERUSALEM ELECTRIC PROJECT

Paris LE MONDE in French 9 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by correspondent Francis Cornu: "The Supreme Court Takes Under Advisement the Government's Plan to Control the East Jerusalem Electric Company"]

[Text] Jerusalem--The Supreme Court of Israel requested the Israeli Government on 7 July 1980 to provide within 45 days explanations of its plan to assume control of the electric power company of the Jerusalem region next year. This private Arab company has been distributing electric power in the whole of East Jerusalem and in a large portion of the West Bank since 1967. The workers and stockholders of the company have greeted with satisfaction this initial decision of the high court, which has thus taken into consideration their petition seeking to cancel the government plan.

The discussion is a "political" one. The company's attorney, an Israeli, underscored it by asserting that under the pretext of economic and technical considerations (faulty functioning of the company, frequent failures in power distribution), the government would like to secure control of the sources of energy in the occupied territories before the establishment of an autonomous regime just as it had declared that it wanted to retain control over water reserves in the West Bank. It is appropriate to note that the electricity company represents one of the principal industrial enterprises in the occupied territories.

On 31 December 1979 the Israeli minister of energy had suddenly announced his intention of putting an end in 1981 to the concession enjoyed by the company and of hooking up the latter's network to that of the Israeli international [sic] electric power company. This declaration had generated very strong protests in East Jerusalem and the entire West Bank.

During the court session of Monday, 7 July, the company's attorney noted that the Israeli Government's decision was a violation of the international convention of The Hague on the administration of territories under military occupation, the occupying power being barred from appropriating enterprises or assuming their control in definitive manner.

BRIEFS

GOLAN HEIGHTS LAW--The Golan Settlements Committee has published a public opinion poll showing that 75 percent of Israel's citizens support the bill calling for implementation of Israeli law in the Golan Heights. The poll was conducted by Dr Mina Tzemah. About 11 percent are opposed and about 12 percent have not yet decided where they stand. [Text] [TA171617 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 17 Aug 80]

PUBLIC OPPOSES NEW SETTLEMENTS--The majority of the Israeli public is opposed to the establishment of new settlements in Judaea and Samaria by the government and Gush Emunim. This emerges from a Fori Institute nationwide public opinion poll conducted at the request of HA'ARETZ. When asked, "Should the government continue to establish new settlements in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza while the autonomy negotiations are continuing?" some 51.8 percent replied no and 36.3 percent answered yes. When asked, "Are you in favor or against Gush Emunim settlements?" 52.7 percent replied no and 34.1 percent replied yes. Some 6 percent said they were prepared to support the establishment of new settlements but only if they are established for purely security needs, if the settlers really are pioneers and not merely use the settlements as a place to live, if the settlements are established only on private land and are not the cause of fights and bloodshed and if the economic situation permits the establishment of new settlements. The remaining 6 percent had no views. The poll covered a representative sample of 1,200 men and women who were interviewed privately throughout the country. [Text] [TA180931 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 18 Aug 80 p 3]

GOLAN HEIGHTS, JERUSALEM LAW--Labor Party Chairman MK Shim'on Peres appeared last night at the 'Afula Labor Council following a tour of the city that lasted the whole day. Replying to a question, he said that the principle of a territorial compromise applies to the Golan Heights as well. Peres said that even though the Labor Party says that the Golan is the country's northern shoulder and despite the fact that the Syrians attacked Israel twice from that area, it has never said that the Golan should be annexed and that there is no room for a compromise. If the Labor Party said this, it would make life easier for Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad and his rejection front. With regard to the "Jerusalem law," MK Peres stated that it was and still remains totally unnecessary. He claimed that the Labor

Party was not dragged to vote for it either by Begin or Ge'ula Kohen, who together had a majority to pass the law anyway. "The Labor Party voted for the law out of a sense of national responsibility, out of the fear that if the party did not vote for the bill the impression would be created in the world that the nation is divided over Jerusalem." MK Peres attacked the government's economic policy, accusing it of preferring "financial sharks" over the workers. He also criticized the expenditure, involving many billions of Israeli pounds, on the settlements in the territories, which, all told, do not have more than 13,000 settlers in all the territories. Mr Peres said that he fears that the government's policy would ultimately result in a loss of all the territories without bringing peace. He urged an ouster of the government soon, claiming that "the squabble within the Labor Party is the only reason preventing early elections." [Excerpt] [TA191920 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Aug 80 p 1]

GOLAN ISSUE COMPROMISE--Labor Party Chairman Shim'on Peres has justified his faction's vote in favor of the Jerusalem law. However, he said the Labor Party would object to implementing Israeli law in the Golan Heights if such an initiative is submitted to the Knesset. Mr Peres noted that this position was in accordance with the Labor Party's platform advocating territorial compromise in the Golan Heights as well. Regarding the Jerusalem law Peres said that the Labor Party faction voted for it in order to demonstrate national unity and preclude [anti-Israeli] ammunition from reaching our enemies. He said that even if the Labor Party had abstained the law would have gained a majority in the Knesset. Mr Peres said the United States had in fact given a hand to adopting the Security Council resolution by abstaining during the vote. This is a most severe move, particularly during an election period. Peres noted that the U.S. position currently reflected a greater closeness to the Arabs than to Israel. He said the resolution itself was very serious and it would have implications in the area. Egypt's ambassador to Israel Sa'd Murtada met Knesset member Peres this morning. [Text] [TA211202 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 21 Aug 80]

ELECTION ALIGNMENT--Labor Party Chairman MK Shim'on Peres and Histadrut Secretary General MK Yeruham Meshel will head the joint headquarters for the Knesset and Histadrut elections. This was agreed upon last Friday at a meeting Peres and Meshel held at the Tel Aviv Bet Lessin with the chairman of the trade union department, Yisra'el Qaysar, and the Histadrut's organization department head, Mr Aharon Har'el. The Labor Party leaders are now waiting for a response from "Dahaf" public relations official Eli'ezer Zhorbin to a request that his firm handle the alignment election campaign. The decision to establish a joint election headquarters was made due to a proximity in time between the elections to the Histadrut and the elections to the Knesset. The alignment executive in the Histadrut decided that the Histadrut elections will be held on 7 April. The Labor Party estimates that the Knesset elections will be held about 6 weeks later, even though the possibility is not ruled out that they will be held about a month before the elections to the Histadrut. [Excerpts] [TA191320 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Aug 80 p 3]

CIVILIAN SETTLEMENT--Yesterday, a new settlement, Kokhav Hashahar, was established in southeastern Samaria, on the Eretz Hamirdafim Road north of Rimoni and a few kilometers east of 'Ofra. The first families arrived on the site yesterday. At this stage they are living in temporary quarters erected by the World Zionist Organization's Settlement Department. The initial infrastructure was provided by the settlement department. The settlement belongs to the "Amana" settlement movement of Gush Emunim. Kokhav Hashahar will be a communal settlement that will earn its living from industry and tourism. Kokhav Hashahar was founded as a Nahal settlement in 1977. In 1979 it was decided to civilianize it and this decision was implemented yesterday. [Text] [TA261022 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 26 Aug 80 p 2]

INDUSTRIAL BUREAU PLANS--Israel and Jordan have foiled--separately--an initiative by Judea and Samaria public figures to set up an association of industrial bureaus, mainly out of fear that the association would be taken over by national guidance committee circles. Our correspondent reports that, prior to his expulsion, Hebron Mayor Fahd al-Qawasimi adopted an initiative by Nabulus and Ramallah industrialists, and asked the military government [to allow him] to set up such an association. However, his request was rejected. Amman officials rejected a similar proposal by a delegation from Judea and Samaria, saying they were not ready to create in Judea and Samaria different frameworks from those existing in Jordan itself--in which there are no industrial bureaus. [Text] [TA230924 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 23 Aug 80]

WEST BANK LAND SEIZURE--The military government has issued a seizure order for military purposes for an area of about 800 dunams of land near the village of Rammun, northeast of Ramallah. Our correspondent Arye Gus reports that the inhabitants of the village and its neighbors are considering a legal appeal, since, according to them, the land is in fact intended for the needs of the nearby settlement, Kokhav Hashahar. They are also demanding an explanation of what area exactly is in question, since the seizure order refers to a map only in the possession of the military government. However, our correspondent comments that a closure order was issued for the same area 5 years ago. [Text] [TA251018 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 25 Aug 80]

MONEY TO GAZA REFUGEES--A few days ago the joint Jordanian committee allocated \$600,000 for the rehabilitation of refugees in the Gaza Strip. Our correspondent Bassam Ja'bar reports that this money was transferred to the strip through Unrwa. This is the highest sum transferred by the committee for this purpose so far and is viewed as a turning point in the policy of Jordan and the PLO. [Text] [TA211327 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 21 Aug 80]

WEST BANK LABOR FEDERATION--A suggestion to set up in Judea and Samaria Histadrut branches, which would represent the professional and social interests of the residents employed at Jewish Israeli places of work, has been under discussion for some time between Prime Minister Menahem Begin and Histadrut Secretary General Yeruham Meshel. It has

been learned that a representative of the workers from the territories approached the Histadrut on this matter, in the wake of which the Histadrut Secretary General initiated talks with the prime minister. The Histadrut is stressing that, beyond the matter's social and professional aspects, political sensitivities are involved which are reflected, among other things, in the fact that the workers from the territories object to their affairs being looked after by governmental bodies. The Histadrut secretary general believes that if an arrangement can be worked out on this issue, it will be possible to bring about greater involvement of the workers from the territories in the Israeli trade union system. The prime minister has not yet adopted a position on the idea, and he is expected to hold another meeting with Meshel to discuss it further. [Yehudit Winkler] [Text] [TA210937 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 21 Aug 80 p 8]

WEST BANK LAND CLOSING--The IDF has recently seized large stretches of land between Qibya, in southern Samaria, and Bet Nehemya, on the Bayt Naballah-Rosh Ha'ayin highway. The army has fenced in large stretches of land covering thousands of dunams and closed them for the purpose of its training. Among other things, traffic along the main highway, which acted as an essential traffic artery for the villages in the region, has been closed. ['Amos Levav] [Text] [TA181155 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 18 Aug 80 p 2]

WEST BANK LAND PURCHASES--Recently Gush Emunim has purchased several scores of dunams of land in Judaea and Samaria. None of the land purchased by Gush Emunim has yet been registered with the land registration authority. Authoritative sources said last night that the purchases were being made in an unprofessional way and that Gush Emunim has not yet learned its lesson from the failed attempts it has made in the past regarding the purchase of land in the territories. In contrast to this, there is an unprecedented impetus in purchases being made by estate agents for the Israeli land authority. The authority, in contrast to the members of Gush Emunim, is holding back the money owing to the land owners until the land has been registered with the land registration office. No other private elements are purchasing land in Judaea and Samaria, in spite of the government decision made more than a year ago permitting individuals to purchase land in the territories for private ownership. ['Amos Levav] [Text] [TA181200 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 18 Aug 80 p 1]

JUDAEA, SAMARIA COURTS INDEPENDENT--Jerusalem, 18 Aug--On Monday the High Court of Justice ruled that the court system in Judaea and Samaria, including the Christian courts, were independent and not subject to its [the High Court of Justice] supervision, since it derives its authority from the military government's legislation rather than from Israeli municipal legislation. The High Court of Justice ruling came in its decision by the Latin church court in East Jerusalem on the struggle over the inheritance of property in Bethlehem. High Court of Justice President Moshe Landau and Justices David Bekhor and Hadassa Ben-'ito

decided to reject the appeal, explaining that the High Court of Justice had absolutely no authority to discuss the matter. The president of the High Court of Justice pointed out that it seemed to him that the High Court of Justice had the authority to supervise the activities of the military government [in its capacity] as an executive branch. However, this legal principle did not apply in this case, since the reference here was to the activities of a legal system that had been set up as an independent system composed of judges who were not part of the Israeli legislative branch. [Excerpts] [TA181611 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1330 GMT 18 Aug 80]

WEST BANK SCHOOL CLOSES--The military government has, in fact, decided to close the Bi'r Zayt High School, (Emir Hasan), because its students often demonstrated and rioted last school year. The 300 students have been dispersed to other schools in the area. [Text] [TA190601 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 19 Aug 80]

SETTLEMENT TERM CHANGES--No longer settlement [hitnahlut] but settlement [hityashvut]. This is the latest directive issued by the commander of Judea and Samaria, Brig Gen Binyamin Ben-Eli'ezer, who has ordered the word settlement [hitnahlut] removed from the vocabulary and official publications of the military government. This directive by Brigadier General Ben-Eli'ezer depends, among other things, on the office of the custodian of absentee property in Judea and Samaria. According to the directive, the settlements in Samaria are no longer to be called settlements [hitnahlut] (in the military government's official publications). Every settlement in Judea and Samaria will from now on be a settlement [hityashvut] in the view of Brigadier General Ben-Eli'ezer and the military government personnel. It has been reported that the reason for the erasure of the word "hitnahlut" depends on the view that it is too aggressive a title, while the word "hityashvut" is more positive. ['Amos Levav] [Text] [TA181409 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 18 Aug 80 p 1]

JULY MONEY ABSORPTION--In July the government absorbed 1.3 billion Israeli pounds from the public. This is the first month since October 1979 that the government has succeeded in absorbing money from the public rather than injecting money into the economy. Money injection since the beginning of 1980 dropped from 7.4 billion pounds to 6.1 billion pounds. [TA051655 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Aug 80 p 8]

COAL SUPPLY--The Ministerial Economic Committee today decided to set up a state corporation for coal supply. It is not yet clear when the company will actually commence operations. The company will be able to engage in coal prospecting and in developing coal mines in Israel and abroad. Energy Minister Yitzhaq Moda'i said today that Israel is considering the possibility of purchasing coal mines. [TA051655 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 4 Aug 80]

EXPORTS UP--Industrial investments in the first 6 months of the year have gone down by one-third in real terms, but exports of existing industry are still rising sharply. The investment center says it approved the establishment of 44 new plants, as compared with 17 the same period a year ago. There was also a similar drop in the amount of money invested and a 10-percent fall in the import of materials for industry. The main reason for this was the 115 percent rise in the cost of investment and the price of equipment as well as the full linkage of development loans to the index. Nevertheless, a new study by the Bank of Israel paints an encouraging picture as regards exports: in 1973 industrial exports--excluding diamonds--totaled \$600 million. Last year the total was \$2.5 billion, and this year the forecast is for nearly \$3.25 billion. Even if the dollar's inflation is subtracted, exports in the last 5 years have doubled in real terms. In 1973 Israel exported 27 percent of its gross national product; last year the figure rose to 40 percent. If the present trend in exports continues then, by the end of 1980 exports will be 42 percent of the GNP. According to the Central Bank's study on export profitability, the cost of living index rose last month by 6 percent and this month an 8-percent jump is expected due to the government's latest price hikes. [TA080525 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1700 GMT 5 Aug 80]

WORKERS FROM TERRITORIES--Jerusalem, 6 Aug--The government press office today reported that in July 44,504 workers from the territories, including 2,108 women, were employed in Israel through the employment bureaus. This compares with 44,401 in June. A breakdown by sectors shows that 14,810 were employed in construction, 17,511 in industry (including 911 women), 7,430 in the services (including 842 women) and 4,752 in agriculture (including 255 women). A breakdown by locations shows that 7,979 persons from the territories worked in Jerusalem, 2,664 in Haifa, 11,635 in Tel Aviv and 4,996 in the Negev. [TA080525 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1415 GMT 6 Aug 80 TA]

UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (Jerusalem, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE)--The unemployment rate in Israel reached 4.5 percent of the economically active population (59,000 individuals) at the end of June 1980 compared to 2.9 percent (37,000 persons) a year earlier, up 59.5 percent. According to the director of economic planning, Ezra Sadan, this rate should increase further between now and the end of 1980, when the number of unemployed could total 72,000. However, the balance of trade deficit which had come to \$3.2 billion in 1979 may only reach \$2.6 billion at the close of 1980 in light of the results shown during the first six months of the year. Between January and June 1980 exports reached \$2,655 million, up 27 percent compared to the corresponding period of 1979. [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 19 Jul 80 p 24] 2662

CSO: 4800

AMBASSADOR TO UN ASKS SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 4-10 Aug 80 pp 48-51

[Interview with Abdallah Beshara, Kuwaiti Ambassador at United Nations, by Mona al-Said, date and place not given]

[Excerpta]

As expected, Israel has said that it will not abide by this week's General Assembly resolution on the question of Palestine. What step do the Arab states and their supporters intend to take next?

The significance of the special session of the General Assembly lies in the fact that its resolutions carry more legal and moral weight than the resolutions of a regular session. We will therefore follow up this resolution. How?

First, in the resolution there is a reference to a Security Council meeting. In other words, the Security Council must meet shortly. By "shortly" I don't mean next month; I mean in November, if Israel does not withdraw from the Arab territories by then, as the resolution stipulates. So this is one step that has to be taken.

Second, the matter will also be followed up in international conferences, and not only in the General Assembly.

Third, we will come back to the General Assembly in the event of non-compliance by Israel. This special General Assembly was adjourned on condition that it will be reconvened when the president, in the light of Israeli action, deems it necessary.

Fourth - and this is the most important thing - the Arab capitals must move. It is unfair to leave the whole burden of the problem, the political struggle of the Palestinian people, to the Arab delegates at the United Nations. The Arab delegates should not be left to work alone. Unfortunately, the special session did not mobilize the Arab capitals, and the result was that we, the Arab delegates, had to work in a vacuum, a political vacuum. We hope that now, in the light of Israel's obstinacy, there will be solid coordination. In a nutshell, we should unite the undertakings of the Arab capitals and not initiate in total isolation from these capitals.

But all action on this resolution will be withheld until November 15?

After the 15th of November, yes.

Will the Arabs seek sanctions against Israel at the Security Council?

Of course! There's no alternative. The stage of normal resolutions is over, in view of the humiliation of Islam and Christianity at the hands of Israel in Jerusalem. The Knesset vote to annex Jerusalem formally has had no precedent since the early days of Islam - 1,400 years. It reminds me of the Crusaders, who tried to take Jerusalem but were finally defeated. I think this is an insult, a political, religious and cultural humiliation to the Moslem countries and to the Arabs primarily. Our action should be commensurate with the Israeli measure.

In other words, we must seek sanctions, regardless of who opposes and who supports. Those who oppose sanctions against Israel must bear their responsibility; those who support them must be shown our cooperation.

In brief, this is the point of no return. Israel's measures on Jerusalem have led it to the point of no return. Sanctions are inevitable.

What kind of sanctions are we talking about?

The Charter of the United Nations provides for long-term sanctions. Under Chapter 7 of the Charter, the countries of the international community can stop trade and economic and political relations with Israel - a total embargo.

We are not talking about symbolic or selective sanctions, like withdrawal of diplomats or

reduction of diplomatic personnel or an arms embargo. In the light of the Israeli measures, we can't accept symbolic sanctions; we must have comprehensive sanctions.

Whether they accept this or not, we must insist that Israel be expelled from the United Nations and subjected to comprehensive sanctions, because what it has done in Jerusalem is unjustified, an insult to Islam, a humiliation to our spiritual feelings.

So the expulsion of Israel from the U.N. will be sought?

I hope so. That does not mean that we will succeed, but whether we do or not should not discourage or encourage us. We must stand on our rights. We must not go by our chances of success or failure. If we go by the rules of that game, we won't get anywhere. We must go by our convictions and let those who oppose us bear the responsibility. Those who oppose us must know that they have chosen political, religious and cultural confrontation with us.

Jerusalem is an Islamic and Arab symbol. What Israel has done is an attack not only on the Arab heritage in Jerusalem but on Islam as a religion. We cannot accept sanctions which fall short of the enormity of the Israeli measures.

Israel has said that no sanctions can be imposed on it because it is protected by the U.S. veto - which, of course, is true. What do the Arabs intend to do if the U.S. blocks their move at the Security Council?

The U.S. cannot have its cake and eat it too. In other words, the United States cannot have good relations with the Arabs and at the

same time be the upholder of the tyranny of Israel. We cannot accept that.

The United States must consider its own interests and act accordingly. If it considers that its interests lie in a confrontation with the Arabs, so be it. But we don't think so. We think its interests require cooperation with the Arabs. Its interests, its traditions, its heritage require its opposition of Israeli tyranny and imperialism. We believe that if the United States takes a negative attitude toward our attempts, it must bear the responsibility for that attitude, because on Jerusalem, we cannot blow hot and cold; we have to be firm; we have to be determined.

What is the Arab attitude toward the vote against this week's resolution by the U.S., Canada, Norway and Australia?

We are not happy with the Canadian or Australian or any other vote against the resolution, but we believe that those countries follow the United States. Our problem is with the United States. The key is the United States.

They tell us the reason is that this is an election year. But they have some kind of justification every month, every week. I think we should work seriously on the United States, because they're taking us for a ride. They're enjoying the benefits of their relationship with the Arabs, and at the same time enjoying their partnership with Israel.

**The Islamic countries demanded an urgent meeting of the Security Council as this interview was being conducted last Friday.*

I believe in confronting the United States, not accommodating it.

How do the Arabs view the West European abstention on this week's resolution?

Some of the Europeans usually oppose resolutions on Palestinian statehood. This time, they abstained, and I think that is a step in the right direction, because it isolated the United States.

The Europeans have their own reasons for not supporting the resolution. They say that a European mission is touring the Middle East — a fact-finding mission and that they are not in a position to make any decision before the return of that mission.

At any rate, their abstention is much better than their opposition. It isolates the United States. As you know, the United States tried to exert pressure on the Europeans, but they didn't budge.

This was a European step in the right direction. It falls short of what we want, yes, but I don't think it should be condemned. It is much better than the European position last year, and it should be encouraged.

Do the Arabs intend to take immediate action on the Jerusalem issue? Will they be demanding a Security Council meeting now?

Yes, definitely, but we are waiting for contacts among the Islamic capitals to be completed.*

As I told you earlier, we will seek sanctions against Israel. That was decided at the Islamic conference in Islamabad: that if the Israeli Parliament passes the Jerusalem bill, sanctions should be sought. That is what we will do.

Do the Arabs intend to take any action against the 11 or 12 states which still have embassies in Jerusalem?

No, no, no. We are talking to these countries, and our talks are being successful. Venezuela has announced the withdrawal of its embassy from Jerusalem. It would not be wise to say that we are in a state of confrontation with these countries. We are talking to them, pointing out that it is illegal to have their embassies in Jerusalem, that embassies in Jerusalem consolidate Israeli colonization and are a violation of the U.N. resolutions. I think we will be successful. Most of these countries are Latin American, and they stood by us at the General Assembly recently.

A news agency report from Kuwait yesterday quoted a Kuwaiti foreign ministry source as suggesting that the United States may be behind the current deterioration of the security situation in Kuwait, the idea being that Washington is trying to prove that the Gulf needs its protection. What is your opinion?

I haven't heard that view, and I really don't know what is going on there in the Gulf, but I believe that the security of the Gulf is the responsibility of the people of the Gulf alone.

What do you think is behind the recent spate of security incidents in Kuwait and the Gulf?

I really don't know... I know that the Gulf is the target of sabotage, and that the sabotage is coming from many quarters. To be fair, I don't think the United States is the only one that wants to destabilize the Gulf; there are many quarters that want to destabilize it.

I believe the internal security of the Gulf should be maintained and strengthened. Frankly, I think the inflow of foreigners should be stopped. The Gulf people are minorities in their own territories. This can't go on. We can't tolerate it.

You can't bring wolves into your own bedroom, because you don't know when they will turn on you and devour you. I think the inflow of foreigners should be stopped. It's a drastic measure, but it should be taken.

Do you see a major crisis approaching in the Gulf?

No, no, no. I don't expect that. The Gulf is a resilient area. Its people know how to handle things realistically and pragmatically. This is what characterizes them, really: their pragmatism and practicality. I don't expect any upheaval. The Gulf has its own strength.

Do you think that the current Israeli campaign against Mr. Waldheim will block his reelection as U.N. secretary general next year?

It won't really block or facilitate his reelection for a third term. That is not the issue. The issue is that the Israelis, as usual, are attacking the secretary general because he stood firmly and displayed his integrity. He is an objective man, a man of integrity.

What he said (two weeks ago about Palestinian self-determination - see Middle East news section in this issue) never went beyond the resolutions of the General Assembly. The secretary general reflected the international consensus. He said what the General Assembly said. If the secretary general is not allowed to articulate an international consensus, what is he supposed to do?

Let me remind you that during the Vietnam war, the then secretary general, U Thant, came out strongly against the United States' bombing of Vietnam. The United States didn't like it, of course, but he thought it was his duty as secretary general to express the international

consensus on that matter. Following the dictates of his conscience and the international conscience, he came out strongly against the bombing of Vietnam, and he proved to be right.

Mr. Waldheim has done the same. He has articulated the international consensus, and if one or two countries don't like it, this doesn't mean that he has departed from the international consensus. It means that these countries have themselves departed from the international consensus and taken steps which are in contradiction with that consensus.

Mr. Waldheim does not need to be defended. Morally, legally and politically, he stands on firm and safe ground. ●

CSO: 4820

KUWAIT WINS BID FOR HAY'S WHARF

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 4 Aug 80 p 6

[Text]

The Kuwait Investment Office last week won control of the London property development company, the Proprietors of Hay's Wharf. Soon after the London-based KIO announced it had acquired 50.5 per cent of the company's shares, Hay's Wharf's board of directors capitulated. The Kuwaiti offer of £2.50 (\$5.75) per share had earlier been rejected by the board as "opportunistic and inadequate" (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, July 28) but a subsequent statement asserted that acceptance of the bid would be in the best interests of shareholders. The bid puts a value of £53.7 million (\$126.7 million) on the company.

Victory in the takeover battle for Hay's Wharf may prove to be far more significant than the size of the deal would suggest. In some respects it marked a coming-of-age for the KIO, which was set up more than 20 years ago by the Kuwaiti government to handle the country's overseas investments. Not only did it demonstrate the Kuwaitis' ability to give and take the hard knocks that are inevitable in a contested takeover, but perhaps more important, it put the seal on the City of London's growing respect for the KIO as a tough-minded and shrewd business organisation. It is a reputation likely to provide openings for top-drawer investments at a highly opportune moment; Kuwait, as recent acquisitions show, is both eager and able to take advantage of such opportunities.

The latest moves must be seen as essentially defensive. As this newsletter reported in its July 28 issue, Bahrain is examining the feasibility of setting up its own exchange and there has also been talk of an exchange in the Emirate of Sharjah. The new Kuwaiti rules are also clearly designed to keep out companies engaging in speculation which have been set up elsewhere in the Gulf, financed mainly from Kuwait.

CSO: 4820

NEW RULES PERMIT LISTING OF GULF SHARES

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 11 Aug 80 p 11

[Text]

The Kuwaiti cabinet last week agreed on conditions under which shares of companies registered elsewhere in the Gulf can be traded on the Kuwait Stock Exchange. Trading in these shares was banned in Kuwait last year (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, October 22 and November 5, 1979) but has continued unofficially since then through other stock exchanges.

The conditions for a listing on the Kuwaiti exchange are that the company must be properly incorporated in a Gulf state which has signed an economic agreement with Kuwait, be at least three years old, have a capital of at least 10 per cent on its capital of at least KD 5 million (\$18.3 million), have made a profit of at least 10 per cent on its capital from its defined operations during the two previous years and be at least 50 per cent Kuwaiti-owned at the time of the cabinet's decision. Companies seeking listing will also have to undertake not to increase their capital for three years following listing and not to establish affiliate or subsidiaries for a minimum of five years after listing. Gulf banking or insurance companies will not be permitted to apply for listing.

At present, there are 38 Kuwaiti companies whose shares are traded on the local exchange, which is the eighth-largest in the world in terms of turnover. It was not known immediately how many Gulf companies would be eligible for listing under the new rules.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

CHIP, MONKS INVESTMENT--The Kuwaiti Investment Bureau has raised its shares in Chip of Britain, which specialises in safety and warning devices production. It was announced in Kuwait last week that the Bureau, which is under the jurisdiction of the Kuwaiti Ministry of Finance has acquired 225,000 additional shares thus bringing its total share of the equity to 5.9 shares valued at \$ 6.5 million. The new share purchase brings Kuwait's share to 9.8 percent. The Kuwaiti decision has improved the selling price of Chip shares on the London market which was recently depressed after the company announced it will not produce cash registers any longer. Kuwait has also raised its share in Monks Investment Trust by 800,000 shares, which now stands at 6.29. [Text/ [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 2 Aug 80 p 22/

INVESTMENT IN MOORHEAD ELECTRIC--Kuwait has increased its investment in the British Moorhead Electric and Electronic Co. Informed sources of the Kuwaiti Investment Bureau under the Ministry of Finance said Kuwait's shares in Moorhead were increased by 15,000 shares to reach 570,000, or 6.7 percent of the total. The value of a Moorhead share on the London stock exchange is \$2.5 with a maximum of 270 pence and a minimum of 90 pence. The total value of Kuwait's shares in Moorhead therefore amount to \$ 615,000. [Text/ [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 2 Aug 80 p 23/

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

IRANIAN LEADERS HAPPY TO COOPERATE--Iranian leaders in the Petroleum, Finance and Economy Ministry and the Central Bank are ready to cooperate and coordinate (their action) with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the areas of banking and the economy, it was learned during a series of talks yesterday morning in Tehran between Mr. Abdellah El Saoudi, the executive president of the Societe Bancaire Arabe and the Iranian Petroleum Ministry, the deputy ministers of Finance and the Economy, the governor of the Central Bank and the president of the Bank of Iran. During these talks, in the presence of Mr Salem El Zinati, the president of the Arab-Spanish Bank, they discussed means of cooperation between the Societe Bancaire Arabe and the Iranian banks. The speakers also spoke of the possibilities of cooperation in the international banking field between the banks in which the Libyan Arab Socialist People's Jamahiriya is a stockholder and the Iranian banks. [Text] [Paris BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'AGENCE JAMAHIRIYA-PRESSE in French 11 Jul 80 p 3] 8956

SUDAN-LIBYAN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION--The Arab Sudanese delegation for agricultural cooperation of Al-Jazira and Al-Mankel which is now visiting Libya has affirmed that what is taking place on the soil of the People's Socialist Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, whether concerning the management of the public services by the people's committees, which are carrying out the decisions of the people's congresses, or concerning the enormous guarantees furnished by the revolution to Libyan agriculture constitutes a source of pride for all Arabs. In a communique which appeared today in the newspaper AL-ARD (The Land) and published at the end of the Sudanese delegation's visit which began on 5 July, the two parties emphasized the necessity of devoting all of Arab energy to the service of the vital Arab cause, that is, the struggle against the Zionist hord which is active in occupied Palestine, rather than wasting them in provocations which serve only the interests of the enemies of the Arab people. The two parties feel that there are several ways in which cooperation between the two organizations can occur, such as setting up an apiculture project aimed at establishing that industry among Sudanese farmers. [Text] [Paris BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'AGENCE JAMAHIRIYA PRESSE in French 16 Jul 80 p 3] 8956

CSO: 4800

AFRICAN FOREIGN LEGION--Colonel Qadhdhafi is soon to levy an armed group he is calling the "African Liberation Army." This force, a kind of African Foreign Legion already comprises 2500 men. These mercenaries are recruited from Chad, Sudan, Niger, and Senegal. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 18 Aug 80 p 28]

CSO: 4800

AMD LEADER DISCUSSES ANTI-REGIME PLANS

Rabat L'OPINION in French 25 Jul 80 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Moustapha Ould Abei Darahamane, formerly planning director and governor of Imchiri and now one of the officials of the Alliance for a Democratic Mauritania (AMD) by Attilio Gaudio--date and place unknown]

[Text] [Question] You are one of the foreign leaders, let's say in exile, of the Democratic Mauritanian Movement that is in opposition to the present regime, but we had already met at the time of President Mokhtar Ould Daddah's regime, in Mauritania, before you became planning director in Nouakchott, when you were still part of the opposition with those young people that we met, especially because they were fighting for the nationalization of the "Miferma" [Iron Mining Company of Mauritania]. These young people remained with the opposition for several years and one day, they rallied to the regime. I believe it is interesting to take a step back and have you explain briefly what were the reasons, the restlessness of these young Mauritanian people that were opposed to Mokhtar and why at a given time, I believe in 1974, you rallied around the regime of the ex-President Ould Daddah?

[Answer] I will try to be brief in answering this specific question. We accepted on the basis of a debate which lasted a whole year in 1974. The outcome of this debate was to rally the regime of Mokhtar Ould Daddah by integrating a portion of the Mauritanian people on two bases: one basis was the internal elements, namely the evolution of the country's internal situation, and the other being a certain number of political, economical and social demands for Mauritania. Certain parts of this program have been implemented such as the nationalization of the "Miferma", the creation of certain institutions whose goal was to improve the conditions of the masses as well as the precise and firm affirmation of national sovereignty.

Our rallying depended essentially upon our having total freedom of expression within this organization. As far as the outside elements are concerned, we have noticed that at the present time, since 1960, the world is more and more divided between the big powers. When we mention the powers

in the world, we are referring to the West and the Eastern countries. In our estimation, the West in general, and particularly France, the old colonizer, was losing its strength considerably and was more and more on the defensive, whereas the Soviet Union was in full offensive, strategically and militarily, and that this was a threat to what we consider most important in our countries, namely national sovereignty.

Once national sovereignty has been obtained, an independent economy can be created, the conditions of the populations can be improved, but if the country is dominated, it remains in the hands of what we call perhaps somewhat vaguely "foreign hegemonic domination". We wanted our country to be pulled out of this, and thus, in all the regions of Africa, a new balance was needed. For this reason, we outlined a common interest plan with the present regimes that desired progress.

The regime of President Mokhtar lend itself perfectly to this, and thus we associated with his regime without being entirely in agreement. We believe in an evolution that brings together the different populations to power.

[Question] What kind of an association would it be, according to your doctrine? How would you associate the populations of Hodd and those of Adrar, for example?

[Answer] It involves giving them the most elementary democratic liberties, associating them with the destiny of their region. What we were criticizing at the time, and which unfortunately still exists, is the fact that a central governor and administrator are sent to a certain region. Of course, there is national unity, it is necessary and a central government is a must, but the populations have always been administered from a distance. Earlier, it was done from Paris or Dakar, then with the independence a great evolution took place. However, that was not sufficient for us. We are for a direct association of the populations with their problems, with the orientation of their region's economy, with academic teaching, local planning and their own representation; and then from a central point of view, we want a political regime which actually represents these populations, and not by proxy. From the social point of view, those in power should pay more attention to the underprivileged populations, because without the association of these underprivileged populations in the development process, there never will be any development.

[Question] With respect to foreign policy, you said at a certain time, that you were conscious of the danger that the Soviet Union represented for Africa. However, the Soviet Union was a long distance away and the battlefields where this breakthrough was taking place were also very far from Mauritania: namely in Angola, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Except for the Saharan war which we presently recognize as being a Libyan intervention with Russian weapons, there was no real danger for West Africa, especially not in 1974. Thus, did you perceive a direct danger from the Soviet Union or an indirect danger from other countries?

[Answer] What I can tell you is that we did a synthesis of what is called the National Liberation Movement in the Third World, and in particular in Africa, and we tried to analyze what the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola], the FRELIMO and the Madagascan Movement represented, as well as what was happening in our country, the various clan-destine movements that exist in Senegal, a little everywhere. Thus, we made a strategical synthesis.

[Question] What have you concluded from this analysis of African liberation movements?

[Answer] We concluded that the African liberation movements, which strongly recommend progressionism as one sees in the West and are doing left-right cleaving, are in fact a perfect mess for a new ideology which is practically a form of enterprise in these countries. This is why we lean much more towards a national unity which includes the most diverse components of the population, to follow a half-way line which prevents the country from becoming a popular democracy.

[Question] Under these conditions, it would be better to have a regime that is more representative, more moderate but also more independent in the sense that in the end, it will be dependent upon no one.

[Answer] Absolutely. We would fail in our patriotic and islamic duty if we did not attempt to overthrow the present regime. As a famous proverb of the Prophet says: "Love for the country is an integral part of religion." It is actually a sacred duty for us because those people are aiming at splitting up the country, consequently, aiming at having our country disappear from the map.

It is a totally unknown adventure, that is why in the ADN declaration it speaks of perspectives of chadization, lebanization and eventually afghanization.

[Question] What are you considering in order to overthrow the regime? Only a propaganda in foreign countries as you are doing now or do you think it will come to an armed battle within Mauritania?

[Answer] We are not excluding any means of battle whatsoever.

[Question] Is the regime well established?

[Answer] We believe that the regime is very weak at the present time. Any one can notice this when on-site. The power is in the hands of several putchist officers and in particular in the hands of 2 or 3 individuals who have no connection with the basis, or with that of the army or the people.

The country is in total opposition to the orientation presently given to the general policy of the country, to the extent that we believe this

fight will not last long. However, if it were to be long, we would consider it our duty and would continue to fight using all means available to us, today the political means, tomorrow military means if there is no other solution.

We believe that an awakening, an outburst from the Mauritanian people--maybe more rapid than we believe--will bring about a change in the situation without any armed fight because the ADN would not want any bloodshed. However, if the national safety depended upon it, we would have no hesitation.

[Question] According to you, is there presently in Mauritania a certain nostalgia for Mokhtar Ould Daddah?

[Answer] We are using all the patriotic personalities. With respect to the ex-president Ould Daddah, since the question has already been asked, we respect his patriotic zeal, first of all because it is the conviction of all and secondly, because it is presently felt by all the Mauritanian populations.

[Question] Do you feel threatened by a portion of Qadhdhafi's Libya?

[Answer] We Mauriticians are in no particular danger, however you know what is happening almost everywhere in the world. There is one thing that worries the ADN of which I am a militant, it is this idea of a Moor general unity. We do not know who is promoting this idea but it is in the air, it is in the conversations and it so happens that this Moor general unity is directly threatening the existence of Mauritania.

You know that Mauritania is a bi-ethnic, multinational country: we have Arabs, Moors, Wolofs, Soninkes, consequently the idea of establishing a Moor state in the Sahara cannot of course be done without consulting the major part of Mauritania. This idea is of great concern to us, and it matters little who is supporting it or who is profiting from it, because its aim is to destabilize the entire region. In fact, it is not only threatening Mauritania in its outburst, but the entire African West as well, because it is a threat to Mali, Nigeria...

[Question] Do you believe that this idea can cause the secession of the River people?

[Answer] Certainly. This idea demands the splitting up of Mauritania and that is one of my main concerns, especially if you take into account the real orientation of the main leaders of the present military regime, particularly that of the Colonel Ould Haïdallah whom we consider a foreigner since he is of "sahraoui" origin. He and the Commander Boukreiss are in favor of this idea whose immediate objective is the splitting up of Mauritania.

[Question] In reality, they would like to create a Mauritanian Republic without the Blacks, without the River people, which would include what exactly?

[Answer] Which would include the Western Sahara region.

[Question] No, since there are Moroccans. Unless they withdraw and there is a large Mauritania?

[Answer] That's it. It would be the Moor general unity. It is often spoken of in history but actually it is...

[Question] It would also include Tindouf, etc...

[Answer] You know, if one carries this idea very far, it could also include a portion of Algeria, part of Mali, part of Nigeria, wherever there are Moors and more than Moors, Sahara inhabitants such as the Touareg who are not Moors but in fact Saharans just as well.

Given this, we at the ADN are against no particular country, or any organization whatsoever as long as they respect the sovereignty of Mauritania within its 1960 limits.

[Question] Do you think you will fight to overthrow the present regime?

[Answer] The Mauritaniens have a hard time praising the president, but when we are not here, the truth is spoken more readily and we believe that at the present time, the ex-President Mokhtar Ould Daddah is particularly popular in Mauritania.

[Question] People then have not forgotten? They have forgotten his errors to remember only his virtues?

[Answer] Taking into account the disorganization created by the new regime and the disorder in the present military management, we believe that precisely the scale is tipping considerably in favor of the ex-President. This is quite normal.

[Question] Do you think he was wrong or that he had no other choice in 1976, by battling the POLISARIO with Morocco? You may not want to take a stand on this? In any case, you believe that Mauritania, because of its economic conditions, can only remain outside of the conflict?

[Answer] Yes. Anyway, on this subject, I have never been pro-war, first of all because I don't believe Mauritania has the means to go to war. However, President Mokhtar Ould Daddah and his team did not engage themselves in the real war until the 1960 Mauritanian territory was attacked. That is a given fact, that is true but part of the past now and what counts is the future.

Today, the Mauritaniens are unanimous in thinking that the destiny of their country lies outside of this war and they are for the preservation of Mauritania within its internationally recognized frontiers.

MAURITANIA

DETAILS OF PRC-MAURITANIAN COOPERATION GIVEN

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 19-20 Jul 80 p 3

[Text] 19 July 1966-19 July 1980...Fifteen years of exemplary cooperation between Mauritania and the People's Republic of China.

A China animated with a feeling of solidarity and sincere freindship towards our nation and who reaffirmed the commitment to tender the aid needed by our country to permit it to complete the work of economic and financial restoration carried out by the National Administration.

Today our nation is struggling relentlessly under the direction of the CMSN [expansion unknown] to overcome underdevelopment and build up a free, prosperous and happy Mauritania. In this long term work, Mauritania is naturally relying on tis own efforts, but it also has the right to expect of its friends an effective solidarity in the accomplishment of its objectives.

Mauritania and China, both belonging to the Third World, are struggling relentlessly for the advent of a more just and equitable international economic order, while using actively the liberation of oppressed nations and the triumph of just cases to consolidate peace in the world.

These are the principles underlying the common struggle and the exemplary cooperation based on the five principles of perceful co-existence and on the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle.

We need put forward as proof only the speech made by the Head of State and Government before the Heads of the Arab and African missions accredited to Beiying during his recent visit to China when he had expressed himself in the following terms: "I would not be betraying any secrets if I told you that the Chinese had affirmed clearly and strongly their support in all our causes."

As for the Sino-Mauritanian cooperation proper, it has already won several victories.

This cooperation has related so far to sectors varied as they are vital to the development of Mauritania.

Thus we may mention the supply of Nouakchott with running water, the drilling of several wells over the entire territory, the construction of the Culture Building which now houses services including in particular four libraries, a scientific research institute, etc., building a Youth Hall in Nouakchott, the national Hygiene Laboratory, the Kiffa hospital. The latter, whose building costs 2,495,000 ouguiyas, extends over an area of 2,467.80 m², has 50 beds and carries equipment worthy of great hospitals.

The hospitals of Nema, Selibaby, the electric power station whose capacity exceeds 20,000 kwh, the Nouakchott Olympic Stadium will contribute to the training of our athletes and will permit the solution of problems of hosting international competitions.

The Olympic Complex extends over an area of about 18 ha and has a built up area of 19,412 m².

It is a stadium with tiers with a capacity of 10,000 spectators which may be the site for multidisciplinary meetings.

The deep water port, the famous "friendship port", whose building costs 2.5 billion ouguiyas, will revolutionize our port infrastructures. It will have a capacity of 1,200,000 tons and would permit simultaneous berthing of three ships and receive 10,000 ton cargo ships.

The development of M'Pourie, covering an area of 1,800 ha, has 1,426 ha distributed in the following manner: 624 ha for the State farm, and 802 ha for the farmers.

This development includes a protective dike of 12.50 km length, which can protect the developed areas against the highest floods of the Senegal river for a 20 year period, a pumping station equipped with 9 power driven pumps of 80 hp power with a total delivery of 5.24 m³/second, a main irrigation channel 6 km long.

The production of the State and that of the farmers are estimated for the 1979-1980 season at 3,896 tons paddy.

Thanks to this project, Trarza was able not only to assure its self-sufficiency in rice, but was able to obtain a surplus sold at a profitable price. The aid given by the People's Republic of China to our country is therefore a model one, since it was always tendered at the tight time and in sectors of crucial development for the economic and social development of Mauritania. Therefore, in spite of its discreet and disinterested nature, the Sino-Mauritanian cooperation is appreciated by all the Mauritania who experience every day its beneficial effects.

9018

CSO: 4400

SOLAR WATER PUMPING STATION OPENED

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 21 Jul 80 p 8

[Text] The Director of Agriculture, Mr Lam Hamady proceeded on the 11 instant to the inauguration of a solar station at Ngorel Guidal, west of Boghe (Brakna).

The plant, whose power is 10 kw, is of the thermodynamic type with energy storage in the form of hot water, which permits essentially the station to operate continuously for 4 hours.

We recall that according to the seasons, it will pump water from the Senegal river at the rate of 1500 to 2,000 m³ water daily. This water will allow 2 or 3 crops of rice, or other cereals every year.

It should be specified that this pump, which is financed by the European Communities, is the fourth of its type to be built in the world. Built by the Societe Francaise d'Etudes Thermiques et d'Energies Solaires (SOFRETES), it is integrated within the project of intensification of agricultural production in the Senegal valley, for which the European community has assured for about 10 years a financing of about 200 million UM.

9018

CSO: 4400

IMF AID APPROVED, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SOUGHT

London WEST AFRICA in English 18 Aug 80 p 1568

[Excerpt]

The IMF has approved a stand-by arrangement for the Government of Mauritania, authorising purchases up to the equivalent of SDR 29.7m over the next two years, in support of the Government's economic stabilisation programme. Purchases under this arrangement will be financed in part from the Fund's ordinary resources (SDR 12.3m.) and in part from resources borrowed by the Fund under the supplementary financing facility (SDR 17.4m.).

Mauritania faces serious economic and financial difficulties stemming from growing fiscal imbalances, in part related to substantial defence-related current expenditures and investments in large projects which have yet to have an appreciable effect on output. This situation has been exacerbated by weak demand for iron ore (the country's major

export), sharply increasing oil prices, and weather-related shortfalls in food production. In recent years, the authorities have taken a number of steps to redress the situation but despite noticeable progress achieved during 1978-79, Mauritania's underlying internal and external imbalances remain large.

The first objective of the Government is to restore a viable equilibrium to the balance of payments. To achieve this aim, the Government intends to accelerate investment, reduce the budget deficit from 18 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1979 to 12 per cent of GDP in 1980, improve tax administration, pursue cautious credit policies, expand exports, improve the structure of external debt, and strengthen the economic and financial institutions.

INFORMATION MINISTER DISCUSSES GOVERNMENT FOREIGN POLICY

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 8 Jun 80 pp 22, 23

/Article by Rafiq Khalil al-Ma'luf: "It Is Not a New Saudi Initiative but a New Reading of Previous Ones"/

/Text/ In a talk with AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WAL-DUWALI, the Saudi minister of information, Dr Muhammad 'Abduh al-Yamani, explained some of the points in the statements of the Saudi crown prince, Fahd ibn 'Abd-al'Aziz to the WASHINGTON POST newspaper last week on the Middle East crisis. Dr al-Yamani said "There is no change in the Saudi position, which is that we believe in a just peace based on giving the Palestinians their full rights, including their right to establish an independent state, return to the territories occupied in 1967, and restore Jerusalem to its natural state."

The Saudi prince added, "There are no new Saudi initiatives; rather, what has been published is a correct new reading of previous Saudi initiatives."

Here is the text of the interview:

/Question/ Could you explain what has been mentioned in the United States on Prince Fahd's interview with the WASHINGTON POST on the Middle East crisis?

/Answer/ In actuality, Prince Fahd dotted the i's and crossed the t's. His interview has been the kingdom's clearest announced position in a long time, and there is no change in the Saudi position. The interview which Prince Fahd gave is the Saudi position which we have announced more than once, which is that we believe in a just peace based on giving the Palestinians their full rights, including their right to establish an independent state, returning the territories to their 1967 state, and restoring Jerusalem to its natural state. This is a position which we have announced more than once. We have said that we are in favor of peace and are in favor of solutions which satisfy the frontline states and satisfy the Palestinians, by granting them their rights in full. There is no shift in this position.

/Question/ The WASHINGTON POST talked about a new Saudi initiative. Is there a new initiative?

/Answer/ I believe that what has been published is a new reading of Saudi initiatives. There are no new Saudi initiatives. We have wanted this statement to be understood for a long time and now it appears it has found receptive ears. It is a proper new reading of previous Saudi initiatives.

/Question/ What in Saudi Arabia's conception, through Prince Fahd's statements, of the Camp David agreements?

/Answer/ Prince Fahd said that we have clearly stated our position on this issue. We believe that the Camp David agreements have not achieved a just peace in the area because as long as the opinions of the people whose cause it basically is are not taken into consideration in any solution, any solution which ignores the Palestinians must be considered incomplete and will never lead to peace, because the Palestinian cause is the heart of the problem. We must consider that Camp David will not achieve peace because it has not taken the essential issue into consideration and has not taken the Palestinians' opinion on this subject. As Prince Fahd said, in spite of our difference of opinion over Camp David, we believe that al-Sadat has done all he could. The fact is that the president of Egypt is in an embarrassing position because he has realized that what the Arabs had been saying in the past is correct, namely, that the Israelis are not prepared to proceed with solutions to the end. They want solutions which will be consonant with their situation and will provide them with peace and security while they manage to achieve what they want, then evade responsibility for the solutions, as they have done now. They want temporary solutions, they want partial solutions, and they shirk the positions which are supposed to be the essence of the solutions.

A New American Initiative

/Question/ Do you believe that the United States must offer new initiatives which will go beyond the Camp David framework, especially after the autonomy talks' failure to arrive at an agreement last 26 May?

/Answer/ We believe that it is necessary to go back to the former solutions which had been propounded, among which was the Geneva Conference. We also believe that the United States must not just offer initiatives but must also stand behind these initiatives and support them so that words will be matched by deeds and so that the other party will realize that pressure is being exerted on it and will respond to these solutions. Naturally the Israelis are known for retreating from promises and relationships at any moment they wish, and they have never shown that they have the honesty and real desire for sound solutions. They want peace at the expense of the Arabs and Palestinians. They want peace on the basis where the Palestinians stay in tents or scattered over the world. When the

essence of the issue is presented, that the Palestinians should return to their homeland, an independent Palestinian state should be established, and all the rights of the Palestinian peoples should be restored, we find that they draw back from all this.

/Question/ What is your view on the measures which Israel is taking on the West Bank and in occupied Arab territories in general and on current events going on there?

/Answer/ Most plainly, the Israelis are showing that they are continuing with their aspirations to expand and are continuing with their former plans, and making no effort except style. The settlements are being built, and they announce with the utmost arrogance that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. Nothing has changed in their thinking. However, the world has changed and has come to know that the Palestinian cause is more than they had known it to be in the past. It has begun to see Israeli obstinacy more than before.

As far as Jerusalem is concerned, the Israelis have declared their position clearly more than once, and that is very negative. However, the hope is that the popular movement in the West Bank will continue.

/Question/ What is Saudi Arabia's opinion about what is called the "European initiative?"

/Answer/ The kingdom's position in this regard has not yet been announced. However, I can state here that we are not dictating any solution to the Palestinians or to others. We are waiting for the parties concerned to develop an understanding of the cause and express their views so that we may express our view in accordance with what we consider will realize the Palestinians' basic interests.

/Question/ How do you evaluate Saudi-American relations?

/Answer/ I believe that Saudi-American relations are traditional relations of friendship and are good relations in which we exchange mutual interests, and we are anxious to put these relations to work in serving Arab causes and serving economic causes in general.

However, the United States has greatly failed in compelling the Israelis to accept just solutions to the Palestinian cause. Even some Americans themselves have started to recognize this and to realize that their inability to put pressure on Israel to accept just solutions is the reason for all the complications in the area, especially since the Israelis feel that they can accept what they want and reject what they want at any time. All the pressure, usually, is put on the Arab countries.

America has failed to create adequate pressure on Israel to accept just solutions, and as long as it does not take a firm position on this issue

and force Israel to accept the just solutions, it will not be able to move, because the Israelis will continue with their games and will try to gain time. It is clear that continuing this process will lead to a major catastrophe someday, because pain and anger are increasing every day in the spirits of the Palestinians and the Arabs who are witnessing their rights vanishing day after day. The Israelis are continuing to usurp the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and attack a people dispossessed from its home and even from its tents as well.

We are saying today that no one has asked that Israel be thrown into the sea, but we ask that equal rights be given to those Palestinians to establish a Palestinian state, fully regain the Palestinian people's rights, and return to their homeland.

Oil and Politics

/Question/ There is a study which Congress has made on oil in the eighties which says that it is difficult to distinguish between oil and politics. To what extent, in your opinion, does Saudi Arabia reconcile oil and politics in its relations with the West, especially the United States?

/Answer/ I believe that oil is governed by many basic factors, as regards production and price, and that it has its circumstances and its laws. The OPEC organization is the one which supervises these essential issues related to oil. Saudi Arabia is committed to OPEC's resolutions and is concerned for this commitment. Therefore, what concern production and pricing and other resolutions are matters which are adopted in accordance with economic, technological and technical factors. However, we can stress that no one can contend that it is possible to divorce oil from politics. However, we do not say that we will use oil as a weapon, though we do say that we cannot divorce oil from politics. Also, we cannot divorce oil from economics.

/Question/ There is a great deal of talk about Gulf security. Western countries talk about defending the Gulf and the need to protect it. What in your opinion are the dangers threatening the Gulf? Is Israel one of these dangers?

/Answer/ We believe that the Gulf is secure. In these circumstances there is nothing to make us feel uneasy over the future of the Gulf. The Gulf is safe and secure. Its people are doing everything they can in the context of their relations with one another and in the context of all the resources available to them to secure their domestic and foreign conditions. There is nothing to call for anxiety on the security of the Gulf. However, without a doubt, Israel is not just a danger to the Arab countries and the Gulf, Israel is a danger to the whole world, because such an inflamed situation in the area will have the effect of inflaming all problems and developing them in all directions, especially since the Israelis have proved that they consider all possible opportunities to increase anxiety and tension in the

region. Israel thinks only from the premise of its special interests. As far as the Gulf goes, I believe that every Gulf citizen has started to hear the tales and ideas which are being told about Gulf security, which point to anxiety about the destiny of the Gulf. We believe that it is secure and that the wise policy which the leaders of the Gulf states and the wisdom with which they treat their issues are making the region one of stability, especially since we are anxious to keep away from international struggles, do not interfere in anyone's affairs, and do not permit the establishment of bases of any type, so that we will not be the stage for any specific struggles. Everyone talking about dangers in the Gulf talks about fantasies more than about fact, or perhaps is talking about his hopes that this area will become an area of fear and anxiety.

The Soviet Danger

/Question/ What about the Soviet danger, on which there has been much talk in the West?

/Answer/ In any case, the Soviet danger exists. An obvious example of it is Afghanistan, which it swallowed up overnight, under the gaze of the whole world, and under the gaze of the free world, which claims that it will not accept more usurping. The Soviet danger exists, and it has existed in the past. The real danger we are facing now, which threatens the region, is the laxness of the West, its failure to bear its responsibilities toward the Soviet tide, and its permissiveness toward this Soviet tide--a danger which is causing some people to accuse the West of colluding with the Soviet Union and causing some people to believe that the West has become weak, to the point where it cannot confront the Soviet Union.

This is the real danger, because as long as the West does not take a firm, precise stand on this serious Soviet movement, the danger will be serious, because the Soviets have started to believe that they can advance, especially now that experience in Afghanistan has given them the feeling that they can confront any country at any time without any pretext.

/Question/ How do you evaluate Saudi Arabia's relations with Iran?

/Answer/ Our relations with Iran are very normal. It is an Islamic country and we are bound to it by very firm links. We have in no way accustomed ourselves to interfering in the domestic affairs of any country. We believe that every country has the right to choose the system it wants. Therefore it has not happened that any friction has occurred between the kingdom and Iran or between the kingdom and any of its neighbors. We respect the relations which bind us to them, and these are neighborly relations and deep Islamic ones.

/Question/ What about relations between Saudi Arabia and the two Yemens?

/Answer/ We aspire to good relations with our neighbors and we are anxious to extend normal bridges to them. In terms of our relations with the two Yemens, we are anxious that these normal strong good relations with them should continue. The fact is that as far as North Yemen goes there are many channels of communication through which the kingdom is anxious to have relations between the two countries and on mutual respect.

As far as South Yemen goes, we are anxious to have normal good relations based on mutual respect. There is an invitation from King Khalid to President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad to visit the kingdom, and the visit will probably be set up at any time. This visit will have an effect in consolidating relations between the two countries.

/Question/ What is Saudi Arabia's role in resolving the Lebanese crisis, especially through the quadrilateral commission?

/Answer/ Saudi Arabia has been anxious to exert all that is in its power to resolve the Lebanese crisis. We have exerted great efforts in this context. Our efforts are continuing. We are prepared to exert any effort which we believe has the possibility of restoring tranquility to Lebanon, because we are all grieved by the suffering of the Lebanese brothers and the degree to which conditions in the form we find them in now have deteriorated in Lebanon.

The kingdom will never ignore the importance of moving to restore matters to their normal state in Lebanon. His majesty King Khalid and His Highness Prince Fahd give special importance to this issue. I am fully aware that they are anxious to exert every possible effort to restore matters to their normal state. We can state that we are optimistic about a brilliant future for Lebanon this year and we hope that that will entail an end to the Lebanese tragedy.

/Question/ Information published by newspapers in the United States has appeared to the effect that Washington will revert to a policy of storing oil in the strategic oil reserve. It is well known that Saudi Arabia takes a position which is opposed to the resumption of oil storage. Is it possible to explain this matter?

/Answer/ We have always stated that our oil policy is governed by important factors, among the most prominent of which is that we produce oil in order to finance development programs in the country and to realize comfort and welfare for the citizen. We have a responsibility within OPEC, and another international responsibility as regards maintaining prices in a manner which will not lead to increased problems, especially as far as developing countries are concerned. We have borne our responsibility with complete care in this context. However, I would also like to say that we have a responsibility toward coming generations. We do not believe that

it is in our interests to produce oil in excess of our needs to be stored by other parties without justification.

We understand that we are increasing production in order to preserve specific prices and stability in the world oil market. We have done our duty most faithfully and honorably. However, without a doubt we will not agree to have oil produced in our country to be stored by another party. We have stated this clearly. One should bear in mind that we are not interfering in the domestic affairs of any country, including America or others, on its decision to store oil, but in any case we will never serve these interests.

/Question/ Reports have appeared whose gist is that Saudi Arabia will increase its oil production capacity. Is that true?

/Answer/ That is not true. We have declared that our production will be 9.5 million barrels per day and we have set that at a period of 3 months. In this regard, we make our decision every 3 months. Unless we issue a new decision on this policy, it will remain as announced. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries are countries which are concerned for moderation in oil prices. Saudi Arabia acts carefully and wisely in oil and political issues, especially in oil issues, in view of their sensitivity. I believe that we, with the other Arab countries in the Gulf, have succeeded in being moderate within the framework of the OPEC organization, in a manner which is in our mutual interest.

11887

CSO: 4802

SAUDI ARABIA

NATION PURPORTEDLY CONNECTS OIL STRATEGY TO PEACE MOVES

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 6 Jun 80 pp 18, 19

/Article by Salim Nassar: "Saudi Arabia Links Its Oil Strategy for the Eighties to the Resolution of the Middle East Crisis"/

/Text/ While the spring season in Europe has recorded the most important dates of major and minor wars over the ages, the month of June of this year, 1980, may be the most serious one, and the one most closely attached to the Middle East crisis.

This month, the heads of the European Common Market are meeting to discuss their initiative and agree over an alternative to Camp David, which may perhaps be Geneva, with the participation of the United States of the United Nations. Carter has warned against the thwarting of his initiative and has threatened to use the veto. This is the first time an American president has threatened to use this political weapon against his European allies.

He mentioned that he was compelled to adopt this decisive step in order to postpone the political resolution until the summit of industrial countries, which will be held on the 22nd of this month and will be attended by President Carter and the prime minister of Japan, alongside the leaders of the Western European countries. Since the promulgation of a European initiative, in its practical format, means the abrogation of Camp David, or a diversion from it, this decision will certainly affect his political future in the American elections, as, according to Carter's claim, it will affect the military situation in southern Lebanon, giving Israel a pretext to carry out its threats to overrun this area and clash with Syria. Therefore he intends to broadcast a declaration in principle at the Venice Conference which will spell out the bases for peace in the Middle East, in a manner transcending the Camp David framework without abrogating it.

This month the OPEC organization countries will hold a serious conference in Algeria to reunify crude oil prices and discuss a production reduction in some exporting countries. It is expected that the economic resolutions in Algeria will influence the political decisions the consuming countries

take; the opposite will also be true in the future, because there is an organic relationship between the political price the Arab producing countries demand and the economic price the Western consuming countries pay.

In June, also, the Palestine Liberation Organization will ask for the convening of an emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly in the hope of discussing the Middle East issue. Then the Iranian Parliament will also proceed to review the problem of the American hostages in the light of the recommendations presented by Austrian President Kreisky and his international socialist colleagues.

Since this month will coincide with the date for the extension or elimination of the peacekeeping forces in southern Lebanon, observers expect that Israel will intensify its raids and escalate its aggressions in order to compel this international force to withdraw, because, in its view, it has fulfilled its purpose as far as Israeli security goes and has become an obstacle obstructing a new fait accompli which "Menachem Begin" is intending to create in Lebanon.

All these important dates will coincide this month since they will be the result of final decisions in a very, very hot summer politically, economically and socially, in the United States, Europe and the Middle East countries.

Officials in Saudi Arabia expect that their attempts and efforts will reduce the heat of the political climate inside and outside the region, as the refrigeration units in Riyadh, Jiddah and other towns have helped reduce the temperature, which ranges from 104 to 113 degrees. A Swedish correspondent who visited the kingdom recently says that the air conditioners distributed throughout the towns are enough in themselves to create an iceberg as big as the one which it is mentioned will be shipped from the North Pole, the only difference being that its small pieces are spread about through the hotels, offices, homes, shops, factories, hospitals and schools. These are among the things whose effect was described by a final examination supervisor in the Saudi Ministry of Education who said that they provide a suitable climate for the more than 720,000 students who began final examinations in all stages this week.

As part of the politico-economic efforts Riyadh is making to lower the "temperature" inside and outside the area, there has been the trip Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the crown prince, made to Morocco and Algeria to mediate between King Hasan and President Chadli Benjdjedid, and there will be King Khalid's visit in the middle of the month to West Germany. It is also expected that that will be the position the minister of oil and mineral resources, Shaykh Ahmad Zaki al-Yamani, has decided to set out at the OPEC conference in Algeria.

These efforts, which lie within the framework of Arab policy opposed to the Camp David agreement, were bound to encounter opposition and distortion.

This campaign appeared clearly in a distortion of the statement Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz made to the American newspaper WASHINGTON POST, from which the part bearing on the rights of the Palestinian people, the failure of Camp David to establish a comprehensive, just peace, and the position of Arab rejection was removed. The purpose in this, as Prince Fahd said in his explanation, was to split Arab ranks and give the impression that there are two positions inside the Arab countries supporting the Baghdad and Tunis summit resolutions.

Prince Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, minister of defense and aviation, described this tendentious distortion as a continuation of the drama fabricated by the film "Death of a Princess". He means that the mixture of fantasy and hope with a few bitter facts has been turned into reality in the view of simple-minded Britishers and Americans. The newspaper WASHINGTON POST, like the majority of papers, which are dominated by Zionists, mix facts in with fraud, whitewashing and exaggeration to serve specific political aims which ultimately flow into the spring of Camp David.

The Saudis are sad that these kinds of tendentious films, statements and comments remote from the truth have been transformed into almost a political conviction on which the leaders of the White House rely in determining their relations with countries of the Middle East. That means that there is a state of affairs which they want to occur and another actual state of affairs in the context of which the region has been living for 30 years, and whenever they try to change the fixed facts so they will conform to the considerations dictated by Israel's policy toward them, they come up against an opposition, just as happened after Camp David and the events in Iran. This is a summary of what the minister of information, Muhammad 'Abduh Yamani, said in Washington when he requested the American press to commit itself more to responsibility to meanings and the facts. What is the good of publishing statements which distort the original and deceive public opinion?

Informed people in Riyadh state that the importance of the sudden visit which Prince Fahd made to Morocco and Algeria lay in the fact that it came at the time of the vacation, which directly follows the issuance of the budget. In their view, the deteriorated state of relations between the two countries compelled him to change his program and head immediately to meet King Husayn the Second and President Chedli Bendjedid. Prince Salman ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the Governor of Riyadh, was also compelled to cancel his program and go with the crown prince, in view of the importance of the discussions. Joining the delegation subsequently was the foreign minister, Prince Su'ud al-Faysal, who was delayed because of his commitment to a meeting with the foreign minister of Senegal.

An Algerian official admits that Saudi Arabia is one of the few Arab countries which can play a mediating role, in view of its good relations with Algeria and Morocco, and also that it is one of the Arab countries

which has no disputes with Arab countries which could affect the course of the mediation or face it with catastrophe.

The information which had reached Arab capitals pointed out that the stage of the dispute between the two Arab countries had reached the point of an armed clash and that there were concentrations /of troops/ Arab countries might exploit to intensify the climate of dispute between the two of them.

Other information had it that domestic problems in both countries in the form of economic and social relapses were becoming badly aggravated and that their pressures could affect the general political situation in a manner where officials considered that there would be a blatant invitation for the military to intervene and settle the deteriorating situation. The Polisario front, supported by Algeria, had expanded its military activity in a manner where it was draining Morocco's domestic forces and causing the country to turn away from economic and social development plans in order to increase the size of its arms; on the other hand, the president of Algeria, Bendjedid, felt that his powerful grip had started to weaken bit by bit after the Berber problem, fanned by Morocco, became reflect in his domestic circumstances, creating a rift in internal ranks between the proponents and opponents of Arabization. In addition to these significant social problems, negative results have emerged in all economic and industrial projects this year because of bad management in the national gas company.

All these pressing matters gave urgency to the Saudi mediation. During his recent visit to Riyadh, the Jordanian monarch alluded to the need to stop the deterioration in relations between Algeria and Morocco because his information stressed that conditions had arisen conducive to skirmishes and fighting between the two countries.

It has been learned that the talks Prince Fahd had with King Hasan and President Bendjedid concentrated on eliminating the state of tension and the need to freeze their disputes in this nervous stage through which the Arab countries were passing and strive to consider the Palestinian cause the central one to which all powers should be exclusively devoted, especially since hostile forces exist which might exploit this dispute to sow the seeds of discord and bring on a stage of armed conflict where the Arab would become a group of clashing and combating fronts, in the context of which the international conspiracy could advance itself and suspicious designs could resume--increasing rifts in the Arab ranks and leading to the loss of the central power which would guarantee a united national position.

During the four meetings between the Saudi and Moroccan delegations, it happened that King Hasan expressed his readiness to establish a constructive dialogue with President Bendjedid, provided that he be furnished a climate of sympathetic understanding which would guarantee the minimum for alleviating the intensity of the dispute over the Sahara.

Although Prince Fahd's visit to Algeria was in response to a previous invitation from President Chadli, it was devoted to mending the rift between Algeria and Morocco and delaying peripheral disputes in the context of joint Arab action.

Arab diplomats in Algeria say that the Saudi delegation defined the points of agreement King Hasan and President Bendjedid presented, in spite of all the charges the two parties had made in presenting a picture of blatant and concealed intervention. Mediation between the two /they stipulated/ should resume after translating the positions into a language which would permit mutual understanding, at which point perhaps there would be a bilateral meeting between Hasan and Bendjedid to be attended by other parties in the form of Arab world leaders before the expanded Arab summit meeting was convened in Amman.

From a review of the political situation in Morocco, it appears that King Hasan's recent statements on the Palestinian issue have been the subject of discussion. This has caused Moroccan diplomats to clarify their position anew and announce their commitment to the resolutions issued by the Rabat conference in 1974, a position subsequently emphasized in the Baghdad and Tunis conferences.

In the middle of this month the Saudi monarch, King Khalid, will make an official visit to West Germany in response to an invitation by the German chancellor Helmut Schmidt.

This visit is timed to come 2 days before the convening of the summit of major industrial countries in Venice. It is clear that Bonn will have a declared political position which is coordinated with the French one. It may be inferred, from the nature of the delegation which will accompany King Khalid, that the two parties will conduct expanded talks in the political, financial, industrial and oil spheres.

The German minister of finance, Hans Matthofer, held discussions in Riyadh last week with Minister Muhammad Aba al-Khayl dealing with economic problems and bilateral relations between the two countries. These discussions paved the way for the visit by the Saudi monarch and the delegation accompanying him with a mutual understanding which could be translated into cooperation on projects and a political position which would help bring about stability in the Near East.

Bonn's information indicates that the West German government will request the purchase of government bonds to remedy the economic deficit which arose recently from the weakness in export activity, the rise in the inflation rate and the increasing recession.

Informed sources stress that West Germany may assume Britain's role in supporting the European initiative and strengthening France's position, if Giscard D'Estaing is compelled to assume the role of modifying Resolution

242, now that Mrs Thatcher's government has hesitated to continue this activity, in response to President Carter's desire.

When the foreign minister of Britain, Lord Carrington, declared the delayed position of hesitance, he expected the Saudi government to change its decisions immediately, but he was surprised by the former rigidity and flexible diplomatic response, whose gist was that the kingdom did not want to infringe upon its commitments toward existing agreements, because that would reflect the extent to which it respected and honored all commitments it imposed upon itself before imposing them on any country cooperating with it. However, this stage will require a full review whereby Riyadh could go over all the agreements newly arrived at with the cooperation the British government and public opinion showed and the degree to which they oppose the attacks to which Saudi Arabia has been exposed in the press and television.

It appears, from the nature of these organized styles in Saudi Arabia's relations with the major industrial countries, that it has set forth a new strategy which will be more and more apparent in the future. The basis of this interaction will depend on the political position of each state and the extent to which it realizes the basic principles in the Middle East crisis, especially terminating the Israeli occupation and granting the Palestinian people the right of self-determination.

A Saudi official in Riyadh relates that during his recent visit to Washington he faced many questions from newsmen who conveyed to him the United States' fear that the oil production rate in the kingdom would drop and would return back to its previous level, and the possibility that the per-barrel price would rise above \$28.

This official relates that he noted the articles by Jack Anderson, the well known commentator, revealing that the great leap in oil prices was by the direction and demand of the American administration, specifically Nixon and Henry Kissinger, who led the Shah of Iran to believe in 1974 that Congress would not agree to his heavy armaments and that he would have to increase the per-barrel price by \$5 at a stroke to pay the price for the massive arms deal. Even though these facts appeared in White House files, Western Public opinion still holds the Arab producing states responsible for the inflation and the disruption which the world economic system is facing. One should bear in mind that Saudi Arabia was one of the very few countries which preserved the low price and prevented the price from going up to \$40 per barrel, as some OPEC states had demanded, and that Minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani saw in this provocative step by the producing countries a blow directed at the stability of the world economic order which would turn the current balance into a bad state of chaos and inflation, all adequate justifications for making enemies of the major industrial powers and inciting them to war--and perhaps occupation!

In the light of the new political and economic data, the Saudi minister of petroleum and mineral resources will announce the oil strategy his government has set out for the coming stage. This month, June, will be the time in which they will be declared, as part of the increased efforts to save energy, in terms of production and in price.

Although Minister Yamani had announced a freeze on the per-barrel price at \$28 and stated that his country would be content with a limited rise, that is, \$2, he expressed his doubt that the other countries would commit themselves to this price. Perhaps \$30 would be the level at which the per-barrel price would stabilize at the coming OPEC conference.

Officials in Riyadh say that the kingdom was compelled to increase the per-barrel price by \$2 in order firstly to keep the world price at a reasonable level and prevent the collapse of the OPEC organization, and secondly to prevent the exploitative activities which some consumer countries like Britain are carrying out. Saudi Arabia, for example, sells to Britain at a price of \$26 per barrel and Britain resells on the Rotterdam market for \$30 and more.

Some people expect that the production rate will return to the level it occupied before Saudi Arabia decided to increase it (from 8.5 million barrels a day to 9.5 million barrels). It is stated that this reduction arises from an international production increase. Britain's North Sea oil production increased in the first 3 months of 1980 (/by/ 430,000 barrels per day) and Mexico's oil output increased by 360,000 barrels per day.

The new oil strategy requires that energy be stored, retained and controlled so that it may be used in proper ways, because the increase of \$2 per barrel has given the Saudi treasury \$750 million a month. This surplus will lead to a loss if it is not invested through a carefully studied financial policy which will achieve the desired growth within controlled inflationary pressures. The minister of finance stressed that his government is anxious to support and develop the economy while preserving financial stability within what is called natural growth rates free from vicissitudes and controlled by factors of stability and firmness.

In addition to these facts, the new oil strategy will take note of political positions in dealings with other countries. This is what Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani described as the political weapon. That is, Saudi Arabia has decided that its fundamental political positions, especially /on/ the Middle East question, will also have a political price. In this case the political position will determine the nature of economic cooperation, development aid and modes of financing.

During an American economic delegation's visit to Saudi Arabia recently, it happened that one member raised the subject of commercial and economic relations with Britain. He stated in his conversation that one could not mix politics and economics.

The Saudi minister looked at him, then asked him "What do you call the decision Carter made to cancel the wheat deal with the Soviet Union as a price for the invasion of Afghanistan? At least we are still holding to our commitments and contracts which have been agreed upon."

The American interlocutor fell silent, and the meeting ended!

11357
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

ARAB LANGUAGE USE--Prince Fahd, the crown prince and first deputy prime minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, has issued an order to all governmental bodies, general organizations and companies owned by the government in the kingdom to be bound by the use of the Arabic language in correspondence, contracts, appended materials, and various documents concluded between these bodies and organizations and foreign companies. Without preventing the translation of these contracts and documents into a second foreign language which the second foreign party may wish in the contract, Prince Fahd is acting on a continuing phenomenon and the widespread use of foreign languages in the writing of contracts between official bodies in the kingdom and foreign organizations and companies. In the order he gave he relied first on the fact that the Arabic language is the official language of the country and second on the fact that contracts written in foreign languages are usually formulated to serve the interests of the foreign party upon their interpretation or translation. The new order is considered to be a confirmation of two similar decrees the Saudi Council of Ministers had previously adopted on 11 April 1959 and 13 March 1978 and an intensification of their application to prevent any violations in this regard. /Text/ /Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 7 Jun 80 p 45/ 11887

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

SEA PORT DEVELOPMENT--Khartoum, July 31, (SUNA)--Some 80% of equipment needed for development raising capacity of Port Sudan harbour has arrived Port Sudan, according to Sea Ports Corporation Board Chairman, Khalid El Sadig. The first phase of the project which costs \$22 million is being implemented according to plan, he said. The \$22 million is a loan from the World Bank. [Text] [Khartoum SUDAN NEWS AGENCY BULLETIN in English 31 Jul 80 p 2]

IRRIGATION, HYDROELECTRIC POWER--Khartoum, July 31, (SUNA)--A sum of Ls. 21,274,000 had been earmarked for the Ministry of Irrigation and Hydroelectric Power for its development projects for fiscal 1980/81. The sum will be used to consolidate Northern Province pumps, improvement of irrigation system, electrification of pump schemes, the Gash and Tokar Schemes, hydraulic experimenting centre, Rahad irrigation works, Jonglei irrigation works, Assalaya sugar project and a number of other projects. Of the total amount Ls. 5,620,000 is in local currency while the remainder is in hard currency. [Text] [Khartoum SUDAN NEWS AGENCY BULLETIN in English 31 Jul 80 p 3]

JUBA-LODWAR ROAD--Nairobi, Aug. 1, (SUNA)--An agreement effecting the granting of 27 m. Kenyan shillings for the engineering designs of the 580 km Juba-Lodwar road project was signed here yesterday. The road stretches 245km. inside Kenya and 335 km inside Sudan, "a manifest of what the OAU and the African Economic Commission have ever advocated," stressed Mr Mwai Kibaki Vice-President and Finance Minister of Kenya. Addressing the signing ceremony also, Sudan Ambassador, Sir Al Khatim Al Sanousi praised Norway contribution to the project and said the road is a further confirmation of the friendly ties that link Kenya with Sudan. Signing the agreement were Norway Ambassador to Nairobi, Sudan Ambassador here and Vice President and Finance Minister of Kenya. [Text] [Khartoum SUDAN NEWS AGENCY BULLETIN in English 1 Aug 80 p 2]

DELEGATION TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA--Khartoum, Aug. 3(SUNA)--A Sudanese delegation will leave here today for Czechoslovakia to sign for the Sudan the \$30 million third Czechoslovak loan to the country. Part of the sum will be directed to meet requirements of some development projects, the second investment programme and the provision of consumer commodities. The delegation comprises Finance and National Economy Under-Secretary Abdel Wahab Osman and representatives of the Ministries of National Planning, Cooperation, Commerce and Supply, Foreign Affairs and the Attorney General Chamber. [Text] [Khartoum SUDAN NEWS AGENCY BULLETIN in English 3 Aug 80 p 6]

CSC: 4820

FORMER LEADERS IMPLICATE AL-ASSAD IN AL-BITAR ASSASSINATION

Paris LE MONDE in French 23 Jul 80 p 5

[Article: "Six Former Syrian Leaders Accuse President Assad"]

[Text] In a communique published in Paris in the name of the "national democratic opposition" five former Syrian leaders formally charged President Hafiz al-Assad with being "directly responsible" for the assassination of Salah (al-Din) al-Bitar. The communique was signed by Gen Admin al-Hafiz, former Syrian president; Akram Hawrani (Hourani), former president of the Syrian National Assembly; Mahmud Adab Sa'id, former minister; Ahmed Muhafel, central committee member of the dissident faction of the [Syrian] Communist Party; and Ahmad Abu Salih, former minister.

Hamud al-Shufi, former Syrian ambassador to the United Nations, in his part published a communique in New York accusing President Assad of "assassinating Salah al-Bitar and thereby demonstrating his fascist and brutal character." Al-Shufi, who had been the secretary general of the Ba'th Party in 1963-1964, added: "Hafiz al-Assad now resorts to the barbarous tactic of assassinating his political adversaries, thereby demonstrating that the problems witnessed by his regime are not limited to a religious and sectarian struggle. Assad has been sustained politically and financially by the Western powers, especially the United States, which have backed his brutal and antidemocratic regime." Al-Shufi concluded his communique by inviting the American press "to put an end to its conspiracy of silence against the Syrian people."

Whereas the Damascus government and press were silent on Monday on the subject of Salah al-Bitar's assassination, the Syrian ambassador in Paris, Yusuf Shakkur, denied reports that the French authorities had supposedly notified him that they were in possession of information on the presence of "Syrian secret agents who had reportedly been charged with liquidating personalities of the [Syrian] opposition settled in France." "The French Government has not taken any steps in this connection," Yusuf Shakkur asserted before continuing: "Salah al-Bitar's criticisms of Syrian policy

could not be considered as a serious threat to Syria because they were not credible." After expressing his "sorrow," President Assad's representative asserted that "the harm which such an assassination can cause Syria is much greater than that caused by what Salah al-Bitar may have written."

The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to make any statement on the reports circulated by the Iraqi press agency. The latter also paid glowing homage to Salah al-Bitar, characterized as a "martyr of Arabism."

The news of the assassination of the former Syrian prime minister aroused strong emotion in all the countries of the Persian Gulf where Salah al-Bitar had numerous partisans and friends. It is thanks to them, it is said, that Bitar financed the review that he published in Paris, AL-INHIA AL'ARABI.

Finally, in Paris the ASFA (Association of French-Arab Solidarity) stated its "profound emotion" in its communique. It "recalled once more that nothing justifies such actions in France and firmly condemns the perpetrators of political assassinations whoever their instigators, who cannot but discredit both the Arab cause and French-Arab relations."

2662

CSO: 4800

INTERVIEWS WITH MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD MEMBERS

Yusuf Ahmad 'Ubayd Interviewed

JN081103 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0515 GMT 8 Aug 80

[Text] The Syrian Television Network last night interviewed the so-called Yusuf Ahmad 'Ubayd, member of the Muslim Brotherhood gang.

During the interview, 'Ubayd admitted that he had personally participated in shooting Qadi 'Adil Mimi and in assassinating Dr Mahmud Khalil Hada. He now strongly denounced and condemned these acts. He pointed out that the organization receives instructions and orders from outside with the aim of sowing sedition and creating dissension.

Referring to the motives of this organization in seeking to undermine the public institutions, he explained that the organization leadership has always opposed these institutions and their socialist objectives. We--the organization--are against any step along the path of socialism.

The so-called Yusuf Ahmad 'Ubayd added: There is no legal justification for attacking any economic institution in Syria. He explained that the enemies are the sole beneficiary of sabotage of the country's economy and of dismemberment of the national unity, and that the homeland and the people are the sole losers.

In conclusion he called upon the Muslim Brotherhood elements to reconsider their stand and to seize the opportunity given them under Law No 49, which, he added, demonstrates the officials' wisdom, leniency and affection.

He urged the organization's elements to take advantage of this law. He added: There has been enough bloodshed and destruction. This is a good opportunity to solve all these matters at their roots. He said: I wish that my brothers would take care of their homes and put aside their grudges because it was these grudges and false propaganda spread by ill-intentioned people that prompted our actions.

He concluded his interview by quoting the Koran: And fear tumult or oppression, which affecteth not only those of you who do wrong: And know that God is strict in punishment. [Koranic verse]

Muslim Brotherhood Members in Amman

JN081106 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 2115 GMT 7 Aug 80

["Text" of televised interview with Yusuf Ahmad 'Ubayd, member of Muslim Brotherhood Organization--date not given--recorded]

[Excerpts] [Question] Would you first introduce yourself?

[Answer] In the name of God, the merciful the compassionate. My name is Yusuf Ahmad 'Ubayd, born in 1951. I graduated as an agricultural engineer and worked for [words indistinct]. I am single.

[Question] When did you join the Muslim Brotherhood Organization and what were your responsibilities since you joined the organization and until your detention?

[Answer] I joined the organization in 1977. Later, I was promoted to the rank of official in charge of the Muslim Brotherhood's military branch in Damascus. At one point I turned down the command's request to send me groups from the north. Also, the brothers in Amman told me that they would provide me with a large sum of money.

[Question] Do you know them?

[Answer] Brothers.

[Question] Did they contact you directly or via your command?

[Answer] They contacted me directly, in my capacity as the official in charge of the military branch in Damascus. They did not know my name. I turned down their offer. I asked myself: Why haven't they sent the money to the command? They should contact the command. This raised doubts in me. This also shows that the command is engulfed in confusion.

CSO: 4802

FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY RELATIONS WITH TUNISIA CLARIFIED

Paris LE MONDE in French 21 Aug 80 p 5

[Text] The French Socialist Party (PS) has asked us to note the following concerning an article dealing with improvement of its relations with Tunisia's Destourian Socialist Party (PSD) (LE MONDE, 7 August): "It was on the initiative of the PS that relations between the PSD and PS had been strained by virtue of the regime's growing authoritarianism. In the wake of the events of January 1978, ties were severed. The PS has maintained regular relations with Tunisian opposition forces, the Popular Unity Movement (MUP) in particular, and has supported the latter's request for membership in the Socialist International.

"The Socialist Party has always wished for the democratization of political life in Tunisia. Therefore it is closely following the change that seems to be taking shape in that country over the past several weeks. And if it should be decided one day to resume relations with the PSD, that could come about only after a political analysis has been made, and through the leadership of the Socialist Party, not through individual endeavors."

CSO: 4400

TUNISIA

UGTT CONGRESS SCHEDULED FOR 1981

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 29 Jul 80 p 4

[Article: "Meeting of the UGTT Administrative Commission"]

[Text] On Sunday night Tijani Abid, secretary general of UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor], presided at the periodical meeting of the administrative commission of UGTT held at the Amilcar hotel.

On this occasion Tijani Abid analyzed the terms of the operation which the directorship of the federation has assumed, and which it continues to assume, from the time it took the destinies of the UGTT in hand in February 1978, and he also reviewed all the important gains acquired for the benefit of the workers during the last 2 years in all fields due to the policy of dialog and planning and in the framework of social peace.

Recalling the wave of anarchic strikes which recently affected many of the country's enterprises, the secretary general of the UGTT affirmed that these strikes are incited by people who have been rejected by the officials of the trade union and who, spitefully, find nothing better to do but to "fabricate" artificial crises and plot behind the scenes for the purpose of breaking up the ranks of the workers and achieve their political ambitions by being prejudicial to the interests of the working classes and the gains of the Bourguiba regime. In this connection he has called upon the union nuclei to remain vigilant and to continue their sound actions by avoiding excesses and extremism for the good of the Tunisian workers and the entire nation.

Tijani Abid later defined the nature of the bonds uniting the UGTT and the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] and certified that the question is not the relation between the ruler and the ruled, but on the contrary a question of mutual relations for cooperation, solidarity and understanding which were forged during the struggle for national liberation.

Speaking of UGTT relations under the international plan, the secretary general of the union federation announced that it is anticipated that the OATUU [Organization of African Trade Union Unity] will hold its congress in Tunis at the end of this year. He also mentioned that an agreement was concluded recently between UGTT and the Union of Moroccan Workers for the purpose of exchanging delegations and visits and coordinating their efforts on the dual African and worldwide plan.

Moreover Abid alluded to the problem of prices and declared that UGTT did its best to maintain price stability in order to preserve the purchasing power of the worker and he was happy with the measures taken by the government in this connection.

At the conclusion of its work the administrative commission decided to convene the next UGTT regular session of congress during the first semester of 1981. The Executive Bureau will be called to set an exact date during the first months of next year.

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